Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-2pzkn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-17T15:22:16.568Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Testing Representational Advantage in the Argentine Supreme Court

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 October 2022

Sergio Muro ,
Alejandro Chehtman ,
Jorge Silva Méndez  and
Nelson Amaya Durán
Sergio Muro*
Affiliation:
Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
Alejandro Chehtman
Affiliation:
Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
Jorge Silva Méndez
Affiliation:
World Bank
Nelson Amaya Durán
Affiliation:
World Bank
*
Contact the corresponding author, Sergio Muro, at smuro@utdt.edu.
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Even if party capability theory has been well documented, parsing out the reasons why “haves” come out ahead has been challenging. Our study takes advantage of the Argentine Supreme Court’s power to dismiss appeals because they contain formal errors to ascertain the existence of representational advantage. We show that representational advantage plays a significant role, as individual appellants represent a larger proportion of appeals rejected on formal grounds than of those analyzed on their merits. In addition, certain areas of law where asymmetrical capability is prevalent and consistent, particularly labor law, are significantly overrepresented in appeals rejected on formal grounds.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Law and Courts , Volume 6 , Issue 1 , Spring 2018 , pp. 1 - 23
Copyright
© 2018 by the Law and Courts Organized Section of the American Political Science Association. All rights reserved.

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

We are indebted to the research assistants of the Argentine Supreme Court Project (http://www.utdt.edu/listado_contenidos.php?id_item_menu=23499) for their excellent work, as well as to participants in the 2016 inaugural conference of the Argentine Supreme Court Project and three anonymous referees for their insightful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.

References

Albiston, Catherine. 1999. “The Rule of Law and the Litigation Process: The Paradox of Losing by Winning.” Law and Society Review 33:869–910.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Atkins, Burton M. 1991. “Party Capability Theory as an Explanation for Intervention Behavior in the English Court of Appeals.” American Journal of Political Science 35:881–903.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Benedetti, Miguel A., and Sáenz, María J. 2016. Las audiencias públicas de la Corte Suprema. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI.Google Scholar
Black, Ryan C., and Boyd, Christina L. 2013. “Selecting the Select Few: The Discuss List and the U.S. Supreme Court’s Agenda-Setting Process.” Social Science Quarterly 94 (4): 1124–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Caldeira, Gregory A., and Wright, John R. 1988. “Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court.” American Political Science Review 82:1109–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Caldeira, Gregory A., Wright, John R., and Zorn, Christopher J. 2012. “Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court Revisited.” Paper presented at the Seventh Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2109497.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chen, Kong-Pin, Huang, Kuo-Chang, and Lin, Chang-Ching. 2014. “Party Capability versus Court Preference: Why Do the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead?—an Empirical Lesson from the Taiwan Supreme Court.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 31 (1): 93–126.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dotan, Yoav. 1999. “Do the ‘Haves’ Still Come Out Ahead? Resource Inequalities in Ideological Courts: The Case of the Israeli High Court of Justice.” Law and Society Review 33 (4): 1059–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eisenberg, Theodore, and Huang, Kuo-Chang. 2012. “The Effect of Rules Shifting Supreme Court Jurisdiction from Mandatory to Discretionary: An Empirical Lesson from Taiwan.” International Review of Law and Economics 32 (1): 3–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Galanter, Marc. 1974. “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change.” Law and Society Review 9:95–160.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Glenn, Brian J. 2003. “The Varied and Abundant Progeny.” In In Litigation: Do the “Haves” Still Come Out Ahead? ed. Kritzer, H. and Silbey, S., 371–81. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
González Bertomeu, Juan. 2016. “Different Ways of Losing: Public and Private Counsel at the Supreme Court of Argentina.” Working paper, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
González Bertomeu, Juan, Dalla Pellegrina, Lucia, and Garoupa, Nuno. 2017. “Estimating Judicial Ideal Points in Latin America: The Case of Argentina.” Review of Law and Economics 13 (1).Google Scholar
Haynie, Stacia L. 1994. “Resource Inequalities and Litigation Outcomes in the Philippine Supreme Court.” Journal of Politics 56 (3): 752–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Johnson, Timothy R., Wahlbeck, Paul J., and Spriggs, James F. II. 2006. “The Influence of Oral Arguments on the U.S. Supreme Court.” American Political Science Review 100 (1): 99–113.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kapiszewski, Diana. 2006. “La Corte Suprema y la Política Constitucional en la Argentina post-Menem.” Revista jurídica de la Universidad de Palermo 7 (1): 5–46.Google Scholar
Kastellec, Jonathan P., and Lax, Jeffrey R. 2008. “Case Selection and the Study of Judicial Politics.” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 5 (3): 407–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kritzer, Herbert. 1998. “Contingent-Fee Lawyers and Their Clients.” Law and Social Inquiry 23:795–822.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kritzer, Herbert. 2003. “Why Does the Government Come Out Ahead in Appellate Courts?” In In Litigation: Do the “Haves” Still Come Out Ahead? ed. Kritzer, H. and Silbey, S., 342–70. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
Lazarus, Richard. 2009. “Docket Capture at the High Court.” Yale Law Journal 119. https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/docket-capture-at-the-high-court.Google Scholar
McCormick, Peter. 1993. “Party Capability Theory and Appellate Success in the Supreme Court of Canada, 1949–1992.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 26 (3): 523–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Muro, Sergio, Chehtman, Alejandro, Méndez, Jorge Silva, and Amaya Durán, Nelson. 2016. “Dismissing Appeals on Formal Grounds: The Case of the Argentine Supreme Court.” Latin American and Iberian Journal of Law and Economics 2 (1): 1–38.Google Scholar
Owens, Ryan J., and Simon, David A. 2012. “Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket.” William and Mary Law Review 53:1219–85.Google Scholar
Ruibal, Alba. 2009. “Self-Restraint in Search of Legitimacy: The Reform of the Argentine Supreme Court.” Latin American Politics and Society 51 (3): 59–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sheehan, Reginald, Mishler, William, and Songer, Donald. 1992. “Ideology, Status, and the Differential Success of Direct Parties before the Supreme Court.” American Political Science Review 86:464–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Songer, Donald R., and Sheehan, Reginald S. 1992. “Who Wins on Appeal? Upperdogs and Underdogs in the United States Courts of Appeals.” American Journal of Political Science 36:235–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tanenhaus, Joseph, Schick, Marvin, Muraskin, Matthew, and Rosen, Daniel. 1963. “The Supreme Court’s Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue Theory.” In Judicial Decision Making, ed. Schubert, Glendon, 111–32. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.Google Scholar
Wheeler, Stanton, Cartwright, Bliss, Kagan, Robert, and Friedman, Lawrence. 1987. “Do the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead? Winning and Losing in State Supreme Courts, 1870–1970.” Law and Society Review 21:403–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar