Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home

Fixing Reference By Imogen Dickie Oxford University Press, 2015, pp.288, £37.50 ISBN 978-0-19-875561-6.

  • Nicholas K. Jones

Abstract

  • An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided below. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.

Copyright

Corresponding author

References

Hide All

1 The relevant states are restricted in at least three respects. (1) They are all beliefs. (2) Their referents are all ordinary objects, i.e. roughly: space-filling, causally unified, macroscopic individuals. (3) They all predicate one monadic property of one object, unlike relational and logically complex beliefs.

2 I follow Dickie's notation in using angle brackets to denote constituents of mental states, so that, e.g., ‘<F>’ denotes a concept representing the property F.

3 A complication: demonstratives, names, and descriptive names are linguistic entities, not constituents of mental states like beliefs. Those states are, however, correctly reportable using demonstratives, names, and descriptive names. Dickie hypothesises that distinct kinds of belief correspond to these distinct kinds of linguistic expression.

4 Several refinements and precisifications of this idea are discussed in chapter 2.

5 This is an adaptation of Dickie's official formulation on page 94.

6 This is an adaptation of Dickie's official formulation on page 102.

7 (D*) is an adaptation of Dickie's principle 4 on page 129.

Fixing Reference By Imogen Dickie Oxford University Press, 2015, pp.288, £37.50 ISBN 978-0-19-875561-6.

  • Nicholas K. Jones

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between <date>. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed.