Preachers of the prosperity gospel in Nigeria criticise politicians’ greed and government corruption, even as many church leaders amass great wealth themselves. Drawing on ethnographic research, this article explores the relationship between Pentecostalism's prosperity gospel and political culture in Nigeria, especially as it pertains to problems of inequality and corruption. The analysis builds on a case study of one particular prosperity church in the city of Umuahia. It addresses the paradox that this brand of Pentecostalism articulates widespread discontent with the venality plaguing national political culture, while at the same time offering divine justification for the pursuit and accumulation of wealth. Examining not only Pentecostals’ interpretations of corruption, but also people's responses to scandals within these churches, the paper attempts to understand why Nigerians who are so aggrieved about corruption and inequality are at the same time drawn to churches that appear to reproduce many of the same dynamics.

African attitudes to income inequality have hardly been studied. As a result, we may have been missing a crucial part of the answer to the question why Africa is so unequal. This paper presents evidence that, across all self-identified class categories, African respondents in 16 African states, representative of all the regions of the continent, are on average considerably more tolerant of inequality than respondents from 43 comparable developing and transition countries. The aim of the paper is to try and explain these differences. It concludes that (a) a modified version of Albert Hirschman's notion of the ‘tunnel effect’ and (b) religious devotedness in the African context provide explanations for the observed variation between African respondents and their counterparts elsewhere. Experienced inequality, in contrast to overall income distribution, influences the tunnel effect more widely than economic growth. Religious belief shapes inequality tolerance in Africa more than the observance of religious practices.

This article examines the use of populist discourse in South African politics. We investigate speeches of leaders from the ruling African National Congress (ANC) and opposition parties, the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). We find that the EFF consistently employs populist appeals, while both the incumbent ANC and official opposition DA largely refrain. Our longitudinal analysis allows an examination of fluctuation across party leaders and electoral cycles, and illustrates that neither the ANC nor the DA have modified their political discourses in light of a rising populist challenger. However, there is some evidence that the two most dominant parties have reformed their programmatic offerings and behaviour in an attempt to compete with the EFF's popular appeal. The South African case offers important insights into the study of oppositional populism on the African continent, and a window into how major political parties may respond to emerging populist contenders.

The article analyses Russia's recent return to Africa. It attempts to answer the question to what extent Russia has abandoned its traditional tools of cooperation such as nuclear energy and military cooperation and engaged in new ‘smart’ ones as indicated by former Foreign Minister Ivanov in 2011. The paper builds on three case studies of African countries having the largest trade volume with Russia in 2018, i.e. Egypt, Algeria and Morocco, and analyses their changing relationship with Russia over the last decade. The results show that Russia has not abandoned its traditional tools but has intensified the use of new ones. The North African region as such has regained significance in Russia's foreign policy. Bilateral relations with all three North African countries have increased at both political and economic levels recently.

Rather than examining what constitutes urban life in a particular city, this paper draws attention to how cities are ‘placed’ along individuals’ life trajectories. The outcome of 15 months of ethnographic research among 102 residents of Lagos's Gowon Estate neighbourhood suggests that Lagos is better understood relationally, through subjective narratives of city life. Given its scale and position among Nigerian cities, the meanings of Lagos to different individuals must be illuminated via an examination of how they ‘place’ those urban places that are important to them – Lagos, hometowns and regional centres – both conceptually and practically within their lived experiences and current livelihoods. In short, this paper exemplifies and advocates a methodology that does not treat cities as a central analytical unit, but instead interprets the meanings of living in cities based on individual inhabitants’ narratives, networks and other aspects of their lived experiences in Lagos and elsewhere.