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12. Yugoslavia was a federal state consisting of six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia) and two autonomous provinces on the territory of the Republic of Serbia (Kosovo and Vojvodina). Of 23.69 million people there were 8.14 million Serbs, 4.43 million Croats, 1.75 million Slovenes, 1.73 million Albanians, 1.34 million Macedonians, and around 300,000 declared as “Yugoslavs” and numerous other minorities.Google Scholar

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34. Bosnia's Muslim led Government—the only side that issued statistics of casualties during this war—estimates that more than 150,000 of its citizens were killed or have disappeared during the past four years or are missing. Although this number is often quoted by international authorities, many suspect that the figure is inflated and that the actual number of casualties may have reached only 3,500. Time, 4 December 1995, p. 22.Google Scholar

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40. UNPAs are areas on the territory of the Republic of Croatia in which Serbs constitute the majority or a substantial minority of the population and where intercommunal tensions have led to armed conflict. The Security Council considered that special interim arrangements were required for the three UNPAs (Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia and Krajina) divided into four sectors: East (Eastern Slavonia, which includes Baranja and Western Srem), North (the northern part of the Krajina UNPA), South (the southern part of the Krajina UNPA) and West (Western Slavonia).Google Scholar

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