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Commentary on Chapter 15 of Patricia Kitcher's Kant's Thinker

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2014

Tobias Rosefeldt*
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin Email:


I argue that Patricia Kitcher's Kant-inspired account of self-consciousness overintellectualizes the requirements for rational cognition. Kitcher claims that a person can only believe something on the ground of another belief if she is able to recognize the grounding belief as grounding the first belief and as one of her own. I criticize this claim by arguing that (i) someone can believe something for a certain reason without recognizing this reason as a reason (the possibility of unreflected reasons), and that (ii) she can recognize something as a reason for something else without being able to self-ascribe either her original belief or the belief that grounds it (the possibility of reflected but not self-conscious reasons).

Symposium on Patricia Kitcher's Kant's Thinker
Copyright © Kantian Review 2014 

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