This article presents peasant grievances on the flawed 2000 elections in Hadiya zone, southern Ethiopia. For the first time in Ethiopia's electoral history, an opposition party managed to win the majority of the votes in one administrative zone. In the run-up to the elections, government cadres and officials intimidated and harassed candidates and members from the opposition Hadiya National Democratic Organisation (HNDO). Several candidates and members were arrested and political campaigning was restricted. On election day, widespread attempts at rigging the election took place, and violence was exerted in several places by government cadres and the police. Despite the government's attempt to curtail and control the elections in Hadiya, the opposition party mobilised the people in a popular protest to challenge the government party's political hegemony – and won. If this is an indication of a permanent shift of power relations in Hadiya, it is however, too early to say.

Following a negotiated transition to democracy in South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established to deal with crimes of the past regime. Despite the detail of submissions and the length of the Final Report, this article highlights the partiality of truth recognised by the Commission. The usefulness of acknowledged truth to deal with South Africa's past is shown to have been neutralised by wider concerns of social and criminal justice. In detailing the governmental reticence to provide reparations, the judicial disregard to pursue prosecutions, and the dismissal of responsibility for apartheid at a wider social level, the author argues that opportunities for reconciliation and developmental change are limited. Against the problems of crime, violence and unresolved land issues, the potential of the TRC to build a ‘reconciliatory bridge’ is called into question. The truth offered by the Commission increasingly appears of limited value.

This paper challenges the conclusions of earlier writers regarding the roles of smallholder agriculture, commercial agriculture and wage labour in rural poverty alleviation in Mozambique. We review literature from across Sub-Saharan Africa and use recently collected household level data sets to place Mozambique within this literature. Results show that, as in the rest of SSA, wage labour earnings are concentrated among the best-off rural smallholders; these earnings increase income inequality rather than reducing it. Results also suggest that the same set of households, who are substantially better-off than others, has tended to gain and maintain access to the ‘high-wage’ end of the labour market over time. Key determinants of access to ‘high-wage’ labour are levels of education and previously accumulated household wealth. Income from wage labour plays a key role in lifting out of relative poverty those ‘female-headed’ households that can obtain it, yet only about one in five such households earns wage income. We stress that the rural development question in Mozambique, and elsewhere in SSA, should not be framed as an artificial choice between promoting either wage labour opportunities or commercial agriculture or smallholder agriculture. The issue is what mix of approaches is needed to develop a diversified rural economy with growing total incomes, improving food security and rapid reductions in poverty. We suggest that commercial agriculture and increased rural wage labour are important components in any such strategy, but that this strategy will fail without substantial and sustained increases in the productivity and profitability of smallholder agriculture.

What lessons on the broad issue of successful democratic transitions and consolidation can be drawn from the Senegalese experience? The most import ant inference from this case is that transition is a function not of one factor alone, or even one dominant factor, but a combination of dynamic changes including institutional design and modification, and the attitudes, values and beliefs of the population. In Senegal, modernisation and political culture change activated a movement towards the transition that only became possible as a result of institutional modifications. Institutional reform creates opportunities but does not ensure a successful transition. The issues of social capital, materialism/post-materialism, education, economic security, regime performance, value change, and confidence in institutions in general all come into play to varying degrees. The gradual creation of democratic institutions precedes and contributes to political culture change, independent of economic development. The article draws on survey data, a replication of the world values survey conducted in Senegal, and an analysis of institutional (electoral system) reforms over the last twenty-five years, with comparative data from other African countries.