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On Two Points Against Wittgensteinian Fideism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

W. D. Hudson
W. D. Hudson
Affiliation:
University of Exeter
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Abstract

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Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy , Volume 43 , Issue 165 , July 1968 , pp. 269 - 273
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1968

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References

1 I have argued myself that God cannot intelligibly be spoken of as a person (in a article on Transcendence in Theology, 03, 1966)Google Scholar. And on the latter concession and claim, cf. A. MacIntyre's remark: ‘Religious believers do know what would have to occur for their belifs to be falsified—they can specify some occurrences with which the existence of omnipotent benevolence is incompatible (“utterly pointless evil” is one commonly used example)’ (in ‘Is Understanding Religion Compatible With Believing?’ Faith and The Philosophers, edited by Hick, John, (London, 1964), p. 130.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 I attempt an argument to this effect in my small book, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Bearing of his Philosophy upon Religious Belif (Lutterworth, London, 1968), pp. 62ff.Google Scholar