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A Comment on Some of Sir Francis Galton's Observations and Inferences with Regard to Free-Will

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

E. G. Reeve
Affiliation:
Croydon, Surrey

Extract

Sir Francis Galton writes:

“Those who find a difficulty in understanding how a feebly felt mental action can vanquish a strong desire, will find the difficulty vanish if they consent to assume a physiological and not a psychical standpoint. The gain is as great as viewing the planetary system after the fashion of Copernicus, instead of that of Ptolemy. There is nothing contrary to experience in supposing that conflicting physiological actions may be perceived with a distinctness quite disproportionate to their real efficacy. We may compare the conflict between faintly perceived activities of one kind and clearly perceived activities of another kind, to that between troops dressed in a uniform scarcely distinguishable from the background with others clad in staring scarlet. We must be content to admit that our consciousness has a very inexact cognisance of the physiological battles in our brain, and that the mystery why apparently weak motives of one class should invariably get the better of apparently strong motives of another class, lies wholly in the word ‘apparently’. In short, that the appearances of their relative strength are deceptive”.

Type
Discussion
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1971

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References

1 SirGalton, Francis, F.R.S., Free-Will—Observations and Inferences”. “Mind”. Vol. IX, 1848.Google Scholar

2 Kant. “Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals”. Trans. T. K. Abbott, together with the “Critique of Practical Reason”, Longmans Green, 1954. (Second Section, paragraph 8.)

3 “The statement, however, that man is noumenally free and empirically determined in regard to the very same actions is a hard saying. But it is one which, given his premises, Kant cannot avoid”. A History of Philosophy, Vol. 6, p. 336. Burns and Oates, 1969.