1 Harré, ‘Behind the Mereological Fallacy’, Philosophy85 (2012), 352.
2Bennett, M. R. and Hacker, P. M. S., Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (Blackwell, Oxford, 2003), 73.
3Searle, J. R., ‘Putting Consciousness back in the Brain: Reply to Bennett and Hacker’, in Bennett, M., Dennett, D., Hacker, P. and Searle, J., Neuroscience and Philosophy: Mind, Brain, and Language (Columbia University Press, New York, 2007), 107.
4 We replied in Neuroscience and Philosophy, 133–5.
5The Physical Basis of Mind, 441.
6 I have elaborated this distinction, which is crucial for the resolution of the mind/body problem, in Human Nature: the Categorial Framework (Blackwell, Oxford, 2007), ch. 9.
7 ‘Behind the Mereological Fallacy’, 338.
8 ‘Behind the Mereological Fallacy’, 350.
9 Rather surprisingly, Harré says that organs are substances (337). But this is mistaken. A functional part of a living substance is not itself a substance. For elaboration, see Human Nature: the Categorial Framework, 42–5.
10 See von Wright, G. H., The Varieties of Goodness (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963), III – 8.
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