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Of Fallen Demons: Reflections on the International Criminal Court's Defendant

  • STUTI KOCHHAR and MAYEUL HIERAMENTE

Abstract

The defendant in international trials is presumed innocent until proven guilty but is often judged by the ‘court of popular opinion’ even before the trial begins. This article provides reflections on how the image of a malevolent individual emerges with regard to those brought/to be brought before international courts. In such a situation, coming before the Court and subsequently being convicted or acquitted can mean little. It is coming before the Court that is, in itself, the end of the line. The manner in which the International Criminal Court has functioned has contributed, both advertently and inadvertently, to the maintenance of the image of the defendant as a malevolent being. Specifically, the purposes of historiography and the ever present discourse of deterrence, breed the suspicion that this ‘demonizing the defendant’ effect might be endorsed by the manner in which the Prosecutor has popularized the Court and it's functions and aims. This is a conflict that gets to the heart of international criminal law. It is the dilemma of how one must simultaneously fulfil two of the law's essential aims: to presume innocence (and thus abide by a fundamental tenet of international criminal law) and to deter, educate and pacify (and thus for the law to have a reason to exist).

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1 But see, Olusanya, O., ‘A Macro-Micro Integrated Theoretical Model of Mass Participation in Genocide’, (2013) 53 British Journal of Criminology 843. See also, J. Galbraith, ‘Good Deeds of International Defendants: A Response’, LJIL Symposium Vol. 25–3, 10 October 2012 opiniojuris.org/2012/10/10/ljil-symposium-vol-25–3-good-deeds-of-international-defendants-a-response/); Woods, A., ‘Moral Judgements & International Crimes: The Disutility of Desert’, (2011) 52 Virginia Journal of International Law 633.

2 For an overview see, Friedrichs, D., ‘Towards a Criminology of International Crimes’, in Smeulers, A. and Haveman, R. (eds.), Supranational Criminology (2000), 29 at 36.

3 See, M. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (2007), 26; Kelman, H., ‘The policy context of international crimes’, in van der Wilt, H. and Nollkaemper, A. (eds.), System Criminality in International Law(2009), 26 at 31.

4 Drumbl, supra note 3, at 39.

5 Smeulers, A., ‘Perpetrators of International Crimes’, in Smeulers, A. and Haveman, R. (eds.), Supranational Criminology (2000), 233; Smeulers, A. and Hola, B., ‘ICTY and the Culpability of Different Types of Perpetrators of International Crimes’, in A. Smeulers (ed.), Collective Violence and International Criminal Justice (2010), 175; Chouliaras, A., ‘Discourses on International Criminality’, in Smeulers, A. (ed.), Collective Violence and International Criminal Justice (2010), 65 at 72; Ambos, K., ‘Criminologically explained reality of genocide, structure of the offence and the “intent to destroy”’, in A. Smeulers (ed.), Collective Violence and International Criminal Justice (2010), 153 at 155 et seq.; Mohamed, S., ‘Deviance, Aspiration and the Stories We Tell: Reconciling Mass Atrocity and the Criminal Law’, (2015) 124 The Yale Law Journal 1628. For an analysis of the influence of group dynamics on the perception of international trials see, Ford, S., ‘A Social Psychology Model of the Perceived Legitimacy of International Criminal Courts’, (2012) 45 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 405; Fletcher, L. and Weinstein, H., ‘Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation’, (2002) 24 Human Rights Quarterly 573.

6 See, Kelman, supra note 3, at 26.

7 Smeulers, supra note 5, at 234, 236.

8 See, e.g., Chouliaras, supra note 5, at 65, 67; Smeulers and Hola, supra note 5, at 177; Mohamed, supra note 5, at 1648.

9 Drumbl, supra note 3, at 6.

10 Drumbl, supra note 3, at 4 refers to the ‘enemy of all humankind’.

11 W. Schabas, The International Criminal Court. A Commentary on the Rome Statute (2010), article 66, at 784 highlights the practical irrelevance of the principle. See also, Mégret, F., ‘Beyond “Fairness”: Understanding the Determinants of International Criminal Procedure’, (2009), 14 UCLA J. Int'l. & Foreign Aff. 37, at 53.

