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Memories of Nations and States: Institutional History and National Identity in Post-Soviet Eurasia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2018

Rawi Abdelal*
Affiliation:
Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, U.S.A.

Extract

The national identities of post-Soviet societies profoundly influenced the politics and economics of Eurasia during the 1990s. These identities varied along two distinct but related dimensions: their content and contestation. Nationalist movements throughout post-Soviet Eurasia invoked their nations in support of specific purposes, which frequently cast Russia as the nation's most important “other” and the state from which autonomy and security must be sought. Nationalists therefore offered specific proposals for the content of their societies’ collective identities. But not everyone in these societies shared the priorities of their nationalist movements. Indeed, the international relations among post-Soviet states often revolved around one central question: did post-Soviet societies and politicians agree with their nationalists or not? The former Communists played a decisive role in contesting the content of national identity. One of the defining differences among post-Soviet states during the 1990s was the political and ideological relationship in each one between the formerly Communist elites and the nationalists—whether the former Communists marginalized the nationalists, arrested them, coopted them, bargained with them, or even tried to become like them. These different relationships revealed different degrees and kinds of societal consensus about national identity after Soviet rule.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © 2002 Association for the Study of Nationalities 

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References

Notes

* The research for this paper was supported by a fellowship for East European Studies from the American Council of Learned Societies, a fellowship from the Institute for the Study of World Politics, and the Division of Research at Harvard Business School. For comments on successive versions of these arguments, I am grateful to Valerie Bunce, Matthew Evangelista, Peter Katzenstein, Jonathan Kirshner, Adam Segal, and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss.Google Scholar

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