In his short administration, President Kennedy was called upon to deal with several Southeast Asian developments but none that had reached such a high watermark of an international crisis as the question of Laos. As in Berlin, he inherited in Laos a situation aggravated by near-direct armed confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. Kennedy's response to that situation was a complex set of policy moves and measures that alternately raised a spectre of large-scale, direct American military intervention and prospects of East-West agreement on Laotian neutrality, only to end eventually on the same note of anti-communist crusade as in the preceding Eisenhower administration.

New Zealand was one of the first parts of the British Empire to offer Britain help in the building of the Singapore naval base and was the only Dominion to do so. It is true that considerable financial help was given by the Straits Settlements. Hong Kong, the Federated Malay States and the Sultan of Johore. Australia's naval programme was, also, based on the assumption that the base would be built. But the Reform Party Ministry in New Zealand was the only democratically elected government which supported the United Kingdom Government with a vote of funds.

Singapore is a new state without a long tradition of independent, democratic politics. The current political leadership is dedicated towards institutionalizing a political system which is both democratic and effective. Attainment of this goal will depend to a significant extent on the creation of citizens who are politically aware, who feel competent to participate in politics and who will participate through legitimate political channels to promote and protect their interests. In terms of contemporary political theory one of Singapore's immediate problems is the creation of a cognitive political culture which is congruent with a democratic and effective political structure. This article focuses on the content, creation and consequences of political awareness amongst farmers in rural Singapore.

Filipino barrios are mostly rural villages. They are, in legal parlance, the smallest political subdivisions in the Philippine system of local governments. Before the fifties barrio government was virtually non-existent. Although there were barrio lieutenants appointed by municipal mayors, it was not until the mid-fifties that councils began to give the barrios a semblance of government — mostly in form rather than in substance —similar to the commission plan of American local government. Under the unitary system of Filipino government, all local governments, except those in the chartered cities, are governed by the Revised Administrative Code. To give the barrio a government of its own and to grant its citizens the right to vote for their own officials would require an amendment to this Code by the Philippine Congress. Thus, the establishment of the first elective barrio councils in 1956 was the result of an amendment to an appropriate section of that Code. Later in 1959 the Philippine Congress became more generous by granting the barrios a general charter which defined in more definitive terms the scope and nature of barrio councils and the manner in which members of these councils were chosen. The purpose of this article is to identify the major issues on the barrio electoral process which confronted the Philippine Congress and to provide some insight into the manner in which these issues were resolved.

Direct diplomatic relations between New Zealand and Malaya/Singapore are a relatively recent innovation dating back only to 1955, and, significantly, the original decision to station troops in the area in peacetime preceded the establishment of formal diplomatic links. It is true that even before the Second World War there had been a growing consciousness of the strategic significance of the area, but it was seen in terms of Singapore as a link in the chain of Imperial defence, never as a region in its own right. Regions were subsumed in the worldwide defence strategy of the British Empire. Thus New Zealand contributed financially to the construction of the base for the Royal Navy at Singapore, but her military commitments were in helping to guard the Suez ‘lifeline’. New Zealand air-force units were stationed in Singapore in 1940, but despite the national trauma associated with the fall of the base and the apprehended threat to New Zealand’s own security, the ground forces remained in the Middle East. Indeed, New Zealand's formal Commonwealth responsibilities were to remain in the Middle East until 1955 and public interest continued to focus on that area to a surprising degree. The lessons of the Pacific War for New Zealand, therefore, were less concerned with the strategic importance of any particular area than with the indispensability of a United States alliance. As one research group put it, ‘in the immediate post-war years New Zealand showed a greater sense of international awareness, but no sense of particular involvement with the Far East; still less with South-East Asia.

Systematic manipulation of symbols is present to varying degrees in all political processes. Such rituals may or may not suggest further substantive action, and when they do, such action may or may not be forthcoming. The term ritualism (or ritualistic behaviour) will here refer to activity which can be subsumed under the general concept of formalism. While some political scientsists describe formalism as a concern to establish an institution rather than to ensure its functioning, our use of the term is less specific: both structure and function may be symbols and parts of a ritual which, if suggesting further activity which is not forthcoming, constitutes ritualism.

