The 1946 election for Venezuela's National Constituent Assembly marked the beginning of democratic electoral processes and the modern party system in that country. Although interrupted by ten years of dictatorship (1948-1958), nine national elections for president and parliament have been held since 1946. In conjunction with these elections, the Venezuelan party system has passed through four stages: a predominant party system (1945-1948), a limited multiparty system (1958-1973), an attenuated two-party system (1973-1993), and recently, the return to a limited multiparty system (1993-) (Sartori 1976).

In his insightful book On the Law of Nations, Daniel Patrick Moynihan states that international law “is not higher law or better law; it is existing law. It is not a law that eschews force; such a view is alien to the very idea of law. Often as not it is the law of the victor; but it is law withal and does evolve” (Moynihan 1990, 19).

Venezuelan politics presents a puzzle to students of Latin America, and to anyone concerned with the comparative analysis of democratization and democracy. As the major countries of Latin America (and the majority of scholars) worked their way from authoritarianism through “transitions”to democracy and hopefully toward democracy’s consolidation, Venezuela moved in the opposite direction. After decades of political stability and social peace, beginning in 1987 Venezuela’s democratic order was shaken by widespread unrest and citizen disaffection, the decay of key parties and state institutions, attempted coups, and the impeachment and removal of the president in 1993.

Implementing market-oriented reforms is often a contentious affair, especially in new democracies. It can be time-consuming when the democratic process permits many opportunities to examine (and to block) controversial proposals. Conversely, when debate is limited by various means, the pursuit of reform can undermine the democratic regime. How, then, can market-oriented reforms and democracy be consolidated simultaneously?

The 1994 presidential election presents a paradox for students of Mexican politics in particular and democratization in general. The year witnessed many numerous and far-reaching changes, both planned and unplanned. An uprising in the state of Chiapas; the assassination of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio; a sweeping electoral reform; and a hotly contested presidential race marked the unprecedented year in Mexican politics. The election results, however, were the same as in every previous presidential election for more than sixty years: a victory by the PRI candidate, in this case Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León. How to explain this? What significance does the outcome have for understanding the process of regime democratization?

During the approximately 30 years in which the exercise of entrepreneurship in a market-oriented setting was effectively prohibited, Cuba actually created a nation of entrepreneurs. Although the intention was to convert Cuba into a “school for socialism,” the reality is that Cuba has also been, in part, a school for market-oriented entrepreneurship. This, indeed, is one of the more surprising and significant paradoxes of the Cuban Revolution. The nature of Cuba’s planned economy itself has inadvertently promoted widespread entrepreneurial values, attitudes, behavior, and savoir-faire, as citizens of necessity have had to buy and sell, truck and barter, hustle and “network” to improvise solutions to their personal economic problems. While entrepreneurial talents have developed broadly among the population, their exercise, until 1993, was restricted to the important but low-level everyday tasks of sustenance and survival, often carried out in the shadow or underground economy or on the black market. But when the space available for entrepreneurial activity was increased with the liberalization of microenterprise beginning in September 1993, the expansion and diversification of microentrepreneurial activity was impressive.

It is difficult to argue with success. Brazil’s public steel firms—once the crown jewels of a state-led model of development—were, by the late 1980s, heavily indebted, unproductive, and dependent on the financial support of a state in fiscal crisis. As if by a wave of the proverbial magic wand, their privatization in the period 1990–94 made them exponentially more productive, financially sound, and competitive. Of the eight major Brazilian steel enterprises, seven were returning profits by the end of 1994. One of the seven, Usiminas, became the most profitable private firm in Brazil in 1993, two years after it was privatized.

The long-drawn-out military conflicts in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala have finally ended. Following the demobilization of the Nicaraguan resistance in 1990, the Salvadoran and Guatemalan guerrilla forces signed peace accords in 1992 (El Salvador) and 1996 (Guatemala) with their respective governments. In the wake of these agreements, Central America presents a new reality. The focus has shifted from war strategies to the consolidation of emerging democratic structures. The revolutionary Left, one of the main protagonists in the conflict that ravaged the region during the 1980s, now confronts a new challenge: it must demonstrate to its supporters and the general public that it indeed presents a viable political alternative.

October 1998 marked the tenth anniversary of the promulgation of Brazil’s most recent democratic constitution—and the debates about how to reform that same constitution have been going on just as long. The continuing efforts at constitutional reform in Brazil suggest the gravity of institutional choice in new democracies. The importance of “getting institutions right” is underscored, in political science, by the notion that institutional choices can undermine or solidify democratic rule.

For thirty years, Cuba was a focal point of the Cold War. Before the demise of the Soviet Union, Cuba’s close ideological and military partnership with the communist superpower posed a challenge to U.S. foreign policy, especially in the Third World (see, e.g., Domínguez 1989). With the end of the Cold War, Cuba retrenched, ending its aid programs for foreign revolutionaries and regimes. Without the Soviet Union’s sponsorship, Cuba could no longer afford the luxury of a global foreign policy exporting revolution. Instead, its diplomats focused on reorienting Cuba’s international economic relations toward Latin America and Europe, building friendly relations with former adversaries.

Until relatively recently, the small, poor countries of Central America were typically regarded as particularly poor candidates for democratization, despite a good measure of early and sustained success in Costa Rica (Ebel 1972, 1984; Rosenberg 1987). Nevertheless, over the years 1984–1996, “transitions to democracy” have been realized throughout the region. Given the extremely negative economic conditions of the 1980s and 1990s and the extent and historical intractability of political violence in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, these transitions via peace processes and “elections of the century” are remarkable achievements. Still, the fullness and consolidation of democracy remain very much up in the air, as is widely the case among countries that have experienced some degree of democratic transition during the last two decades (the so-called “third wave”). This situation raises the prospect of a historical era in which the poorer provinces of the globe are populated largely by “hybrid regimes” that are, at best, highly incomplete democracies.

Federalism has increasingly shaped Brazilian politics in the 1990s. Because the military regime of 1964 to 1985 heavily centralized government in Brasília, civilian political forces since 1985, in reaction, have expanded decentralization in the name of representation and participation. Institutional reforms, free-market (“neoliberal”) policies, and privatizations since 1990 have moved the country away from the legacy of statist authoritarian rule. The executive has lost power to the legislative and judicial branches, the union to states and municipalities, and the state to society, private enterprise, and market forces. The Constitution of 1988 recognized the local government units called municípios (loosely, municipalities) as component parts of the federation and shifted considerable political power and tax resources from the federal government to the states and municipalities (Selcher 1989).