Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-x4r87 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-26T21:15:26.628Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Greater Serbia: A New Reality in the Balkans

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2018

Reneo Lukic
Reneo Lukic*
Affiliation:
Emory University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

“We Serbs must militarily defeat our enemies and conquer the territories we need.”

Vojislav Maksimovic, Member

Bosnian Serb Parliament

“I don't see what's wrong with Greater Serbia. There's nothing wrong with a greater Germany, or with Great Britain.”

Bosnian Serb Leader

Radovan Karadžić

The break-up of Yugoslavia has come about as a result of national, economic and political conflicts which by the end of 1987 had taken on unprecedented dimensions. At that point, latent political conflicts between various republics came into the open. More specifically, the conflict between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo had turned into a low-intensity war. Under Slobodan Miloševićs leadership in Serbia, the Serbo-Slovenian conflict over Kosovo deepened, forcing other republics and provinces to take sides. The Slovenian leadership opposed a military solution to the Serbo-Albanian conflict in Kosovo. By 1990 the Serbo-Slovenian conflict had spilled over into Croatia, completely polarizing the Yugoslav political elite into two distinct camps; one encompassed Slovenia and Croatia, the other Serbia and Montenegro, with Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina playing the role of unsuccessful mediators.

Type
I Eastern Europe Reconsidered
Information
Nationalities Papers , Volume 22 , Issue 1: Special Issue - Ethnopolitics in Poland , Spring 1994 , pp. 49 - 70
Copyright
Copyright © 1994 Association for the Study of Nationalities of Eastern Europe and ex-USSR 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Note

1. Quoted by Maass, Peter, “Bosnian Serbs Bar U.N. Peace Plan,” The Washington Post, April 3 1993, A.17.Google Scholar

2. Quoted by Maass, Peter, “A Springtime of No Hope,” The Washington Post, April 5, 1993. A.15.Google Scholar

3. “Milošević on New Constitution,” FBIS-EEU-90–123, June 23, 1990, p. 51.Google Scholar

4. Masnak, Tomaz, “Yugoslavia—And is no more,” East European Reporter, January-February 1992, Vol. 5, number 1, p. 4.Google Scholar

5. Pucko, Stane, “Nema nade za savezne amandmane” (“There is no hope for amending the federal Constitution”), Vjesnik, Zagreb, August 29, 1990.Google Scholar

6. “Nacionalni sastav stanovnistva,” (National composition of the population). Jugoslavenski pregled, no. 1, 1992, (Beograd), p. 6.Google Scholar

7. “Trinaest na mala vrata,” (Thirteen on the back door), Novi Danas, August 14, 1992, (Zagreb). p. 30.Google Scholar

8. Zerjavic, Vladimir, “Srbi u gradove,” (Serbs go to the cities), Novi Vjesnik, (Zagreb), August 8, 1992.Google Scholar

9. “Deklaracija HAZU o hrvatskom nacionalnom interesu,” (Declaration of the Croatian Academy of the Art and Science about Croatian national interest), Vjesnik, (Zagreb), November 14, 1991.Google Scholar

10. During the Second World War, the Ustashe government in Croatia committed atrocities against the Serbian population living in the region. The number of Serbs killed is the subject of much contention. Yugoslav authorities maintained that close to 700,000 Serbs were victims of the Ustashe regime. Many Serbian historians continue to cite these numbers, while many Croatian historians have asserted that the actual toll was closer to 70,000. See, for example, yubo Boban, “Jasenovac and the Manipulation of History,” East European Politics and Societies (Fall 1990) pp. 580–92. The claims against President Tudjman have been fervently denied by both Tudjman and his supporters, who point to the facts that he himself fought during the war as a partisan in Tito's army.Google Scholar

11. Interview with Stipe Mesić. Danas, (Zagreb), August 27, 1990, p. 12.Google Scholar

12. Vasić, Miloš, “Put u pakao,” (Road to the hell), Vreme, (Beograd), August 26, 1991, p. 20.Google Scholar

13. Quoted by Vasić, Miloš, “Put u pakao,” (Road to hell), p. 20.Google Scholar

14. Ibid., p. 20.Google Scholar

15. “A Confederal Model Among the South Slavic States,” Review of International Affairs, (Belgrade) No. 973 (October 20, 1990) pp. 11–22.Google Scholar

16. “A Concept for the Constitutional System of Yugoslavia on a Federal Basis,” Review of International Affairs, (Belgrade) No. 974, (November 5, 1990) pp. 15–18.Google Scholar

