1 Annual Philosophical Lecture, British Academy. London: Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 4. I might also have taken as my text the following statement: ‘But we have moral rules and principles and indeed the institution of morality itself, primarily or at least importantly, to adjudicate in a fair manner conflicts of interest.’ Nielsen, Kai, ‘Alienation and Self-Realization’, Philosophy 48, No. 183 (01 1973), p. 30.
2 See ‘Moral Arguments’, Mind 67 (1958), as reprinted in Thomson, J. J. and Dworkin, G., Ethics, New York: Harper and Row, 1968, p. 19. My italics.
3 Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives', Philosophical Review 81 (1972), pp. 305–316.
4 It is interesting to notice that both she and S. N. Hampshire, a formalist, seem to build a prohibition of killing human beings into the definition of morality. See Hampshire, , ‘Morality and Pessimism’, New York Review of Books, 01 25, 1973, pp. 26–33.
5 See Normative Discourse, Englewood Cliffs, N.H.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1961, pp. 107f, 279–286.
6 I assume that Mrs Foot still holds that only certain sorts of things count as dangers or benefits. See ‘Moral Beliefs’, in Thomson, and Dworkin, , Ethics, especially pp. 245–253.
7 See Findlay, J. N., ‘Morality as Convention’, Mind 53 (1944), pp. 142–169; and Warnock, G. J., The Object of Morality, London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1971, pp. 10–16.
8 For Aristotle, see Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 4–5.
10 Op. cit., p. 21. Strictly, one should also distinguish between moral action and moral evaluation. They might have different objects, if they have objects.
11 Actually, if one reads that paper by itself, it is not entirely clear that she is proposing this. See pp. 307–309, 310f, 315. She even says that the amoral man who does not care about suffering and injustice ‘will recognize in the statement that one ought to care about these things a correct application of the non-hypothetical moral “ought” by which society is apt to voice its demands’ (p. 315).