Air traffic management (ATM) under its current paradigm is reaching its structural limits considering the continuously growing demand. The need for a decrease in traffic workload opens numerous problems for optimization, from capacity balancing to conflict solving, using many different degrees of freedom, such as re-routing, flight-level changes, or ground-holding schemes. These problems are usually of a large dimension (there are 30 000 daily flights in Europe in the year 2012) and highly combinatorial, hence challenging for current problem solving technologies. We give brief tutorials on ATM and constraint programming (CP), and survey the literature on deploying CP technology for modelling and solving combinatorial problems that occur in an ATM context.

This paper reviews the development of agent-based (computational) economics (ACE) from an econometrics viewpoint. The review comprises three stages, characterizing the past, the present, and the future of this development. The first two stages can be interpreted as an attempt to build the econometric foundation of ACE, and, through that, enrich its empirical content. The second stage may then invoke a reverse reflection on the possible agent-based foundation of econometrics. While ACE modeling has been applied to different branches of economics, the one, and probably the only one, which is able to provide evidence of this three-stage development is finance or financial economics. We will, therefore, focus our review only on the literature of agent-based computational finance, or, more specifically, the agent-based modeling of financial markets.

Hypothesis testing is uncommon in agent-based modeling and there are many reasons why (see Fagiolo et al. (2007) for a review). This is one of those uncommon studies: a combination of the new and old. First, a traditional neoclassical model of decision making is broadened by introducing agents who interact in an organization. The resulting computational model is analyzed using virtual experiments to consider how different organizational structures (different network topologies) affect the evolutionary path of an organization's corporate culture. These computational experiments establish testable hypotheses concerning structure, culture, and performance, and those hypotheses are tested empirically using data from an international sample of firms. In addition to learning something about organizational structure and innovation, the paper demonstrates how computational models can be used to frame empirical investigations and facilitate the interpretation of results in a traditional fashion.

Individual Evolutionary Learning (IEL) is a learning model based on the evolution of a population of strategies of an individual agent. In prior work, IEL has been shown to be consistent with the behavior of human subjects in games with a small number of agents. In this paper, we examine the performance of IEL in games with many agents. We find IEL to be robust to this type of scaling. With the appropriate linear adjustment of the mechanism parameter, the convergence behavior of IEL in games induced by Groves–Ledyard mechanisms in quadratic environments is independent of the number of participants.

The time evolution of aggregate economic variables, such as stock prices, is affected by market expectations of individual investors. Neoclassical economic theory assumes that individuals form expectations rationally, thus forcing prices to track economic fundamentals and leading to an efficient allocation of resources. However, laboratory experiments with human subjects have shown that individuals do not behave fully rationally but instead follow simple heuristics. In laboratory markets, prices may show persistent deviations from fundamentals similar to the large swings observed in real stock prices.

Here we show that evolutionary selection among simple forecasting heuristics can explain coordination of individual behavior, leading to three different aggregate outcomes observed in recent laboratory market-forecasting experiments: slow monotonic price convergence, oscillatory dampened price fluctuations, and persistent price oscillations. In our model, forecasting strategies are selected every period from a small population of plausible heuristics, such as adaptive expectations and trend-following rules. Individuals adapt their strategies over time, based on the relative forecasting performance of the heuristics. As a result, the evolutionary switching mechanism exhibits path dependence and matches individual forecasting behavior as well as aggregate market outcomes in the experiments. Our results are in line with recent work on agent-based models of interaction and contribute to a behavioral explanation of universal features of financial markets.

This paper reviews the Zero Intelligence (ZI) methodology for investigating markets. This approach models individual traders, operating within a market mechanism, who behave without strategy, in order to determine the impact of the market mechanism and consequently the effect of trader behaviour. The paper considers the major contributions and models within this area from both the economics and finance communities before examining the strengths and weaknesses of this methodology.