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Volume 1 - December 1995

Contents

Page 2 of 2

Articles

  • The Sequential Principle of Relative Culpability

  • Douglas N. Husak
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    13 February 2009, pp. 493-518

  • A rational defense of the criminal law must provide a comprehensive theory of culpability. A comprehensive theory of culpability must resolve several difficult issues; in this article I will focus on only one. The general problem arises from the lack of a systematic account of relative culpability. An account of relative culpability would identify and defend a set of considerations to assess whether, why, under what circumstances, and to what extent persons who perform a criminal act with a given culpable state are more or less blameworthy than persons who perform that act with a different culpable state.

Article

  • Is Law Coercive?

  • William A. Edmundson
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    13 February 2009, pp. 81-111

  • That law is coercive is something we all more or less take for granted. It is an assumption so rooted in our ways of thinking that it is taken as a given of social reality, an uncontroversial datum. Because it is so regarded, it is infrequently stated, and when it is, it is stated without any hint of possible complications or qualifications. I will call this the “prereflective view,” and I want to examine it with the care it deserves.

Front matter

  • LEG volume 1 issue 3 Cover and Front matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    13 February 2009, pp. f1-f2
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  • LEG volume 1 issue 2 Cover and Front matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    13 February 2009, pp. f1-f2
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Back matter

  • LEG volume 1 issue 2 Back matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    13 February 2009, pp. b1-b2
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Index to Volume

Back matter

  • LEG volume 1 issue 3 Back matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    13 February 2009, p. b1
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Front matter

  • LEG volume 1 issue 1 Cover and Front matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    13 February 2009, pp. f1-f2
    • Article
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Back matter

  • LEG volume 1 issue 1 Back matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    13 February 2009, pp. b1-b2
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Front matter

  • LEG volume 1 issue 4 Cover and Front matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    13 February 2009, pp. f1-f2
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Back matter

  • LEG volume 1 issue 4 Back matter

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    13 February 2009, pp. b1-b2
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Page 2 of 2