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The Brazilian Army and the Problem of Mission, 1939–1964

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 February 2009

Extract

On 1 April 1980, Brazil concluded sixteen years of military-dominated government. While political scientists have taken the lead in examining the origins and methods of the regime in terms of civil-military relations, the role of the military in society, and what might be called military politics, historians have lagged behind in providing analysis from an institutional perspective.1 While the Revolution of 1964 might have occurred even if Brazil had never entered World War II, the Brazilian army's involvement in that conflict and its readjustments to the post-war situation gave shape and substance to that revolution.

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Articles
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1980

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References

1 Stepan, Alfred, The Military in Politics, Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, 1975);Google ScholarSchneider, Ronald M., The Political System of Brazil, Emergence of a ‘Modernizing’Authoritarian Regime, 1964–1970 (New York, 1971);Google ScholarRoett, Riordan, ‘A Praetorian Army in Politics: The Changing Role of the Brazilian Military’ in Roett, R. (ed.), Brazil in the Sixties (Nashville, 1972), pp. 350;Google ScholarStepan, Alfred, ‘The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion,’ in Stepan, A. (ed.), Authoritarian Brazil, Origins, Policies, and Future (New Haven, 1973), pp. 4765.Google Scholar The most useful institutionally-focused historical study is in Carone, Edgard, A República Velha, Instituçóes e Classes Sociais (São Paulo, 1972), pp. 345–72;Google Scholar for the war years and an essay on their consequences, see Branco, Manoel Thomaz Castello, O Brasil na II Grande Guerra (Rio de Janeiro, 1960).Google Scholar For a treatment in English of the army in the war years, see McCann, Frank D. Jr, The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–1945 (Princeton, 1973).Google Scholar

2 Ibid., pp. 403–42.

3 Conn, Stetson and Fairchild, Byron, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense (Washington, 1960), p. 266.Google ScholarU.S. Military Intelligence Service, War Department, ‘Survey of the Rio de Janeiro Region of Brazil,’ Vol. I, 6 Aug. 1942, p. 54.Google Scholar Declassified copy in author's possession. This report indicated troop strength to be 95,500 but it did not cite a source so it is not possible to verify its accuracy. ‘Lei N. 13I de Dezembro 1935,’ Boletím do Exército, 20 Jan. 1936. This set the active army strength for 1936, 1937, 1938 at 74,284, and the reserves at 15,000. It is not likely that these figures represent actual strength since units were often under-strength. Also they do not represent consistent strength because of the annual turnover of draftees and the periodic difficulty of securing sufficient numbers locally.Google Scholar

4 See McCann, Frank D., ‘The Nation in Arms: Obligatory Military Service during the Old Republic’, in Alden, Dauril and Dean, Warren (eds.), Essays Concerning the Socioeconomic History of Brazil and Portuguese India (Gainesville, 1977), pp. 226–8.Google Scholar See also da Fonseca, Mario Hermes and Escobar, Ildefonso, Primórdios da Orgánizaçāo do Defesa Nacional (Rio de Janeiro, 1943), pp. 1328.Google Scholar The shooting clubs (linhas de Tiro) provided periodic military drill and enabled members to pass after a year into the inactive reserve. In 1940, the Minister of War admitted that only about 20 per cent of the military age youths were being called up. da Guerra, Ministério, Relatório apresentado ão Presidente do república dos Estados Unidos do Brasil pelo General do Divisāo Eurico Gaspar Dutra, Ministro do Guerra em Maio de 1940 (Rio de Janeiro, 1940), p. 15.Google Scholar

5 Carone, A República Velha, pp. 345–72, includes a description of the Navy.Google Scholar

6 ‘Survey of the Rio de Janeiro Region,’ p. 57;Google Scholar and McCann, The Brazilian-American Alliance, p. 366.Google Scholar For a detailed listing from Major General to barber 3rd class, see da Guerra, Ministerio, Relatório apresentado ao Presidente da Repúhlica… pelo General de Divisão João Gomes Filho, Ministro de Estado da Guerra, Maio de 1936 (Rio de Janeiro, 1936), pp. 168–9.Google Scholar

7 ‘Survey of the Rio de Janeiro Region,’ p. 60.Google Scholar

8 Stepan, Military in Politics, p. 41;Google ScholarVargas, Getúlio, A Nôua Política do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 1938), III, 129;Google ScholarCarone, A República Veiha, p. 353.Google Scholar

