Recent developments in organ procurement have revived the much-debated role of markets in our health care system. The unique American health care system, with its presumption of universality alongside private health insurance and relatively limited federal and state programs, is in many ways consumer-driven today. We certainly tolerate more broad disparities in availability of care and in outcomes of care largely based on socioeconomic status than do many other developed countries, where notions of universal access are supported by broader public financing.

In the opening years of the 21st century, it became fashionable to describe the human genome as belonging to the common heritage of humanity. The United Nations, in its Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, now identifies the human genome as part of the common heritage, as does the international Human Genome Organization (HUGO) and the Council of Europe. The common heritage concept has played a prominent role in arguments against patenting the human genome or portions thereof. This essay considers whether the common heritage designation will advance the political and legal goals of its proponents.

This essay does not directly address organ transplantation or even issues of justice, fairness, or equality in access to organs for transplantation. Instead, it engages a higher-order question: the justice of coercively and globally imposing any particular contentfull view of justice, fairness, and/or equality (i.e., a view grounded in a particular ranking of primary human goods and/or right-making conditions) under circumstances that would violate peaceable, consensual choice. It is argued that state coercion, as in the prohibition of the sale of organs or the coercive imposition of equal access to transplantations or health care, is unjust when there are insufficient grounds to establish with certainty the canonical normative character of the particular account of justice, fairness, or equality, as well as the warrant for the use of coercive force to impose such an account.

Corporations, through their products and behaviors, exert a strong effect on the wellbeing of populations. Public health practitioners and academics have long recognized the harms associated with some corporations’ products. For example, firearms are associated with approximately 30,000 deaths in the United States each year1 and over 200,000 deaths globally. Motor vehicles are associated with about 40,000 deaths in the United States each year and over 1.2 million deaths globally. Tobacco products kill about 438,000 people each year in the United States5 and about 4.9 million people worldwide. In addition to producing unsafe or harmful products, some corporations behave in ways that negatively impact the public’s health, such as marketing alcohol to youth and other vulnerable populations. Given these observations, one can conclude that it is possible to quantify the public health impact of individual industries, such as firearms, motor vehicles, tobacco, and alcohol. Health professionals can then target these individual industries to prevent or lessen the harms they cause.

The idea that disability insurers would benefit if the use of predictive genetic testing expands may seem little short of obvious. If individuals with higher than species-typical genetic propensities for illness or disease are identified, and barred or discouraged from participating in disability insurance programs, is it not obvious that the amount that disability insurers pay out will decrease? Is there any reason to doubt that insurers thus would gain advantage by promoting genetic testing? Writers on this subject typically have taken on faith that advantage goes to whoever knows most about the genetic characteristics of the individual seeking insurance. They therefore have assumed, without proving, that insurers’ interests lie with proliferating genetic information about insurance seekers.

Consequently, from a perspective that gives priority to commercial interests, denying insurers the freedom to obtain genetic information about insurance seekers or holders appears obviously damaging and even unfair. On the other hand, from a perspective that gives priority to the interests of citizens who may use insurance, the greater use of and access to predictive genetic testing sets off ethical alarms.

Childhood obesity is a national public health problem. Regardless of gender, race, socioeconomic status, or geographic location, children are “gaining weight to a dangerous degree and at an alarming rate.” Since 1980, the number of overweight children has doubled; among adolescents the number has almost tripled. Today, among children who are more than six years old, about nine million are obese. Many of the factors that contribute to obesity occur at a societal level, prompting the Surgeon General to conclude that preventing obesity is a “community responsibility.”

Childhood obesity is, in many important respects, a result of legal policy. Law shapes the situational and environmental influences that drive both dietary intake and physical activity. Government, public health advocates, and the food industry all use the law to alter these influences in furtherance of their respective goals. Public interest advocates attempt to persuade government and corporations to act in the interest of public health while the industry focuses on profit.

Although scientific and commercial excitement about genomic biobanks has subsided since the biotech bust in 2000, they continue to fascinate life scientists, bioethicists, and politicians alike. Indeed, these assemblages of personal health information, human DNA, and heterogeneous capital have become and remain important events in the ethics and politics of the life sciences. For starters, they continue to reveal and produce the central scientific, technological, and economic paradigms so ascendant in biology today: genome, infotech, and market. Biobanks also illustrate what might be called the new distributive politics of biomedical research. Within those politics, the commodification of persons – or at the very least, of their informational representations – has challenged the ontological, ethical, and political underpinnings of the social contract between researchers and their human research subjects. In brief, biobanks are unsettling relations between genes, tissue, medical records, and persons (both individual and collective). But it is also clear that these relations are increasingly being restructured by new rights of control, access, exclusion, and use known as “property,” both material and intellectual.

The obesity epidemic among children and adolescents in the United States continues to worsen. The most recent analysis of data from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey showed that the prevalence of overweight among children and adolescents – defined as a Body Mass Index (BMI) at or above the 95th percentile on gender-specific BMI-for-age growth charts developed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) – increased significantly between 1999-2000 and 2003-2004. Over this period, the prevalence of overweight among children and adolescents aged 2-19 increased 23% – from 13.9% to 17.1%. In 2003-2004, 18.8% of children aged 6-11 and 17.4% of adolescents aged 12-19 were overweight. Roughly comparable proportions of each age group were considered to be at risk of becoming overweight (BMI equal to or higher than the 85th percentile and less than the 95th percentile).

The issue of detention as a tuberculosis control measure has resurfaced following the prolonged detention of a patient with an extensively drug-resistant strain of tuberculosis in a prison cell in Arizona, and the attempted detention in Italy and subsequent detention in Atlanta, Georgia of an American sufferer thought to have XDR-TB in May 2007. These cases have reignited the debate over the evidence that supports detention policy in the control of tuberculosis, and its associated legal and ethical ramifications. This paper considers whether involuntary detention is justified where voluntary measures have failed or where a patient poses a danger, albeit uncertain, to the public, and discusses the need for strengthening evidencebased assessments of public health risk.

Xenotransplantation is defined as “any procedure that involves the transplantation, implantation, or infusion into a human recipient of either (a) live cells, tissues, or organs from a nonhuman animal source, or (b) human body fluids, cells, tissues or organs that have had ex vivo contact with live nonhuman animal cells, tissues, or organs.” Xenotransplantation has been viewed by desperate patients and their surgeons as a solution to the problem of the paucity of human organs available for transplantation. Foes of xenotransplantation argue that the use of animal organs degrades the human race and should be avoided.

In this paper, we briefly review the cultural context of xenotransplantation and explore the infectious disease risk of xenotransplantation. The United States Code of Federal Regulations requires life-long surveillance of a xenotransplantation recipient due to the largely unknown risk of novel infectious disease transmitted across species, known as xenogeneic infectious disease. We argue that despite being in the interest of protecting the public health, the imposition of lifelong surveillance requirements on xenotransplant recipients effectively abrogates the right to withdraw from a clinical trial after the transplantation has taken place. Moreover, we argue that a waiver of the right to withdraw should be made explicit in the interest of full disclosure, out of respect for the research subject’s right of self-determination.

One of the most important and contentious policy issues surrounding genetics is whether genetic information should be treated separately from other medical information. The view that genetics raises distinct issues is what Thomas Murray labeled “genetic exceptionalism,” borrowing from the earlier term “HIV exceptional-ism.” The issue of whether the use of genetic information should be addressed separately from other health information is not merely an academic concern, however. Since the Human Genome Project began in 1990, nearly every state has enacted legislation prohibiting genetic discrimination in health insurance; two-thirds of the states have enacted laws prohibiting genetic discrimination in employment, and other state laws have been enacted dealing with genetic discrimination in life insurance, genetic privacy, and genetic testing. Bills in Congress also would prohibit genetic discrimination in health insurance and employment.

In a recent article published in the Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, David DeGrazia criticized the two pivotal assumptions that underlie President Bush’s policy on funding stem cell research. Those assumptions are (1) that we originate as single-cell zygotes at the time of conception and (2) that we have full moral status as soon as we originate.

In this paper, I would like to concentrate on the first of those assumptions and show in light of recent findings in embryological development that DeGrazia’s criticisms have to be rejected. I shall save my discussion of DeGrazia’s critique of the second assumption for a later article that can take into account DeGrazia’s further elaboration of his position.

The Human Genome Project has allowed researchers to gain new insights into the genetic causes of health and disease. With this knowledge comes the potential to develop new genetic tests that are capable of predicting the risk of disease or disability among presently healthy individuals. This information is potentially beneficial in that it may allow individuals to develop strategies to reduce their risk of illness and may allow health providers to recognize and treat the early stages of disease more effectively. As knowledge about genetic contributions to disease continues to grow and genetic testing technology becomes more widespread, there is a risk that personal genetic information could be used in ways potentially concerning to consumers. Genetic testing technology could potentially be used to discriminate against individuals in terms of their ability to obtain health, life, and disability insurance. Decreased access to insurance, in turn, significantly hinders access to health care and income for oneself and/or for one's dependent(s).

Dramatic events involving dangerous microbes often focus attention on isolation and quarantine as policy instruments. The incident in May-June 2007 involving Andrew Speaker and drug-resistant tuberculosis (TB) joins other communicable disease crises that have forced contemplation or actual application of quarantine powers. Implementation of quarantine powers, which encompasses authority for both isolation and quarantine actions, is important not only for the handling of a specific event but also because the use of such authority provides a window on broader issues of public health and the legal rules, ethical principles, and governance systems that support it. Debates about quarantine powers reflect political and social attitudes about public health that often tell us more about this policy endeavor than acts of isolation and quarantine themselves.

The concept of brain death was recently described as being “at once well settled and persistently unresolved.” Every day, in the United States and around the world, physicians diagnose patients as brain dead, and then proceed to transplant organs from these patients into others in need. Yet as well settled as this practice has become, brain death continues to be the focus of controversy, with two journals in bioethics dedicating major sections to the topic within the last two years.

By way of background, the Uniform Determination of Death Act states that “[a]n individual who has sustained either: (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made in accordance with accepted medical standards.” In other words, death can be defined by either cardiorespiratory or neurological criteria, with “brain death” representing the loss of all brain function. This standard, or closely related variants, has become the accepted approach throughout the United States and in many parts of the world.

We say that celebrated accidents shape public perception of safety and risk in health care. Take the so-called celebrated story of the three Colorado nurses who, by administering bezathine penicillin intravenously, caused the death of a neonate. The nurses were charged with criminal negligence, with one pleading guilty to a reduced charge and another fighting the charge and eventually being exonerated. “Celebrated” accidents (i.e., celebrated in the media and, accordingly, popular imagination, amplified momentarily by the media as it may get ferried along from courtroom to courtroom) seem to follow a predictable script and cast participants in recognizable roles. They present heroes (e.g., a care provider who tried to save the patient despite the odds and errors of others), survivors, and victims. And, of course, they put villains, or anti-heroes, center stage – the chief protagonists of a fatal plot.

Defining “community” from a research perspective is difficult. Communities consist of environmental, social, and geographic components. In addition, race, ethnicity, socio-economic status (SES), and group memberships often play roles in community identity. Barry Wellman and Scot Wortley urge that to truly understand and influence a community, and most certainly to conduct research within communities, one must take into account the varied nature of relationships and networks and how they may work together synergistically to meet the needs of community members. Using the Social Ecological Model, with its delineation of multiple spheres of influence (individual-interpersonal-organizational-community-public policy), community-based research has attempted to reach this understanding. Although dramatic shifts have not yet been realized, many studies suggest improved health behaviors and healthy environments, which indicate a promising future for community intervention work. The discussion that follows reviews the theory and rationale for community-based interventions, the socialecological approach to understanding and studying obesity, and the progress and promise of community interventions.