Using some appellate courts' reviews of projects to maintain moral order in the city as the main source of data, this article shows that an analysis of legal knowledge production that (1) is dynamic and (2) refuses to treat people and texts as totally different entities, one studied by social scientists and the other studied by lawyers, can tell us much about such familiar but seldom theorized legal maneuvers as judicial review and constitutional challenges. Choosing to analyze the dynamics of knowledge processes is inspired by Actor Network Theory (ANT), Bruno Latour's work in particular. This methodological choice is particularly appropriate because judicial review tends to avoid making judgments about the content of impugned laws or ordinances, focusing instead, as Latour does, on form and process. But insofar as legal processes in general privilege form and process to a greater or lesser degree, a more general argument is made about the appropriateness of using tools from ANT to study legal and quasi-legal knowledge networks.

Whereas most sociolegal studies concerned with hegemony and resistance focus on the resistances of ordinary citizens in everyday life, this article focuses on the development of a particular social movement—the alternative birth movement—and analyzes the process by which this movement emerged and has achieved significant legislative victories. The analysis makes several contributions to the literatures on hegemony, resistance, and the law. First, by demonstrating the importance of medicine's assertion of its authority for the expansion and mobilization of the alternative birth movement, we show that the mobilization of the law by a dominant group may trigger the emergence of social movements seeking to resist hegemonic understandings and arrangements. At the same time, by examining how birth activists' organizational resources developed over time and were rendered meaningful in legislative debates, our study demonstrates the importance of avoiding dichotomous conceptions of structure and culture. In addition, by analyzing culture as a process of meaning-making rather than an independent and hierarchical set of values, the analysis shows how cultural and legal hegemony—even that of modern medicine—may be destabilized, even as it sets the terms of the effort to destabilize it and shapes the nature of the hegemony that will replace it.

An important yet poorly understood function of law enforcement organizations is the role they play in distilling and transmitting the meaning of legal rules to frontline law enforcement officers and their local communities. In this study, we examine how police and sheriff's agencies in California collectively make sense of state hate crime laws. To do so, we gathered formal policy documents called “hate crime general orders” from all 397 police and sheriff's departments in the state and conducted interviews with law enforcement officials to determine the aggregate patterns of local agencies' responses to higher law. We also construct a “genealogy of law” to locate the sources of the definitions of hate crime used in agency policies. Despite a common set of state criminal laws, we find significant variation in how hate crime is defined in these documents, which we attribute to the discretion local law enforcement agencies possess, the ambiguity of law, and the surplus of legal definitions of hate crime available in the larger environment to which law enforcement must respond. Some law enforcement agencies take their cue from other agencies, some follow statewide guidelines, and others are oriented toward gaining legitimacy from national professional bodies or groups within their own community. The social mechanisms that produce the observed clustering patterns in terms of approach to hate crime law are mimetic (copying another department), normative (driven by professional standards about training and community social movement pressure), and actuarial (affected by the demands of the crime data collection system). Together these findings paint a picture of policing organizations as mediators between law-on-the-books and law-in-action that are embedded in interorganizational networks with other departments, state and federal agencies, professional bodies, national social movement organizations, and local community groups. The implications of an interorganizational field perspective on law enforcement and implementation are discussed in relation to existing sociolegal research on policing, regulation, and recent neo-institutional scholarship on law.

There has been considerable discussion since September 11 of the enormous resource that local police potentially represent in the fight against terrorism. This article identifies limits to the local role in homeland security by analyzing a case study of Dearborn, Michigan. Partly because Dearborn is home to one of the largest concentrations of Arabs in the United States, its experience with homeland security highlights two kinds of burdens that cities incur when they engage in proactive surveillance to identify potential terrorists: damage to their reputation (since police surveillance implies that its objects are not trustworthy) and damage to police legitimacy (since new surveillance may undermine trust between police and the community). Because the benefits of efforts to identify terrorists typically accrue to jurisdictions other than the one that engages in it—unlike street crime, terrorism is a national or even international problem—local governments have little reason to pursue it. Instead, cities such as Dearborn have reason to emphasize what I call the “community protection” aspects of homeland security, such as target hardening and emergency response. This finding has more general implications for our understanding of the police role and the politics of policing, showing how both are shaped by the structural location police occupy in federalist systems of government.

The boundary between homo- and heterosexuality once stood solidly in our cultural imagination, marked off by a set of assumed differences that were purportedly made manifest in real, material ways. Gays and lesbians, so the story went, were verifiably different from straight people, but gradually, the perceived boundary between the two sexualities has eroded. It has been 30 years since the American Psychological Association cured us of our homosexuality with the stroke of a pen. Despite the enthusiastic application of scientific and statistical technologies, the efforts of researchers such as Dean Hamer, Peter Copeland, and Simon LeVay (just to name a few), have failed to show conclusively that our ears, fingers, brains, or genes actually reveal anything concrete about our choices of sexual partners. Lawrence v. Texas (2003) has knocked down Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) as well as the remaining sodomy laws, expanded the right of privacy to include same-sex sex, and in the wake of Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health (2003) Massachusetts has begun allowing same-sex couples to marry. In contrast to many European nations, gay and lesbian parents in the United States are winning legal victories with increasing frequency, gaining greater access to adoption and child custody despite jurisdictional variation. For that diminishing segment of the population that still desperately wants a clear marker of its sexual superiority the news is not good. Fortunately for them, heterosexuals still have one clearly identifiable social sanctuary where they can remind themselves that they have something that non-heterosexuals do not: marriage. With a minimum of effort and expense, one man and one woman can enter into a relationship with the state that brings about numerous legal benefits, obligations, and privileges. Despite some advances, marriage thus stands as one of the last clearly exclusive, forcefully bounded, brightly illuminated enclaves where gays and lesbians may not tread; it remains for heterosexuals only (or at least, for those who want to appear that way).

Existing explanations for historical changes in punishment in Britain have tended to examine the replacement of disorderly prisons and public executions with national penitentiaries from the late eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century. Despite their significant contributions to our understanding of how punishments operate in a broader social, political, and economic context, these scholarly accounts have narrowed debate on the mechanisms of penal change to the intentions of penal reformers. This analysis extends this time frame and uses historical data to compare the development of the penitentiary in Britain to its primary, yet less studied, penal substitute, the transportation of felons to America and Australia. In doing so, it provides an alternative explanation for the ascendancy of national penitentiaries. I argue that the development of these penal institutions in Britain was historically made possible by two interdependent sets of changes: (1) changes in the structure and administration of the state's penal apparatus (from decentralized to centralized and patrimonial to bureaucratic); and (2) transformations in popular understandings of the state's power to punish in correspondence with the expansion of a broader and more equal definition of citizenship (democratization). In conclusion, I argue for the value of perspectives on punishment that identify the explicit relationships between state organization and social relations in order to clarify how culture inheres in material conditions to influence specific penal outcomes.