One of the principal difficulties in arriving at a constitutional settlement in India during the 1940s stemmed from the inherent conflict between Congress's emphasis upon the principle of majority rule and fluid political alignments and the Muslim League's commitment to the Islamic conviction that numerical configurations were irrelevant to politics and that what mattered was the rigid ideological divide between Muslims and non-Muslims.

While it is very well known that the small Indian state of Kerala has many extraordinary anthropological, demographic, ecological, economic, educational, historical, political, religious, etc. features (which are reflected in a vast and to some extent learned literature), so that it is quite unlike what Stokes denotes as ‘the great agricultural plains areas, which for centuries before the British had experienced large-scale political organization’, it is yet possible that certain of its peculiarities are still insufficiently appreciated. So I here note some of the ‘surprises’ (as well as the uncertainties) which I experienced as a result of spending nearly three months in 1981–82 doing fieldwork in the lowlands of rural Trivandrum District, in the extreme south of Kerala, while also consulting the excellent library of the Centre for Development Studies near Trivandrum city. Whether Kerala bears comparison with Java, as some have claimed, I cannot say; but, of course, it provided an extraordinary contrast to the villages in southeastern Karnataka where I had worked in 1977–78.

The tiny, oil-rich Sultanate of Brunei, situated on the north-west coast of Borneo, regained full independence at the end of 1983, when the United Kingdom surrendered responsibility for its defence and foreign policy. Internally, the predominantly Muslim, Malay State has been self-governing since 1959, albeit by an autocratic monarchy. In this article, however, I shall focus on the British ‘Residency’ in Brunei, which lasted from January 1906 until September 1959.

In 1941–42 Japan destroyed the empire of the British in Southeast Asia. They were determined to return and, with the assistance of the US, they were able to do so in 1945. The plans they developed in preparation for their return were unrealistic. Rightly they took account of some of the weaknesses of their prewar régimes in Burma, in Malaya, in Borneo. But the policies they developed for dealing with them required an assumption of authority that, with their comparatively diminished power and their devastated economy, the British were unable to sustain in the immediate postwar years, and took too little account of the changes that had taken place since they left. They adjusted their policies with some success. Their essential aims were security and stability, the conditions for economic revival. The re-establishment of colonial régimes was one means to such ends: other means might have to serve. If Burma's leaving the Commonwealth promised stability more than attempts to keep it in, then that course could be accepted. If a Malayan Union seemed to promise division rather than consensus, greater weakness rather than greater strength, it must be replaced by Federation. The choices may still not have been right: Burma virtually collapsed; the Emergency began. But they were the only ways the British could perceive of achieving their aims in the circumstances in which they found themselves.

Feeling strong pressure from Western Powers Japan abandoned her seclusion policy in 1854 and inaugurated serious efforts to modernize her society and economy after the Meiji Restoration in 1868. She, in turn, forced Korea who had been keeping the seclusion policy on her own to open the door in 1876. The feudal Korean government (the Yi Dynasty, 1392–1910) was impelled to embark on social and economic reforms by opening the door. Yet, after nearly thirty years’ struggle to make reforms and to secure the independence of the country, Korea was converted into a protectorate of Japan in 1905 and was officially annexed to her in 1910. The Japanese government recognized that the creation of modern monetary and banking systems in Korea was the precondition for trade expansion between the two countries (for Japan, rice imports on the one hand and textile exports on the other) and thus started its colonial rule over Korea by establishing a central bank, development banks and financial cooperatives. This paper aims at setting forth an analysis of a more or less unexplored field in the study of the economic history of Korea, that is, the financial aspects of her economic growth under Japanese rule. Particularly, emphasis will be placed on quantitative analysis of major financial variables represented by money, interest rates and bank credit. Before proceeding to the main subject, it may well serve to review some of the financial problems in the late Yi Dynasty period.