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A Logical Limitation On Determinism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Bernard Mayo
Affiliation:
University of Birmingham

Extract

I begin with some elementary observations about assertion. In spite of recent criticisms of philosophers who have been too ready to take the subject-predicate indicative sentence as the standard form of assertion, there is no doubt that this form of sentence does represent something very fundamental about assertion. To put the matter in a rough-and-ready way: if we are to assert anything at all, it seems obvious that we must first draw our listener's attention to something that we propose to talk about, and then, when we have secured his attention, go on to say something about that to which we have drawn attention.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1958

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