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Henderson on Meta-Induction and the Problem of Induction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 August 2023

Gerhard Schurz Open the ORCID record for Gerhard Schurz [Opens in a new window]
Gerhard Schurz*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Heinrich Heine University Duesseldorf, Duesseldorf, Germany.
*
Email: schurz@hhu.de
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Abstract

This note presents a short reply to Henderson’s critical discussion of Schurz’s approach to the problem of induction based on the optimality of meta-induction. Henderson objects that the meta-inductive a posteriori justification of object-induction rests on a certain premise—namely, an approximation condition—that she reveals as untenable. I reply that Henderson’s approximation condition is indeed too strong to be plausible, but it is not needed by the meta-inductive approach; a much weaker and highly plausible approximation condition is sufficient.

Type
Discussion Note
Information
Philosophy of Science , First View , pp. 1 - 6
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

Henderson, Leah. 2023. “Crossing Levels: Meta-Induction and the Problem of Induction.” Philosophy of Science 90 (4): 985–993. https://doi:10.1017/psa.2023.2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schurz, Gerhard. 2019. Hume’s Problem Solved: The Optimality of Meta-Induction. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schurz, Gerhard. 2024. Optimality Justifications: New Foundations for Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar