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Universal Principle of Right: Metaphysics, Politics, and Conflict Resolutions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 November 2018

Sorin Baiasu
Sorin Baiasu*
Affiliation:
Keele University
*
Email: s.baiasu@keele.ac.uk
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Abstract

In spite of its dominance, there are well-known problems with Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium (MRE), as a method of justification in meta-ethics. One issue in particular has preoccupied commentators, namely, the capacity of this method to provide a convincing account of the objectivity of our moral beliefs. Call this the Lack-of-Objectivity Charge. One aim of this article is to examine the charge within the context of Rawls’s later philosophy, and I claim that the lack-of-objectivity charge remains unanswered. A second aim of this article is to examine the extent to which, despite Rawls’s express intention to avoid reliance on Kant’s moral philosophy, supplementing Rawls’s political constructivism with some Kantian elements, in particular Kant’s idea of a universal principle of right, not only addresses some of the issues raised by the lack-of-objectivity charge, but also does so without compromising the ability of the Rawlsian account to accommodate the pluralism of conceptions of the good, which he takes to be a fact of modern democracies. I argue for a revised justificatory methodology, which combines Rawls’s MRE and Kant’s Critical Method.

Keywords

method of reflective equilibriumtranscendental argumentsCritical methodjustificationobjectivityKantRawls
Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 23 , Special Issue 4: Special Issue on Kant & Rawls , December 2018 , pp. 527 - 554
Copyright
© Kantian Review 2018 

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