12 Mégret, F., ‘Practices of Stigmatization’, (2013) 76 Law & Contemporary Probl. 287, at 300.

13 See, e.g., D. Garland, The culture of control: crime and social order in contemporary society (2002), 67–103; J. Young, The exclusive society: social exclusion. Crime and difference in late modernity (1999), 30–96.

14 See, W. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (2011), ix-xiii; Drumbl, supra note 3, at 30.

15 See, Drumbl, supra note 3, at 9 with further references.

16 M, F., ‘Three Dangers for the International Criminal Court: A Critical Look at a Consensual Project’, (2001) 12 Finnish Yearbook of International law 193, at 196.

17 As Hannah Arendt, Eichmann and the Holocaust (2005), and many others have amply pointed out, international defendants are rarely ‘psychopaths’ or ‘lunatics’ but are often reasonable and polite sometimes even charming individuals. See also, Smeulers and Hola, supra note 5, at 176–7.

18 This article focuses mainly on the ICC. While other international criminal tribunals share some of its characteristic features, they will not be discussed in extenso to keep the article compact.

19 On this subject see, N. Lacey, The prisonersdilemma: political economy and punishment in contemporary democracies (2008), 1–55.

20 Arendt, supra note 17, at 113.

21 See, D. Chandler, A dictionary of media and communication (2011), 324.

22 See, Young, supra note 13, at 96–121.

23 Garland, supra note 13, at 75–103.

24 Young, supra note 13, at 1–56.

25 See, Chouliaras, supra note 5, at 67.

26 Drumbl, supra note 3, at 9.

27 See, Drumbl, supra note 3, at 3.

28 See, G. Bass, Stay the hand of vengeance: the politics of war crimes tribunals (2000), 147–206 where he outlines the decision-making process and the various proposals put forward for dealing with the Nazis.

29 See, Young, supra note 13, at 130, warning against the folly of treating crime as a blemish that needs to be cleared up, as opposed to investigating its underlying causes.

30 See, S. Power, A problem from hell: America and the age of genocide, (2003), referring to an expression chosen by Warren Christopher.

31 Chouliaras, supra note 5, at 78 notes that the collective dimension is ‘dexterously downplayed’. See also, Fletcher and Weinstein, supra note 5, at 579, 603 et seq.; Balint, J., ‘Dealing with International Crimes’, in Smeulers, A. and Haveman, R. (eds.), Supranational Criminology (2000), 311 at 325; Mohamed, supra note 5, at 1685 et seq.; M. Drumbl, ‘Toward a Criminology of International Crime’, (2003) Washington & Lee Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, at 14, referring to the failures by the international community.

32 For the general contours of the argument see, G. Simpson, Law, war and crime: war crimes trials and the reinvention of international law (2007), 11–30.

33 Drumbl, supra note 3, at 38.

34 Drumbl, supra note 3, at 202.

35 See, Fletcher, G.P., ‘The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt’, (2002) 111 The Yale Law Journal 1499, at 1537–41; Drumbl, supra note 3, at 36; Gattini, A., ‘A historical perspective: from collective to individual responsibility and back’, in van der Wilt, H. and Nollkaemper, A. (eds.), System Criminality in International Law (2009), 101 at 106–7; Fletcher and Weinstein, supra note 5, at 580.

36 At Nuremberg, there was a concerted effort to have those in positions of responsibility in diplomatic, economic, political, and military leadership represented, see, Schabas, W., ‘Victor's Justice: Selecting Situations at the International Criminal Court’, (2010) 43 J. Marshall L. Rev. 535, at 539.

37 Whether the current ICC practice always measures up to the stated policy is certainly debatable. The Court will, however, have a narrower focus than the ad hoc tribunals.

38 For a good overview, see, Rauschenbach, M. and Scalia, D., ‘Victims and international criminal justice: a vexed question?’, (2008) 90 International Review of the Red Cross 441. Fletcher and Weinstein, supra note 5, at 593 qualify the ‘therapeutic’ aspirations as generally too simplistic.

