Since 2002, government nationalizations and contractual breaches in general around the world have surged. South America has witnessed a wave of nationalizations of private enterprises, mostly foreign. Some analysts contend that this trend is shaped by the left-wing ideological orientation of the governments, whereas others argue that a more robust explanation is the combination of economic pressure and constraint factors. This article contributes to the debate by using a nuanced institutional analytical framework based on the concept of company versus government opportunism, applied to the recent nationalization of previously privatized companies. It examines Argentina, a country that in the last two decades has seen radical policy reversals, from sweeping privatization of state-owned enterprises in the 1990s to a renationalization effort with some of the same companies in the early 2000s.

Many studies suggest that mixed-member electoral systems produce different attitudes and behaviors among representatives. This article assesses how this type of electoral system shapes Bolivian legislators' perceptions of their roles as representatives, their district activities, and their relationships with their political parties. It examines these dimensions using elite survey data and interviews with legislators and their personal assistants. The results show that the electoral system does not produce a uniform impact. It shapes how legislators perceive their role as representatives and the nature of the relationship they build with their political parties, but it does not produce differences in the kinds of activities that both types of legislators carry out in their districts.

Scholars concur that conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs have a strong proincumbent effect among beneficiaries. Although no study has properly focused on the overall effect of cash transfers on incumbents' national vote shares, most scholars have deduced that this effect is positive; i.e., that cash transfers lead to the expansion of incumbents' electoral bases. This article analyzes survey data from nearly all Latin American countries and confirms that beneficiaries of CCT programs are more likely to support incumbents. However, it also shows that CCT programs may induce many voters who were previously incumbent supporters to vote for the opposition. As a consequence, the overall impact of cash transfers on incumbents' vote shares is indeterminate; it depends on the balance between both patterns of behavioral changes among voters. This study is the first to report evidence that cash transfer programs may have significant anti-incumbent effects.

This article analyzes the relationship between clientelism and citizens' political orientation in Latin America. Consistent political perceptions in the citizenry are central in traditional theories of political competition. This article argues that clientelism hinders the development of consistent political orientation by reducing the utility of information cues, such as left-right labels. More specifically, clientelistic parties generate indifference among their supporters toward the left-right divide by offering them an alternative voting rationale, and increase uncertainty in the political realm by making left-right labels less meaningful. Both arguments are tested with multilevel regression analyses using cross-sectional data covering 18 Latin American countries. The results indicate that clientelistic party supporters are more likely to show indifference toward the left-right dimension and, to a lesser extent, that their left-right orientation corresponds less with their political attitudes.

Democratic institutions, ranging from constitutional provisions and electoral rules to judiciaries, have been important in improving the rights of citizens across the world. If institutions matter for human rights, then it stands to reason that institutions built specifically to protect human rights, like the human rights ombudsman, should matter too. Using a comparative case study approach, this article examines the effect of the human rights ombudsman at the regional level on several human rights measures in Latin America between 1982 and 2011. The results suggest that the presence of an ombudsman, and some of its design features, have had effects on some social and economic rights, in keeping with the broad mandate given to this office.

Why have some Mexican states proceeded faster than others in the revolutionary transformation of overhauling criminal procedure? Contributing an original index of criminal procedure reform across Mexico's 32 states from 2002 to 2011 and building on existing research on policy diffusion, this article seeks to answer this question. It finds that the 2008 constitutional reform at the federal level exerts a strong positive effect (federal mandate); being situated in a neighborhood of states that have reformed has a counterintuitive negative effect (spatial proximity); and having a governor from the same party as governors of other states that have reformed has a positive influence (network affinity). These findings yield a better understanding of the vertical, cross-level and horizontal, cross-unit diffusion of reform, with implications for understanding how to overcome challenges to criminal justice reform in Mexico, Latin America, and elsewhere.