It is important for both theoretical and policy reasons to partition aggregate crime rates into measures of prevalence (reflecting breadth of participation) and incidence (reflecting intensity of participation by those who do engage in crime). Prevalence is measured by accumulating over age the probability of first arrest as a function of age. Incidence is estimated by the probability of recidivism in a feedback model. The probability of a male in U.S. cities over 250,000 population ever being arrested for an index crime is estimated as 25 percent, and is quite different for black males (51 percent) and white males (14 percent). The probability of re-arrest for an index crime is estimated as 85 to 90 percent for both whites and blacks. These estimates highlight the breadth of involvement in index-crime arrests, and suggest that the large differences in race-specific arrest rates are predominantly attributable to difference in participation, and not to differences in recidivism for those who do get involved.

Formal conflict resolution is not the principal function of the Philippine Court of Agrarian Relations. Rather, litigants mobilize the court's resources to increase their power over opponents and to maximize gains. A combination of the rights stipulated for the litigants, the aims of the principal and adjunct actors, and the relative power and wealth of the disputants and their allies determines who gets what and how in this struggle. Because the agrarian court exists in a social context where law as norm and the general distribution of power operate to the advantage of the “have” sector, it is limited in its capacity to effectuate social change.

During a three-year panel study, the job aspirations of University of Denver law students changed so as to reduce the economic supply of public interest attorneys. Elementary economic theory suggests that this reduction in supply has an important impact on the size and quality of the public interest bar. Both demand and supply must be considered in attempts to increase the number and quality of public interest attorneys. Although this study does not attempt to explain the reasons for changes in students' job aspirations, reformers attempting to increase economic supply should not ignore the potential impact of legal education.

This paper examines the effects of the abrogation of one common-law doctrine—“charitable immunity”—on the operation and viability of one charitable institution—the hospital—in 24 states over the period 1951-1971. Four models of the effects of abrogation are considered. To test these models, I conceptualize the termination of immunity as an experimental treatment in an interrupted time-series design. I conclude that abrogation led to changes of quite varied magnitude in different states. Apart from abrogation, the onset of Medicare and Medicaid, and changes in the economic environment had considerable effects on hospital costs. In states abrogating after the beginning of federal intervention in medical care, judicial doctrine had no discernible impact on the costs of hospitals.

Economism is seen as having a number of disadvantages compared with legalism as the preferred model for regulating hazardous industrial practices such as pollution. Economism forces public policy to react retrospectively to hazards when efforts could be made to prevent the hazard before it occurs. Economism engenders a moral relativism which weakens the moral force of law; it makes detection and deterrence more difficult than under legalism. The regulatory approaches of economism may involve reduced cost burdens on business but lesser predictability of those costs. Economism does not relieve business of the burdens of government inspections; it simply replaces technical inspectors with tax investigators because taxes on hazards can easily be evaded. Legalism, unlike economism, is not wedded to the assumption that business enterprises always behave rationally. In practical terms it is impossible to calculate economically optimal levels of taxes on social harm. Even if it were possible, the costs of making such calculations would be prohibitive. It is concluded that economistic strategies have quite limited, though important, roles in business regulation.

This paper explores the determinants of the costs of prisons. An economic model relates cost to output, input prices, and a number of variables controlling for differences in the type of outputs and inputs for each prison. Data from the federal prison system are used to estimate the model. Our results indicate that a minimum-cost prison would be quite large (1,000 to 1,600 inmates) and that the improvement of some correctional standards (e.g., single-bed cells, more living space) may serve to decrease rather than increase prison operating costs.

This article examines the business of three United States Courts of Appeals over the course of their history. The courts selected for study were the northeastern Second Circuit, the deep south Fifth Circuit, and the west coast Ninth Circuit. A random sample of 50 cases was drawn for each circuit for every fifth fiscal year beginning with 1895 and ending with 1975. The sample years were aggregated into four time periods: 1895-1910, 1915-1930, 1935-1955, and 1960-1975. The business of the three circuits was found to have changed substantially from the 1895-1910 time period to the modern period. In the earlier years the circuits had small proportions of criminal cases—with the exception of the Second Circuit—a significant portion of real property cases, substantial proportions of business cases, and significant proportions of tort cases. By the 1960-1975 period a sizable proportion of the business of all three circuits was devoted to criminal and other public-law type cases; there were negligible proportions of real property cases, relatively small proportions of business cases, and even smaller proportions of tort cases. Public disputes replaced private disputes as the major source of the courts' business, and over time there has been a convergence among the circuits in the mix of cases coming to them.

In 1969 Nathan Hakman published a report of his investigation of the role of interest groups in Supreme Court litigation. He found that interest groups filed amicus curiae briefs in only 18.6 percent of the 1,175 “noncommercial” cases decided by the Supreme Court between 1928 and 1966. Participation as amicus curiae illustrates only one aspect of litigation activity, and at that one of the most limited, but Hakman took this as a reliable indicator that interest group activity in the courts was less frequent than was commonly supposed. Based on these findings, Hakman attacked the view that amicus participation was a form of political action. Such a view, he argued, was mere “scholarly folklore” (Hakman, 1969: 199).

This research note summarizes some of our work on the allocation of maintenance (alimony payments) in Belgium, specifically the obligation of a husband to provide maintenance and the entitlement of his former wife to receive it following a divorce grounded in fault. The converse situation of a maintenance-obliged wife and a maintenance-entitled husband occurs only rarely, and it is excluded from our study. So too, we do not consider the obligations of either or both divorced parents to provide maintenance for their children.

This article describes and illustrates a new, easily applied method of scaling the severity of different types of criminal sentences and the seriousness of different types of crimes. In contrast to past approaches, this method is based on actual judicial performance, not on opinions or subjective scaling procedures. Using this approach, the effects on sentencing of variables other than type of crime can be examined.