17. “Draft Contents of the Most Essential Relationships in the Yugoslav State Community,” Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), No. 982 (March 5, 1991), pp. 15–18.Google Scholar

18. “88.5 percent of Slovenia's 2.1 million people opted for the independence of Slovenia.” Le Monde, December 28, 1990.Google Scholar

19. Tudjman, Franjo, “Republika Hrvatska proglašava se samostalna i suverena država” (“Republic of Croatia proclaims itself independent and a sovereign state”), Glasnik, Hrvatski politički bednik, Zagreb. No 61, June 28, 1991, p. 4.Google Scholar

20. Fontaine, André, “Le cauchemar Yougoslav,” I, II, Le Monde, June 20, 1992, and June 21/22, 1992.Google Scholar

21. Reneo Lukic, “Twilight of the Federations in East Central Europe and the Soviet Union,” Journal of International Affairs, Winter 1992, Vol. 45, no. 2.Google Scholar

22. On August 1, 1991, President Bush in his Kiev speech sharply criticized, without naming them, the political leaders in the former USSR for the disintegration of the USSR and the creation of the nation-states. See Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 27. no. 26 (Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC), July–Sept. 1991, p. 1094.Google Scholar

23. For details see the article by David Binder, “Eagleburger Anguishes over Yugoslav Upheaval,” The New York Times, June 19, 1992. See also the article by Patrick Glynn “Yugo blunder,” The New Republic, February 24, 1992. About the role of Mr. Eagleburger in the Yugoslav crisis, Glynn wrote: “Throughout 1990 and 1991 Eagleburger consistently opposed measures that might undercut Yugoslavian unity—or penalize the Serbian republic.” p. 16.Google Scholar

24. House Banking Committee Chairman Henry B. Gonzales (D-Tex.) said that Mr. Eagleburger and Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL), were “instrumental in helping facilitate imports of Yugoslavian Yugo automobiles.” Quoted by Guy Gugliotta; “Bush, others said to have repeatedly pressed the Bank to Aid Iraq,” The Washington Post, February 25, 1992.Google Scholar

25. R.W. Apple, Jr., “Baker aide asks War crimes inquiry into Bosnia Camps,” The New York Times, August 6, 1992.Google Scholar

26. Only 5 percent of all the Yugoslav citizens in the 1981 census declared themselves members of the Yugoslav nation. The other 95 percent listed their nationalities as Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Albanian, etc. The total population of Yugoslavia was then about 23 million.Google Scholar

27. NIN, Beograd, August 3, 1990, pp. 13–15.Google Scholar

28. Chuck Sudetic, “Financial Scandal Rocks Yugoslavia,” The New York Times, January 10, 1992.Google Scholar

29. Ustav Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije, Uvodni Deo, Osnovna Nacela, 1974, Savremena Administracija, Beograd 1974, pp. 37–38. See also articles 1 and 3, pp. 57–58.Google Scholar

30. See Interview with Milan Kučan, “Nisam za vojnu intervenciju” (“I am not for military intervention”), Novi Danas, Zagreb, No. 2, July 6, 1992. p. 24.Google Scholar

31. FBIS-EEU-91–190, October 1, 1991, p. 53.Google Scholar

32. The New York Times, October 8, 1991. A3.Google Scholar

33. Chuck Sudetic, “Yugoslav Breakup Gains Momentum,” The New York Times, December 21, 1991.Google Scholar

34. Financial Times, July 1, 1991, p. 3.Google Scholar

35. See Interview with Milan Kucan, ibid., p. 22.Google Scholar

36. Danas, Zagreb, July 2, 1991, p. 48.Google Scholar

37. Danas, Zagreb, October 1st, 1991, p. 40.Google Scholar

38. The New York Times, July 3, 1991, p. A6.Google Scholar

39. Blaine Harden, “Fighting Escalates Across Croatia As Sides Discuss Cease Fire Terms.” The Washington Post, October 6, 1991.Google Scholar

40. “Vjerujem u su~ivot Srba i Hrvata,” (I Believe in the Coexistence of Serbs and Croats), Vjesnik, (Zagreb), February 2, 1992, p. 12. [emphasis added].Google Scholar

41. In the presence of the EC “troika” (foreign affairs ministers of Luxembourg, Italy and Holland), all the republics, the Yugoslav government and the Presidency accepted EC's guarantee, a three-month moratorium on decisions regarding Slovenian and Croatian independence, during which an agreement on the future of the Yugoslav republics was broken.Google Scholar

