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Kant’s (Non-Question-Begging) Refutation of Cartesian Scepticism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 2019

Colin Marshall
Colin Marshall*
Affiliation:
University of Washington
*
Email: crmarsh@uw.edu
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Abstract

Interpreters of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism face a dilemma: it seems to either beg the question against the Cartesian sceptic or else offer a disappointingly Berkeleyan conclusion. In this article I offer an interpretation of the Refutation on which it does not beg the question against the Cartesian sceptic. After defending a principle about question-begging, I identify four premises concerning our representations that there are textual reasons to think Kant might be implicitly assuming. Using those assumptions, I offer a reconstruction of Kant’s Refutation that avoids the interpretative dilemma, though difficult questions about the argument remain.

Keywords

KantscepticismDescartesRefutation of Idealism
Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 24 , Issue 1 , March 2019 , pp. 77 - 101
Copyright
© Kantian Review 2019 

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