9 Coutinho, Lourival, O General Góes Depōe… (Rio de Janeiro, 1956), p. 2. His father owned a sugar plantation in Alagoās that had seen better days.Google Scholar

10 ‘Decreto 192, de 20 de junho de 1935,’ Diário Official, 11 July 1935. The decree contains the course listing by year. Copy of the decree is in Relatório… (1936), pp. 231–2 cited in note 6.Google Scholar For cadet life, see de Aragão, Colonel Campos, Cadete do Realengo (Rio de Janeiro, 1959).Google Scholar For the development of the Brazilian military academy see Motta, Jehovah, Formaçāo do Oficial do Exército (Currículos e regimes na Academia Militar, 18101944) (Rio de Janeiro, 1976).Google Scholar

11 Called CPOR – Centros de Preparaçāo de Oflciais da Reserva. Discussions of its origin and program are in Lopes, Theodorica and Torres, Gentil, Ministros da Guerra do Brasil, 1808–1946 (Rio de Janeiro, 1947), pp. 301–2;Google ScholarFortes, Heitor Borges, Velho: Regimentos, Ensaio sôbre a evoluçāo de artilharia de campanha Brasileira de 1831 a 1959 (Rio de Janeiro, 1964), pp. 276–9.Google Scholar

12 For sections of constitutions relating to the military, see Gen. Tavares, A. de Lyra, Exército e Naçāo (Recife, 1965), pp. 8997.Google Scholar For the German experience and the so-called indigenous mission that attempted to spread its lessons through the army, see de Carvaiho, Estavão Leitão, Memórias de Um Soldado Legalista (Rio de Janeiro, 1961), Vol. 1.Google Scholar

13 Exército, Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do, Guerras Insurrecionais no Brasil (Canudos e Contestado) (Rio de Janeiro, 1968). This general staff school manual was written by the military history section for use in its courses.Google Scholar

14 For this point of view, seede Carvalho, Estevão Leitão, Dever Militar e Política Partidária (São Paulo, 1959).Google Scholar

15 Sodré, Nelson Werneck, Mernórias de um Soldado (Rio de Janeiro, 1965), p. 61;Google ScholarSodré, N. W., História Militar do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 1965), pp. 199200;Google ScholarCarone, A República Velha, pp. 350–2;Google Scholarde Carvalho, Leitāo, Dever Militar, pp. 34–43;Google ScholarMcCann, , ‘The Military and Change in Brazil,’ in Rippy, Merrill (ed.), Cultural Change in Brazil, Papers from the Midwest Association for Latin American Studies (Muncie, 1969), p. 4.Google Scholar

16 Sodré, Memórias, p. 229.Google Scholar

17 Relatório… 1935, p. 36. Full citation in note 5.Google Scholar

18 For Góes Monteiro, see McCann, The Brazilian-American Alliance; Sodré, Memórias, p. 230. Commenting on his experiences at the staff school, Sodré wrote: ‘que é preciso, antes, constuir o país perfeito, para só depois organizar fôrças militares perfeitas; elas não surgem apriorísticamente, surgem como decorrência do desen-volvimento material e cultural do país: não há Exército eficiente em país pobre.’Google Scholar

19 Coutinho, O General Góes Depāe… pp. 382–4.Google Scholar

20 For information on the militarized state police forces, see Love, Joseph, Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism, 1882–1930 (Stanford, 1971), pp. 254–5;Google ScholarWirth, John, Minas Gerais in the Brazilian Federation, 1889–1937 (Stanford, 1971), pp. 186–92;Google ScholarSilveira, Geraldo Tito, Crônica da Polícia Militar de Minas (Belo Horizonte, 1966);Google ScholarFernandes, Heloisa Rodrigues, Política e Segurança, Fôrça Publica do Estado de São Paulo: Fundamentos Histórico Sociais (São Paulo, 1974);Google ScholarLevine, Robert M., Pernambuco in the Brazilian Federation, 1889–1937 (Stanford, 1978).Google Scholar

21 ‘Survey of the Rio de Janeiro Region,’ p. 24.Google Scholar

22 The constitution specified that they were to be considered auxiliary forces, reserves of the Army. Art. 183 of the Constitution of 1946 said that, in time of foreign or civil war, they were to enjoy the same privileges as the regular army personnel.Google Scholar