39 Justice Pal, the Indian judge at the Tokyo Tribunal objected to the charge of conspiracy. He decried the Tokyo trial as politicized and, in his dissenting opinion, acquitted all of the defendants, see, Kopelman, E., ‘Ideology and International Law: The Dissent of the Indian Justice at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial’, (1990) 23 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 373. Regarding modes of individual liability to address collective crimes, see also, Drumbl, supra note 3, at 39; Gattini, supra note 35, at 121; van Sliedregt, E., ‘System Criminality at the ICTY’, in van der Wilt, H and Nollkaemper, A. (eds.), System Criminality in International Law (2009), 183 at 189 et seq.; Chouliaras, supra note 5, at 84 et seq.

40 See, Smeulers, supra note 5, at 244; Smeulers and Hola, supra note 5, at 180; Kelman, supra note 3, at 28–9; Sliedregt, supra note 39, at 183; Ambos, supra note 5, at 166.

41 See, Drumbl, supra note 3, at 17, describing the ‘dramaturgical aspects’ of holding former leaders responsible.

42 The commission considered appropriate trying the Kaiser for waging an aggressive war, see, Commission on the responsibility of the authors of the war and on enforcement of penalties, ‘Report presented to the preliminary peace conference, March 29, 1919’, (1920) 14 AJIL 95. See also, Gattini, supra note 35, 104 et seq.

43 Balint, supra note 31, at 316–17; Mohamed, supra note 5, at 1649.

44 Simpson, supra note 32, at 57. See also, Gattini, supra note 35, at 106; Mohamed, supra note 5, at 1639–41.

45 Chouliaras, supra note 5, at 93.

46 For a detailed discussion, see, Fletcher and Weinstein, supra note 5, passim. See also Gattini, supra note 35, at 116.

47 See also, Koskenniemi, M., ‘Between Impunity and Show Trials’, (2002) 6 Max Planck UNYB 1, at 14.

48 See, generally, Garland, supra note 13.

49 Zimring, F., ‘Imprisonment rates and the new politics of criminal punishment’, in Garland, (ed.), Mass Imprisonment, Social Causes and consequences (2001), 145 at 147 (calling this the ‘zero sum fallacy’ and stating that the ‘rhetoric in current politics often seems to assume that criminals and crime victims are engaged in a zero sum contest. . . .[A]nything that hurts the offender by definition helps the victim’).

50 Mégret, supra note 11, at 39, 57.

51 Jouet, M., ‘Reconciling the Conflicting Rights of Victims and Defendants at the International Criminal Court’, (2007) 26 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 249, at 263.

52 Damaška, M., ‘Reflections on Fairness in International Criminal Trials’, (2012) 10 JICJ 611, at 615.

53 For an overview, see, Nsereko, D., ‘The Role of Victims in Criminal Proceedings – Lessons National Jurisdictions can learn from the ICC’, (2010) 21 Criminal Law Forum 399; Guhr, A.H., ‘Victim Participation at the Pre-Trial Stage at the International Criminal Court’, (2008) 8 International Criminal Law Review 109, at 128. See also Kendall, S. and Nouwen, S., ‘Representational Practices at the International Criminal Court: The Gap between Juridified and Abstract Victimhood’, (2013) 76 Law & Contemp. Probs 235, at 236 decrying an ‘“usurpation” of the voices (and indeed authority) of the represented’.

54 Kendall and Nouwen, supra note 53, at 253. See also, Fletcher and Weinstein, supra note 5, at 592.

55 Jacobs, D., ‘A Samson at the International Criminal Court: The Powers of the Prosecutor at the Pre-Trial Phase’, (2007) 6 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 317, at 332.

56 On the role of the media see, M. Drumbl, ‘Kony 2012: Clicktivism and Child Soldiering’, 20 April 2012 (opiniojuris.org/2012/04/20/kony-2012-clicktivism-and-child-soldiering/); M. Kersten, ‘Kony 2012: Diverging Trajectories: Social Media and International Law’, 19 April 2012 (opiniojuris.org/2012/04/19/kony-2012-diverging-trajectories-social-media-and-internationallaw/).

57 Arendt, supra note 17, at 125.

58 Young, supra note 13, at 14.

59 Garland, D., ‘The limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime control in contemporary society’, (1996) 36 British Journal of Criminology 445, at 462 (‘the criminology invoked by the punitive strategy is of essentialised difference. It is . . . a criminology, which trades in images, archetypes and anxieties. . . . This is a criminology of the other, concerned to demonise the criminal, excite popular fears and hostilities.’).

60 See also, Mohamed, supra note 5, at 1667–8.

61 See also, Koskenniemi, supra note 47, at 1 and 10 et seq.; Chouliaras, supra note 5, at 79 and 90 et seq.

62 Garland, supra note 13, at 22.

63 As quoted by B. Elberling, The defendant in international criminal proceedings: between law and historiography (2012), 200.

64 Galbraith, J., ‘The Pace of International Criminal Justice’, (2009) 31 Michigan Journal of International Law 79, at 90.

65 Mohamed, supra note 5, at 1679.

66 R. Steinke, The politics of international criminal justice: German perspectives from Nuremberg to The Hague (2012), 12 and 33.

67 For a description of how ‘judicial truth’ is created, see, U. Ewald, ‘Reason and Truth in International Criminal Justice’, in Smeulers, A. and Haveman, R. (eds.), Supranational Criminology (2000), 399 at 407 et seq. See also, Fletcher and Weinstein, supra note 5, at 588.

68 Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Transcript of 25 October 2013, ICC-01/09–01/11-T-59-Red-ENG WT 25–10–2013 25/88 WN T.

69 K. Heller, ‘Correcting my recent post on Ruto's public criticism of the OTP’, 1 November 2013, opiniojuris.org/2013/11/01/updating-recent-post-rutos-public-criticism-otp/.

70 See, e.g., R. Wilson, Writing History in International Criminal Trials (2011), 70, 77 though he also observes a ‘profound sense of disadvantage that defense lawyers frequently voice’, at 141. Wilson states he considers historical evidence by the defense less valued because it is often viewed as tactical in nature, ibid., at 168.

71 Elberling, supra note 63, at 199.

72 Simpson, supra note 32, at 79 with references to L. Douglas, The Memory of Judgment (2001).

73 Regarding the local public, see, Ford, supra note 5, passim; Fletcher and Weinstein, supra note 5, passim.

74 Wilson, supra note 70, at 78–80.

75 Walther, E., ‘Guilty by mere association: Evaluative conditioning and the spreading attitude effect’, (2002) 82 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 919.

76 See, Mégret, supra note 12, 300, describing trials as a constant theatre of efforts to up the ante of moral indignation at the accused.

77 Simpson, supra note 32, at 67.

78 Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Judgement, Case No. IT-95–10-T, T. Ch., 14 December 1999, para. 100.

79 See, W. Schabas, War Crimes and Human Rights: Essays on the Death Penalty, Justice and Accountability (2008), 755.

80 Koskenniemi, supra note 47, at 3.

81 D. Burgess, ‘The Dread Pirate Bin Laden’, Legal Affairs, (www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2005/feature_burgess_julaug05.msp). See also, Ewald, supra note 67, at 412–17 referring to the impact of the new global security dialogue on international trials.

82 Mégret, supra note 11, at 60–2.

83 See also, Khan, K. and Shah, A., ‘Defensive Practices: Representing Clients before the International Criminal Court’, (2013) 76 Law & Contemp. Probs. 191, at 192 (referring to the ‘international media pushing a narrative that becomes accepted as the “truth” even before the clients appears in court’).

84 Galbraith, supra note 64, at 92; Whiting, A., ‘In International Criminal Law, Justice Delayed can be Justice Delivered’, (2009) 50 Harvard Journal of International Law 323, at 328 (‘Even just initiating an investigation of alleged war criminals can serve important short-term goals, such as beginning to identify and stigmatize accused war criminals’).

