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The economic importance of judicial institutions, their performance and the proper way to measure them

  • ALAIN MARCIANO (a1), ALESSANDRO MELCARNE (a2) and GIOVANNI B. RAMELLO (a3)

Abstract

In the present paper we contribute to the previous literature on de facto enforcing mechanisms, by focusing on the role of judicial institutions and their performance and measurement. We propose both theoretical and empirical evidence supporting the necessity of a clear distinction between two measures of judicial performance, efficiency and efficacy, which have often been confused in previous literature. Not only might economic actors not be affected to the same extent by these two indicators, but we show that these measures do not even correlate significantly with each other. We also bring evidence against the alleged trade-off between the quality of justice and judicial performance in its quantitative dimension, showing that this relationship is much more complicated than is claimed by some legal scholars.

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Corresponding author

*Corresponding author: Email: giovanni.ramello@uniupo.it

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The economic importance of judicial institutions, their performance and the proper way to measure them

  • ALAIN MARCIANO (a1), ALESSANDRO MELCARNE (a2) and GIOVANNI B. RAMELLO (a3)

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