Australian policies are usually formulated in terms of specific national interests related to Asia. These may be grouped in three categories, which I shall call security, economy, and identification. The three are separate, but point in much the same direction: in whichever of these categories an Australian views his country's future in Southeast Asia, he sees its interests as involving preservation and enlargement of Australia's present character. There is room for argument about details and interpretation, between the intellectual and the man in the street, and between one political party and another. At times these arguments are heated, especially when the question of security is being debated. But, basically, Australians want to go on being as they are in the place where they are. Although they recognize the actual and symbolic importance of Southeast Asia, their national interests demand that they be not submerged or impoverished by influences from that direction. Their position is, in essence, a defensive one, but capable of a good deal of initiative. While it is often expressed as a position involving only Southeast Asia – because that is the closest part of Asia, the one which Australians know best, and is often used as a synonym for Asia at large — the Australian position towards Asia as a whole is much the same.

Despite the undoubted significance of possible Australian participation in a five power Commonwealth security arrangement centred on Malaysia and Singapore, considerations of an Australian nuclear force, the presence of numerous American bases in Australia, and Australian policies towards a Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, the public debate on Australian foreign policy continues to centre on the Indo-China war. This is understandable, for not only has Australia been supplying material assistance to the counter-revolutionary forces in that area since 1953, military advisers since 1962 and a task force since 1965, but the commitment has focussed critical attention on those strategic assumptions which have dominated Australian foreign policy for the last two decades.

A pattern of trade completely new to the traditional structure of Southeast Asian trade emerged in the eastern extremity of Southeast Asia following the permanent settlement of the Spaniards at Manila in 1571. The new addition was based upon the Manila-Acapulco trade with its two supply lines originating from the ports of Fukien province in China, and the Coromandel and Malabari Coasts in India. Two hundred years later, this trade with Manila as the entrepot, had become a well-defined system, and very much a part of the traditional pattern of Southeast Asian trade. The mercantilist regulations obtaining in Manila, the seasonal rhythm of shipping movements, the goods carried along the routes and the dependent trades outside the Spanish systems had moulded the character of the Manila trade.

It is widely acknowledged that colonial experience has greatly affected the political development of ex-colonial countries. In particular, colonialism has often been regarded as the most important, if not the sole, basis of national integration in many of these countries. At the same time, the literature on political development still lacks a critical evaluation of the impact of colonial rule on these ex-colonies. The following essay is an initial assessment of the contribution of Dutch colonialism to the national political integration of Indonesia. Such an evaluation has not been explicitly made, even though the literature on Indonesia does not lack sweeping judgments by both Indonesian nationalists and the apologists for the Dutch “mission interrupted”.

For the past thirty years, events in Southeast Asia have substantially shaped Australian defence policy. Japan became an imminent threat only when it moved into Indo-China, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies. As a result Australians became understandably alarmed, and concentrated their defence programme on this situation rather than events in Europe, the Middle East, or even South Asia. Since World War II, a sense of continuing threat or potential threat from Asia has prompted the raising and maintaining of a regular, standing army, units of which have been deployed almost continuously since 1950 on the Asian mainland – in Korea, Malaya, Singapore and South Vietnam, as well as in northern Borneo. As this is being written, there are still Some 8,000 Australian servicemen in the Vietnam theatre, and nearly 3,000 in Malaysia and Singapore.

Will peace in Vietnam and neutralised Indochina bring stability to Southeast Asia? Or will most of the area fall under a China-North Vietnam condominium? Can the Nixon doctrine, with the U.S. nuclear deterrent in the background, assure the security of a regional association? Or will the Japanese — the flag following trade — gather Southeast Asia into a new co-prosperity sphere?