85 See, Nerlich, V., ‘The International Criminal Court, 2002–2010: a view from the inside’, (2011) 22 Criminal Law Forum 199, at 205.

86 See, Tiemessen, A., ‘The International Criminal Court and the politics of prosecutions’, (2014) 18 The International Journal of Human Rights 444, at 445, 454.

87 This does not mean that defendants will lose (political) power under all circumstances as national groups often identify with ‘their’ leader facing trial, see, Ford, supra note 5, at 409, 425, 436. Some have certainly used international trials to their benefit – at least on the national level. For the Kenyan example, see, Hiéramente, M., ‘Wahlen in Zeiten der Strafverfolgung. Die Situation in Kenia und der Internationale Strafgerichtshof’, (2013) 88 Die Friedens-Warte – Journal of International Peace and Organization 187, at 194–8. On the ICTY, see, Clark, J., ‘Courting Controversy: The ICTY's Acquittal of Croatian Generals Gotovina and Markač’, (2013) 11 Journal of International Criminal Justice 399, at 419–20.

88 Nouwen, S.M.H. and Werner, W., ‘Doing Justice to the Political: The International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan’, (2010) 21 European Journal of International Law 941, at 946 et seq. See also, Tiemessen, supra note 86, at 447.

89 Knoops, G.-J., ‘Prosecuting the Gaddafis: Swift or Political Justice’, (2012) 4 Amsterdam Law Forum 78.

90 Regarding difficulties the prosecution has faced in gathering evidence, see, Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Decision on the withdrawal of charges against Mr. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09–02/11–1005, T. Ch. V(b), 13 March 2015; see also Hiéramente, M.et al., ‘Barasa, Bribery and Beyond: Offences against the Administration of Justice at the International Criminal Court’, (2014) 14 International Criminal Law Review 1123.

91 Mégret, supra note 11, at 50.

92 Simpson, supra note 32, at 35.

93 Mégret, supra note 11, at 51.

94 De Vos, C. M., ‘Prosecutor v. Lubanga – Someone who comes between one person and another: Lubanga, Local Cooperation and the Right to a Fair Trial’, (2011) 12 Melbourne Journal of International Law 217, at 229.

95 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Redacted Decision on the Prosecution's Urgent Request for Variation of Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the VWU, ICC-01/04–01/06–2517-Red, T. Ch. I, 8 July 2010, para. 27.

96 Turner, J., ‘Policing International Prosecutors’, (2012) 45 International Law and Politics 175, at 184–5.

97 For a good overview of the debate, see, Damaška, supra note 52, at 611.

98 Regarding the worrisome plans to weaken the institutional support of the defense see, J. Rozenberg, ‘UK's first ICC judge attacks proposed restructuring of international court’, The Guardian, 4 November 2014.

100 See, Côté, L., ‘Independence and Impartiality’, in Reydams, L.et al. (eds.), International Prosecutors (2012), 319 at 349. See also, Daktaras v. Lithuania, Judgment of 10 October 2000, para. 32, where the ECtHR found that of the two components of impartiality, the objective component required that the conduct appear impartial.

101 See, e.g., Art. 54(1)(a) ICC Statute.

102 L. Moreno-Ocampo, ‘Now end this Darfur denial’, The Guardian, 15 July 2010.

103 Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Decision on the request for disqualification of the prosecutor, ICC-01/11–01/11–175, A. Ch., 12 June 2012, para. 1.

104 Ibid., paras. 31–3.

105 F. Bensouda, ‘Statement of the ICC Prosecutor on the withdrawal of charges against Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta’, 5 December 2014 (www.youtube.com/watch?v=s3HORJn15Mg).

106 Côté, supra note 100, 357.

107 Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Decision on the request for disqualification of the prosecutor, ICC-01/11–01/11-OA 3, A. Ch., 12 June 2012, para. 33.

108 Human Rights Watch, ‘Sudan: ICC warrant for Al-Bashir on genocide’, 13 July 2010, (www.hrw.org/news/2010/07/13/sudan-icc-warrant-al-bashir-genocide).

