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Rational Feelings and Moral Agency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 June 2011

Ido Geiger
Ido Geiger
Affiliation:
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel
Corresponding
E-mail address:
geigeri@bgu.ac.il
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Abstract

Kant's conception of moral agency is often charged with attributing no role to feelings. I suggest that respect is the effective force driving moral action. I then argue that four additional types of rational feelings are necessary conditions of moral agency: (1) The affective inner life of moral agents deliberating how to act and reflecting on their deeds is rich and complex (conscience). To act morally we must turn our affective moral perception towards the ends of moral action: (2) the welfare of others (love of others); and (3) our own moral being (self-respect). (4) Feelings shape our particular moral acts (moral feeling). I tentatively suggest that the diversity of moral feelings might be as great as the range of our duties.

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Kantian Review , Volume 16 , Special Issue 2: The Revolutionary Kant: Graham Bird Meets His Critics (Symposium) , 16 June 2011 , pp. 283 - 308
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Copyright © Kantian Review 2011

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