At the beginning of this study of military dictatorship and the political role of the intellectuals in Latin America, Florestan Fernandes (1970: 1) makes the following statement: “The idea that Latin America is a region in which the coups d'état are a political routine has become a commonplace.” Without doubt, such an opinion is justified and also explains—at least to a certain extent—the wealth of “routine” verdicts on the function of the military in Latin America. A contradiction, however, seems evident at this point: while the number of publications on the political and social position of the armed forces is rapidly increasing (McAlister, 1966; Rouquié, 1969), there is an evident lack of comprehensive analyses that go beyond detailed description, and which explain in a reliable and sound manner the phenomenon of the cyclically increasing militarization of politics. It cannot be overlooked that research on the role of the military in Latin America is in a really critical situation which calls for a reexamination of the facts according to new criteria.

The Latin American military is a complex institution in a complex society. It probably has always been, but in the past the dynamics acting upon the change versus order equation have allowed new structural relationships to be worked out over extended periods of time, relatively free from ideological passions and exogenous influences. That time has passed. Probably in no other region of the world are military establishments undergoing the degree of institutional selfexamination and mission redefinition as are the armies of Latin America today. They have neither the development-oriented self-confidence of the armies of the “new” nations, nor the threat-oriented Weltanschauung of the military in the established countries. Previously acceptable roles—as moderators in the political process or guarantors of their own image of the country's traditions—are under examination not only in the society at large but in the heart of the military institutions.

In October of 1968, in what appeared to be the typical and time-honored fashion of Latin American military establishments, the Peruvian Army unseated the constitutionally elected government of Fernando Belaunde Terry. To many in the United States and elsewhere who saw Belaunde as a dedicated reformer in the best tradition of the Alliance for Progress, the golpe represented yet further evidence of the Peruvian military's determination to remain the “watchdog of the oligarchy.” However, the new government, headed by General Juan Velasco Alvarado, declared from the first that, far from being an attempt to defend the oligarchy, their action represented the firm intention of the Peruvian military to carry out the basic reforms that previous civilian governments had been either too weak or too corrupt to effect. Indeed, the new government Velasco promised would be nothing short of nationalist and revolutionary.

Political scientists today are deeply engaged in the search for better ways to study the phenomena within their purview and for more insightful characterizations of political processes. Examination of the politically active military in developing countries has not escaped the trend. Yet this remains a segment of the discipline where impressionism and conjecture still are much in vogue. Indeed, the state of the art of analysis of the military role in less-developed areas is discouraging to some (Nordlinger, 1970). Even without taking a glum view, however, there is ample room to hold that more precise and structured studies of the politicomilitary phenomenon are much needed. The approach to the study of the Latin American military suggested here, which has possible applications to other geographic sectors of the underdeveloped world, is not intended to substitute for, but rather to complement forms of analysis that customarily have been followed.

This paper examines the nature of the U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP) to Latin America and the historical development of the Military Assistance Program in the hemisphere. It further analyzes this program with regard to the two major criticisms levelled at it:

1. (1) that Military Assistance Programs have perpetuated “militarism” in the form of military coups and strong-man military regimes; and

2. (2) that Military Assistance Programs have encouraged large military forces where they are not needed.

Changes in U.S. policy toward Latin America are noted as they affect MAP—i.e., the shift in U.S. policy from one of fostering hemispheric defense to one of promoting internal security and economic development. Finally, an assessment of the impact of this change in U.S. military assistance policy forms the conclusion of this paper.