109 Damaška, M., ‘Should national and international justice be subjected to the same evaluative framework?’, in Sluiter, G.et al. (eds.), International Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules (2013), 1418 at 1419.

110 For more see, H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the philosophy of law (2008), 1–28.

111 J. Braithwaite and P. Petit, Not just deserts: a republican theory of criminal justice (1992), 86–155.

112 See also, Mégret, supra note 12, at 288.

113 Ibid., at 296.

114 Section 112 (1) of the German Criminal Procedural Code states: ‘Remand detention may be ordered against the accused if he is strongly suspected of the offence and if there is a ground for the arrest’ (emphasis added).

115 Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision on the Prosecution's Application for Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05–01/09–3, Pre-T. Ch., 4 March 2009.

116 Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the ‘Decision on the Prosecution's Application for Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir’, ICC-02/05–01/09-OA, A. Ch., 3 February 2010.

117 Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on the request of Judge Akua Kuenyehia of 18 February 2010 to be excused from participating in the exercise to reclassify documents in the appeals proceedings related to the case of The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda and in all appeals in the case, ICC-01/04–584-Anx3, Presidency, 11 November 2010.

118 Human Rights Watch, supra note 108.

119 Ibid.

120 See, Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/09–01/11–373, Pre-T. Ch. II, Dissenting Opinion Judge Kaul, 23 January 2012, para. 47.

121 Ibid., para. 56.

122 Ibid., para. 52.

123 See, Groome, D., ‘No Witness, No Case: An Assessment of the Conduct and Quality of ICC Investigations’, (2014) 3 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 1; Whiting, A., ‘Dynamic Investigative Practice at the International Criminal Court’, (2013) 76 Law & Contemp. Probs. 163; Khan and Shah, supra note 83, at 201, 221 with special focus on late disclosure. On the disclosure aspect, see also, Swoboda, S., ‘The ICC Disclosure Regime – A Defence Perspective’, (2008) 19 Criminal Law Forum 449.

124 Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Decision on Defense Application Pursuant to Article 64(4) and Related Requests, ICC-01/09–02/11–728-Anx 2, T.Ch. V, 26 April 2013, para. 1.

125 Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Corrigendum to ‘Decision on the “Prosecution's Request to Amend the Final Updated Document Containing the Charges Pursuant to Article 61(9) of the Statute”’, ICC-01/09–02/11–700-Corr, Pre-T. Ch. II, 21 March 2013, para. 36.

126 Schabas, supra note 14, at 174 also warns – referring to a problematic Security Council referral – of the danger that ‘the Court might rule on the legality of paragraph 6 and the resolution as a whole after a prosecution has already been undertaken and perhaps even after one had been completed’.

127 On the subject, see, Hartwig, A., ‘Appeal and Revision’, in Safferling, C. (ed.), International Criminal Procedure (2012), 531 at 550.

128 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09–19, Pre-T. Ch., Dissenting Opinion Judge Kaul, 31 March 2010.

129 See, Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/09–01/11–373, Pre-T. Ch. II, Dissenting Opinion Judge Kaul, 23 January 2012, para. 2; Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/09–02/11–382-Red, Pre-Tr. Ch. II, Dissenting Opinion Judge Kaul, 23 January 2012, para. 2.

130 Werle, G. and Burghardt, B., ‘Erfordern Menschlichkeitsverbrechen die Beteiligung eines Staates oder einer “staatsähnlichen” Organisation?’, (2012) 7 Zeitschrift für internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 271.

131 See, Hiéramente, supra note 87, at 187. The ICTY's history has shown that the Appeals Chamber does heavily influence the outcome of the trials; so one should think about involving the appeal judges at an earlier point.

132 J.Q. Wilson, Thinking about crime (1985), 209.

* Stuti Kochhar, MSc (London School of Economics and Political Science), Intern on the Ratko Mladić Defence Team at the ICTY []. This contribution materially draws on the author's LLM dissertation submitted to the LSE.

** Dr. Mayeul Hiéramente, Defence Attorney, Wessing & Partner, Düsseldorf, Germany, Alumni of the International Max Planck Research School for Retaliation, Mediation and Punishment [].

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