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Principles of Morality1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Extract

When we first begin to reflect about conduct in a philosophical way? whether as philosophers or not, we look for general truths, fundamental principles. Our acceptances and rejections, preferences, commendations and disgusts, seem at the start chaotic and unsystematic, and we hope to reduce them to order—to show that there are general principles by reference to which all our varied acts, admirations and decisions can be understood and justified. The number of such principles should for choice be small. Ideally, we think, it should be possible to present our progress through life not as a thing of fits and starts, of zig–zags, gestures and recoils, but as aimed in a single uniform direction. If we esteem some things above others, praise some men, commend some deeds, admire some paintings this should be (according to the ideal) because in each case the Supreme Value or Ultimate Good finds expression in the esteemed, praised, commended or admired thing, man, deed or picture. We hope to find a single standard by coming up to or falling short of which things of all sorts will earn the prizes or rebukes they deserve.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1956

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References

page 151 note 1 Mr. Thomas is at present Director of the National Gallery of Western Australia. His unpublished thesis on this subject is full of illuminating suggestions of this sort, but it had the ill–fortune to be adjudicated on by teachers of English, not by philosophers.