Under the various treaties and quasi-treaties between Britain and the Malay States, matters affecting ‘Malay custom and religion’ were under the jurisdiction of the Rulers and their chiefs. The succession to a Malay throne was a matter of Malay custom but, since the establishment of British rule, it came to be controlled and regulated by the colonial power. At times this control had been exercised in a manner distasteful to the Malay ruling houses, but no Malay Ruler had come out in open opposition to a British choice of a successor to his throne until the Selangor Succession Dispute. To the great surprise of the colonial government, the old Sultan openly resisted its attempt to impose on Selangor a Raja Muda (Heir Apparent) who was unacceptable to him and to a section of his family. This paper proposes to discuss the Selangor Succession Dispute which raged for five years in Malaya and London with important repercussions on British policy towards the Malay States.

One would hardly expect New Zealand, whose population has yet to reach three million and which still exports very largely pastoral and forest products, to play a really significant part in Asian trade. Nevertheless surprise, or disappointment, may well be felt at the trifling contribution revealed by Table 1. Most of New Zealand's Asian exports go to Japan but, in 1967, were less than 1 per cent of Japan's total imports, and the remainder going to developing Asian countries were less than 1/3 per cent of their imports. New Zealand, in fact, exports more to Australia than to them, although they have a vastly bigger population and Australia has a range of export industries which compete with those of New Zealand.

An exercise in nomenclature can throw interesting light on the settlement history of an area. The location, site and situation of each of the place-names could in fact be incorporated into each place-name, which can thus authenticate, or can be authenticated by, a feature or features on the landscape. Place-names, when taken in the context of the geography of the area, can also commemorate events or personages, real or mythical, a locality being thus imbued with associations at once romantic. Coloured by romance, however, historical verisimilitude then is but an incidental consideration. Frequently, place-names just serve the mundane purpose of designation, the convenient presence of such features as trees, rocks, bays and others providing the root terms for the names. Even here though, it is possible to be adventurous and the rocks and stones and trees can be conceived fancifully, or even in the full force of belief, in terms of their semblances of animals shapes or of their magical properties. They can also be interpreted as petrifications of human forms (usually heroes or heroines, or ill-fated lovers) or as having historical pertinence in being touched by, or sat upon, or having sheltered some legendary or supernatural personalities.

During the 130 years since Chinese settlers first began coming to Sarawak, the pattern of leadership and power within the Chinese community has changed in a number of important respects. The purpose of this essay is to examine the nature of the changes manifested within the Chinese elite, and to analyze the ways in which the criteria for the selection of leaders and the exercise of power have changed from the establishment of Chinese settlement in the 1830's to the contemporary situation as part of the Malaysian Federation. The emphasis is on leadership and power within the Chinese community itself. At the same time the history of the Chinese elite is treated as a problem in local history.

To what extent can it still be argued that Australia enjoys a ‘special relationship’ with Malaysia and Singapore, and, if such a relationship exists, is its maintenance conditional upon purely strategic advantage? ‘Special relationship’ are elusive concepts in the vocabulary of international diplomacy. Presumably they require both objective and subjective proof of their existence. In other words, it would take more than an affirmation by the Malaysian and Australian governments to show that a special relationship existed between them. Demonstrations of unusual solidarity or harmony of interest would presumably be sought to test the affirmations.

Australasian universities are tied to Southeast Asia in a number of ways. The most obvious is through their teaching. Since the second world war, but more particularly in the past ten or fifteen years, this has paid more attention to Southeast Asia, its peoples, their history and their languages, than at any time since the first university institutions were founded in Australia and New Zealand in the nineteenth century. There are other, perhaps less obvious, ties. The teaching has been primarily at undergraduate level, but the staff members involved have, of course, been involved in research in the area. Possibly the majority would have been trained overseas, if not themselves of overseas origin; but quite recently, and especially at one or two centres, the number of graduate research students has become significant, at least in Australia. Some of the research has been published in book or monograph form by existing Australasian or overseas publishers, or by the university presses, whose numbers have augmented over the past decade.

Tun Abdul Razak, the prime minister of Malaysia, has recently announced that his Government cannot consider the claim to the Limbang River made by the Sultan of Brunei. This dispute has its origins in the 1880's when North Borneo and Sarawak were intriguing against each other to gain possession of the remains of the once powerful Sultanate. Since that time the problem of the Limbang has smouldered continually, every now and then breaking into a fitful glow. The problem is a complex one and has not hitherto received detailed scholarly analysis.