^{page 245 note 1} I Cor. iii. 1–3 makes it clear that the Corinthians were not τέλτεıοı because they lacked άγάπη which Paul later was to term the στύνδεσμος τ⋯ς τελεıος (Col. iii.14). For εΰξıς as practice (or perhaps the familiarity that results from it) cf. Sirach proleg. 9; for δıάκρıσıς as moral discernment Epict. 1, 20, 10, I Cor. xii. I; and for αισθητήρıα as ‘faculties’ LXX Jer iv. 19.

^{page 245 note 2} Having made δικαιοσύνης a doctrine Spicq is obliged to make διάκρισις doctrinal discernment—between the old covenant and the new. Yet while the one is ‘better’ than the other it is inconceivable that the two should be contrasted as good and evil.

^{page 245 note 3} Polycarp (ad Philipp. 9) understood the phrase in this sense.

^{page 245 note 4} Moffatt comes nearest to this meaning with his ‘moral truth’.

^{page 245 note 5} The words used by Knox in his translation.

^{page 246 note 1} De Congr. 9–19 (Loeb. ed), De Cher. 105, De Agr. 18.

^{page 246 note 2} De Agr. 158–62, De Congr. 19, De Sobr. 9–11 (Those at the first stage are called νέπιοι because of their Tò τ⋯ς διανοìας άλóγιστον).

^{page 246 note 3} De Congr. 22–3, De Migr. Abr. 26–30 (Such wisdom is τ⋯ν φιλαρέτων ψυχ⋯ν ένδιαìτημα and constitutes both their ‘inheritance’ and their ‘rest’.) A little later on (35) Philo tells how he himself received this highest wisdom as a gift from God. His experience had two dominant characteristics. It was ecstatic (ώς ύπò κατοχ⋯ς ένθέου) and it yielded a vision that he describes as φωτòς άπóλαυσιν, óξυδερκεστάτην óψιν

^{page 247 note 1} Philosophical instruction, while in the main ethical, also includes the elements of theology. II, 14, 9–13 (Loeb ed.).

^{page 247 note 2} II, 9, 13 and 16, 4.

^{page 247 note 3} II, 19, 14–19.

^{page 247 note 4} II, 23, 36–47.

^{page 247 note 5} III, 15, 12–13 and 19, 6; also II, 16, 40–7.

^{page 247 note 6} This process of re-enaction is admirably described by Seneca, Epist. 33, where he says that the memorization of maxims is a task for children. The adult who is making progress should make such maxims and not memorize them (dicat ista, non teneat). For the Stoic this second stage was an essentially creative, or rather recreative, one.

^{page 248 note 1} The violence of διó can hardly be explained by conveniently assuming a ‘break in dictation’ at υ. 14. Even if there had been a break (which is intrinsically improbable) one would have expected an adversative particle or, at the most, μέν ουτν. Evidently the author wrote to shock. Would that not in itself be a minor way of pricking lethargy?

^{page 248 note 2} The Epistle to the Hebrews (I.C.C.), p. 73.

^{page 248 note 3} πìστεως έπì Θεóν. Even this is unpromising. For, while it is unwise in general to expect subtlety from prepositions in Hellenistic Greek, Westcott is probably right in saying that έπì here indicates an ‘external relationship’.

^{page 249 note 1} ii, 1, 3; v. 11; vi. 12.

^{page 249 note 2} As Aristotle observed (Nic. Eth. VI, 8, 5; VII, 3, 8).

^{page 249 note 3} vi. 4–8; x. 26–31.

^{page 249 note 4} ix. 27–8; x. 25.

^{page 249 note 5} xii. 2, where the secondary meaning ‘founder’ would be especially appropriate if there is a reference to the άρχή–θεμέλιος of this section.

^{page 249 note 6} xi. 10. The author was clearly familiar with Paul's Corinthian letters; and there the θεμέλιος is said to be Christ himself (I Cor. iii. 11).

^{page 249 note 7} xi, 1.

^{page 249 note 8} ii. 10; v. 9; x. 14; xii. 2 (iii. 14).

^{page 249 note 9} xii. 9–11.

^{page 250 note 1} Nearly the same is true of the cognate verbs. θε⋯σθαι does not occur at all, θεωρειν only once (quite non-significantly) and λινώσκειν only once significantly (x. 34), apart from two O.T. citations. (έπìγνωσις occurs once, x. 26, but with reference to truth that the ‘Hebrews’ have already gained.) The omission of σοφìα is striking since in all our relevant sources it is the name given to the illumination reserved for τέλειοι (Wisd. ix. 6, Philo, De Mig. Abr. 46, and Paul, I Cor. ii. 6–7 where it is coupled with μνστήριον).

^{page 250 note 2} φωτìʒειν may seem an exception. But the word is often used of divine illumination in the LXX; e.g. Ps. CXVIII (CXIX), CXXX where God is said to enlighten νήπιοι. The writer prefers to express the Christian's relationship with God and Christ either by words that do not specify the form of know-ledge (e.g. βλέπειν instead of θεωρειν or θεάσθαι) or by words that have no cognitional associations at all (e.g. προσέρχεσθαι—seven times).

^{page 251 note 1} To see how far Hebrews is from anything that can be called gnosticism one need only glance at the quotations from this section in Clement and Origen who equate the θaiAtos with Greek philosophy and the στερεά τροφή with the θεια σοφια, the unwritten γνωστıκή παράδοσıς that the Apostle committed to a spiritual élite. (Clem. Strom. V. 10, VI. 8 and Origen Contra Celsum, VI. 13).

^{page 251 note 2} L'Epitre aux Hébreux, I, p. 7.

^{page 251 note 3} The Epistle to the Hebrews, passim.

^{page 252 note 1} In the only place where Philo uses the phrase ‘eternal life’ he defines it as ‘flight to the Absolute’ —ή πρòς τò òν καταφυγή (De Fuga, 78). The point is noted by Dodd, N.T.S. II, p. 161.

^{page 252 note 2} i. 2.

^{page 252 note 3} vi. 20; x. 20.

^{page 252 note 4} xii. 22 and xiii. 14.

^{page 252 note 5} x. 14.

^{page 252 note 6} iv. 14.

^{page 253 note 1} See Michel (with authorities quoted) Th. W. N. T. v, p. 216.

^{page 253 note 2} iii. 1.

^{page 253 note 3} iv. 14.

^{page 253 note 4} x. 23. Whenever Christians confess Christ they confess the hope that he inspires.

^{page 253 note 5} xi. 13.