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Protagoras' Doctrine of Justice and Virtue in the ‘Protagoras’ of Plato

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 December 2013

G. B. Kerferd
G. B. Kerferd
Affiliation:
University of Manchester
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Extract

Protagoras has just been presented with a new pupil, Hippocrates, and he states what he proposes to teach him—such prudence in domestic affairs as will best enable him to regulate his own household, and such wisdom in public affairs as will best qualify him to speak and act in affairs of state (318e). Socrates asks is this the art of politics and is Protagoras undertaking to make men good citizens, and Protagoras agrees (319a). Socrates replies that he had supposed that this art could not be taught, and he gives two grounds: (1) the Athenians are agreed to be wise men, yet, while they call in experts in the assembly to advise them on technical matters, they regard all citizens alike as capable of advising them on matters pertaining to the city (319b–d); (2) the wisest and best of the citizens are not able to hand this virtue on to others. So Pericles educated his sons well in all that could be taught by teachers, but he did not try to teach them, or have them taught his own wisdom, but left them to pick it up unaided (319d–320b).

Now Protagoras, it has been pointed out, is in a difficult position. He is apparently confronted with the choice of admitting that virtue cannot be taught and that his profession is a fraud, or of declaring that the theory of Athenian democracy is false, and his patron, Pericles, is ignorant of the true nature of political virtue. His reply takes the form of a myth, followed by a set argument (Logos). Some have regarded his reply as ‘a tissue of obscure and contradictory ideas,’ while others who have recognised its skill, have regarded it as failing in one way or another to give a satisfactory answer to Socrates' objections. It is the aim of what follows to show that Protagoras' answer is perfectly satisfactory if rightly understood, and that the contrary opinions are due to misunderstandings of what Protagoras actually says in the dialogue.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Hellenic Studies , Volume 73 , November 1953 , pp. 42 - 45
Copyright
Copyright © The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies 1953

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References

1 Prof.Morrison, J. S. in CQ XXXV (1941), 7.Google Scholar This article is in a sense the starting point for what follows, and the criticisms here expressed in no way affect its main contentions.

2 E.g. Gomperz, Th., Greek Thinkers, E.T. II. 309 ff.Google Scholar, Frutiger, , Les mythes de Platon, 183–4.Google Scholar

3 Taylor, , Plato 4243Google Scholar; Raeder, , Platons philosophische Entwickelung 2, 108Google Scholar; Morrison, op. cit. 8; Pohlenz, , Aus Platos Werdezeit, 87 ff.Google Scholar

4 The same day for both animals and men, cf. 320d4 with 321C6–7.

5 This is stated by Zeller, , Ph. d. Gr. I 51120Google Scholar; Raeder, op. cit. 108; Cornford, , Plato's Theory of Knowledge, 82 n. 2Google Scholar; Pohlenz, op. cit. 86.

6 Diels5 80B3.

7 The view expressed by Heinimann, , Nomos und Physis, 116Google Scholar; Loenen, , Protagoras, p. 11 and n. 28Google Scholar; Levi, A., in Mind XLIX (1940), 294 n. 4CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and implied in many other discussions, e.g. Jaeger, , Paideia, E.T. II. 115.Google Scholar

8 The denial that Justice was by nature is attributed to Protagoras and his supporters by Plato, in Theaetetus 172b.Google Scholar Cornford, ad loc., argues curiously that this passage does not refer to Protagoras, in part on the ground that in the Protagoras Plato ascribes to Protagoras the doctrine that Aidos and Dike are by nature. As a result he is forced to adopt a strained interpretation of the passage in the Theaetetus. Though Protagoras is not named, there is no reason to doubt the same doctrine is referred to in Laws 889e, and in Cicero, , De Legibus I. 46–7Google Scholar, on which see Untersteiner, , La dottrina di Protagora e un nuovo testo dossografico in Riv. di Filol. xxii–xxiii (1944–1945), 21 ff.Google Scholar In Euripides Supp. 911, Aidos is the product of upbringing. This passage almost certainly has the doctrine of Protagoras in view, cf. Morrison, op. cit. 14–15.

9 Pointed out by Loenen, op. cit. 12–13, who refers to supporters of the view. To them add Untersteiner, , La fisiologia del mito 311.Google Scholar

10 μετέχω. Where an equal share is meant, ἐξ ἴσου or its equivalent is added, e.g. in Plato, , Rep. VIII, 557a.Google Scholar

11 E.g. Gomperz, E.T. II. 310.

12 So in 323C5–6 is a direct denial of αὐτόματοι in 320a2. Taylor, op. cit. 246, seems to forget this when he says that ‘goodness is merely picked up in the main automatically’.

13 For this cf. Prof.Morrison, in Durham University Journal, XLI (1948–1949), 57 ff.Google Scholar

14 This point is made by Moreau, J., La construction de l'idéalisme platonicien, p. 37Google Scholar; cf. also Gigon, O. in Phyllobolia für Peter von der Mühll, pp. 97–8.Google Scholar

15 Morrison, op. cit. 8–9.

16 Cf. Raeder, op. cit. 108 n. 1.

17 Morrison, op. cit.

18 Taylor, op. cit. 245–7.

19 Cf. e.g. very clearly 324e2–325b1.

20 J. Moreau, op. cit. 37 ff.

21 Cf. Plato's Meno, passim.