23 McCann, The Brazilian-American Alliance, pp. 321–2, 331, 345.Google Scholar

24 Discussed in detail in ibid.

25 ‘Não tinhamos uma organização e uma mobilização para combater alémmar. Sópara combater na América do Sul e internamente.’ In Santos, Francisco Ruas (ed.), Marechal Castello Branco, Seu Pensarnento Militar, 1946–1964 (Rio de Janeiro, 1968), p. 128.Google Scholar

26 On numbers, see Gonçalves, Carlos Paiva (Lt. Col. Medical Corps, Brazilian Army), Seleçãao Médica da Pessoal da F.E.B., Histórico, Funcionarnento e Dados Estanísticos (Rio de Janeiro, 1951)Google Scholar and de Morais, J. B. Mascarenhas, A FEB Pelo Sea Comandante (Rio de Janeiro, 1960), pp. 346–55.Google Scholar At least 302 of the 870 infantry-line officers were reservists. Some of them left a valuable post-mortem in de Arruda, Democrito Cavalcanti, et al. , Depoimento de Oficiais da Reserva Sôbre a FEB. (Rio de Janeiro, 1949).Google Scholar The operations officer of the FEB, Lt. Col. Humberto de Castello Branco, wrote after the war: ‘Na Itália combateram todos os tipos de brasileiros. Havia o militar professional - Oficlais e Sargentos - e a grande massa de reservistas convocados.’ In Santos, Ruas, Marechal Castello Branco, p. 126.Google Scholar

27 Ibid., p. 139.

28 McCann, The Brazilian-American Alliance, pp. 343–77, 304–42. For FEB songs, there is the recording ‘20 Anos Depois: Expedicionários em Ritmos,’ Chantecler Records, São Paulo, release CMG 2397.Google Scholar

29 The incident had a happy result for the historian because the chief of staff, Floriano de Lima Brayner, took out his frustrations in a useful, illuminating, though sometimes disgruntled memoir: A Verdade Sôbre a FEB, Mcmórias de um Chefe de Estado-Maior na Cam panha de Itália (Rio de Janeiro, 1968).Google Scholar

30 General Edson de Figueiredo, as quoted in Stepan, Military in Politics, p. 242.Google Scholar

31 Brayner, Lima, A Verdade Sôbre a FEB, p. 525;Google ScholarSantos, Ruas, Marechal Castello Branco, p. 278. Castello urged this in a talk on 19 September 1955.Google Scholar

32 Branco, Manoel Thomaz Castello, O Brasil na II Grande Guerra, pp. 574–7. Quote from p. 577.Google Scholar

33 See army pamphlets entitled O Seu Exército and Exército, Sua Atividade-Fim, A Grande Escola. The latter describes the army as ‘Uma imensa sala de aulas ão alcance de todos os brasileiros.’ Stepan, Military in Politics, pp. 15–16.Google Scholar

34 Branco, Manoel Thomaz Castello, O Brasil na II Grande Guerra, p. 579.Google Scholar

35 Stepan, Military in Politics, p. 35, table 3·3.Google Scholar

36 Ibid., pp. 32–3.

37 Ibid., pp. 40–1.

38 Schneider, The Political System of Brazil, p. 252.Google Scholar

39 Stepan, Military in Politics, p. 41.Google Scholar

40 Santos, Ruas, Marechal Castello Branco, pp. 252–3.Google Scholar

41 See Castello's 1957 paper, ‘Doutrina Militar Brasileira’ in ibid., pp. 244–70.

42 Stepan, , ‘The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion,’ in Stepan, Alfred (ed.), Authoritarian Brazil, p. 56.Google Scholar

43 Information on courses is from Ministerio do Exército, Departamento de Ensino e Pesquisa, Diretoria de Formação e Aperfeiçoamento (Rio), ECEME, Programa de Maréria e Plano de Matéria, ‘Curso de Comando e Estado-Maior: Curso de Chefia’, 1973. Curriculum research was conducted in August 1973.Google Scholar

44 Stepan, ‘The New Professionalism…’, p. 58.Google Scholar

45 Coelho, Edmundo Campos, Em Busca de Identidade: o Exército e a Política na Sociedade Brasileira (Rio de Janeiro, 1976). He observed (pp. 169–70)Google Scholar that the Army's identity crisis had its origin in the identity crisis of the state which lacked a focal institution which everyone could accept as the ‘incorporation of national authority’, and that through the 1964 movement, the army leadership intended to impose its conception of the national state.