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Intellectual Virtue Signaling and (Non)Expert Credibility

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2024

KEITH RAYMOND HARRIS Open the ORCID record for KEITH RAYMOND HARRIS [Opens in a new window]
KEITH RAYMOND HARRIS*
Affiliation:
UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA keithraymondharris@gmail.com
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Abstract

In light of the complexity of some important matters, the best epistemic strategy for laypersons is often to rely heavily on the judgments of subject matter experts. However, given the contentiousness of some issues and the existence of fake experts, determining who to trust from the lay perspective is no simple matter. One proposed approach is for laypersons to attend to displays of intellectual virtue as indicators of expertise. I argue that this strategy is likely to fail, as non-experts often display apparent intellectual virtues while legitimate experts often display apparent intellectual vices. Then, I argue that this challenge is difficult to overcome, as experts who attempt to better exhibit apparent intellectual virtues would likely compromise their own reliability in the process. Finally, I discuss two conclusions—one more optimistic and one more pessimistic—that one might draw concerning the role of intellectual virtue in the identification of experts.

Keywords

autonomyexpertsintellectual virtueopen-mindednessvirtue signaling
Type
Article
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Journal of the American Philosophical Association , First View , pp. 1 - 17
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The American Philosophical Association

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