42. Slobodan Milošević, Godine raspleta (“Years of Denoument”), Belgrade: BIGZ, 1989.Google Scholar

43. Montenegrinian reservists and irregulars participated in the shelling of the Croatian town of Dubrovnik. Though Dubrovnik never fell, it was badly damaged. More than 40,000 rounds of artillery had been fired at the city and its suburbs, destroying more than 3,000 residences and damaging 5,500 buildings. See Michael T. Kaufman: “The Walls and the Will of Dubrovnik,” The New York Times, July 15, 1992, p. A6.Google Scholar

44. Quoted by Maas, Peter; “Uneasy Rest the New Serb Rulers of Bosnia,” The Washington Post, September 17, 1992. p. A33.Google Scholar

45. Srpska Akademija Nauka i Umetnosti Srpskom narodu (“Serbian Academy of Art and Science to the Serbian People”), American Serbian Heritage Foundation, 1986, Los Angeles, California, p. 74.Google Scholar

46. Ibid., p. 62.Google Scholar

47. Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its sovereignty only on October 15, 1991. “Memorandum on Sovereignty” was adopted by Muslim Slavs and Croatian legislators after 73 Serbian delegates walked out from the Parliament. See The Washington Post, October 16, 1991, p. A29.Google Scholar

48. It is important to note that in the regions of Slavonija (Osijek, Vukovar) and Baranja which were the theaters of the worst fighting in the Serbo-Croatian war, only 18.49 percent of the population are Serbs. See “Declaracija HAZU …” Vjesnik, Zagreb, November 14, 1991.Google Scholar

49. Sudetic, Chuck, “Fighting in Croatia Threatens Truce,” The New York Times, August 20, 1991.Google Scholar

50. UPI dispatch, written by Jonathan S. Landay, December 2, 1991.Google Scholar

51. van Houten, Ambassador Dirk Jan, in Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, One Hundred Second Congress, second session, “The Yugoslav Republics: Prospects for Peace and Human Rights,” February 5, 1992. US Government Printing Office, Washington 1992, p. 19.Google Scholar

52. Ibid., UPI dispatch.Google Scholar

53. Sudetic, Chuck. “Observers Blame Serb-Led Army For Escalating War in Croatia,” The New York Times, December 3, 1991.Google Scholar

54. Sudetic, Chuck, “5 European Observers Are Killed As Yugoslav Troops Down Copter,” The New York Times, January 8, 1992.Google Scholar

55. Quoted by Harden, Blaine; “Observers Accuse Yugoslav Army,” The Washington Post, January 17, 1992.Google Scholar

56. Remarks by the US Ambassador in Belgrade, Mr. Warren Zimmermann at the Institute of International Politics and Economics in Belgrade, March 11, 1992. Medjunarodni Problemi (International Problems), Beograd, Nr 1–2, 1992, p. 192.Google Scholar

57. “Supports 1918 Borders, Federation,” FBIS-EEU-90–214, November 5, 1990. pp. 49–50.Google Scholar

58. On July 31, 1991, Vuk Drašković wrote an open letter to Ćosić. In this letter Drašković has strongly criticized Ćosić's support for Milošević and his approval of the war in Croatia. See Drašković's open letter to Dobrica Ćosić: “Najgori su na čelu, najbolji se žigošu za izdajnike” [“The worst are at the head of the nation, the best were declared the traitors of the nation”]. Politika, Beograd, July 31, 1991, p. 20.Google Scholar

59. Politika, Belgrade, July 27, 1991, p. 8.Google Scholar

60. Ibid.Google Scholar

61. Ibid.Google Scholar

62. “Plavi slemovi na liniji fronta” (“Blue helmets on the front line”), Politika, Belgrade, December 4, 1991.Google Scholar

63. Djilas, Milovan, “Srbi ne vode pravedan rat” (“Serbs do not conduct the just war”), Danas, Zagreb, November 12, 1991, p. 39 [Author's emphasis added].Google Scholar

64. Deak, Istvan, “The One and the Many,” The New Republic, October 7, 1991, p. 33 [Author's emphasis added].Google Scholar

65. Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debate of the 102nd Congress, First Session, Vol. 137, No. 171, Washington, Tuesday, November 19, 1991, Senate.Google Scholar

66. Ibid.Google Scholar

67. Masnak, Tomaž; “Yugoslavia—And is no more …” Ibid., p. 4. (see the note 8).Google Scholar