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Posidonius' system of moral philosophy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 September 2015

A. Dihle
A. Dihle
Affiliation:
The University of Köln
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Extract

Seneca devoted two of his letters to Lucilius to a problem which had been treated quite differently in previous philosophical doctrine. Letter 94 is written against philosophers who believe that there is no need for praecepta, for single precepts and moral sentences or proverbs concerning individual and specific situations in human life. Moral progress rests solely and entirely upon the knowledge of some basic decreta which belong in the context of a scientific theory and provide sufficient help for every occasion in human life. The second letter, 95, deals polemically with those who admit nothing but praecepta in their educational programme and who reject every kind of dogmatic knowledge. The first group is represented by Aristo the Stoic, whose contempt of praecepta is also attested by Sextus Empiricus. For the other group, Seneca does not quote an authority. He does not mention Cynics and Sceptics who rejected moral and general dogmatism alike, and it seems to be very likely that he was thinking of his own teacher Sotion and the Sextian school who had no interest in ethical theory, but were very famous for their use of moral and psychagogic sentences.

Seneca's own opinion is far from being original. He says that both—praecepta and decreta—are useful and even necessary, and this position was already held by Cleanthes, Panaetius and the majority of Stoics, by Aristotle and other philosophers.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Hellenic Studies , Volume 93 , November 1973 , pp. 50 - 57
Copyright
Copyright © The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies 1973

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References

1 Sext. adv. math. vii, 12 = SVF i, 359.

2 Sotion ap. Stob. 5, p. 972 Hense. The Cyrenaics, too, rejected ethical dogmatism (Sext. adv. math. vii 191; hyp. i 215 = fr. 216 Mannebach), and Seneca knew their doctrine (Ep. 89, 12).

3 fr. 176 Edelstein-Kidd, ∼ Paed. 1Google Scholar, 1. Posidonius is considered the outstanding moral teacher alongside Chrysippus; Sen. Ep. 104, 22.

4 SVF i 582; Cic. de off. iii 5; Aristot. fr. 13 Rose. The chapter περὶ προτροπῶν καὶ ἀποτροπῶν in the orthodox system of the Stoics does not constitute a non-dogmatic section of moral philosophy as the τόπος ὑποθετικός does in Posidonius' system.

5 Panaetius' opinion concerning the inequality of men has been discussed by Pohlenz, M. (Die Stoa i 202Google Scholar). Cf. also Hecato, fr. 14Google Scholar Fowler.

6 K. Reinhardt, RE 22, 732 ff. There is a recent tendency to underrate the heterodoxy of Panaetius and Posidonius by pointing to those fragments where both obviously stick to Stoic orthodox traditions; cf. the articles quoted by Hadot, J., Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung, Berlin 1969, 76Google Scholar f. Posidonius, however, completely disagreed with traditional Stoicism on very important subjects such as psychology and doctrine of values, and his heterodoxy is duly referred to in extant doxographic literature (see notes 13 and 18). So he did not consider virtue the only ἀγαθόν, as MrsHadot, concludes from the famous anecdote Cic. Tusc. ii 61Google Scholar (l.c. 76). He included, as did the Peripatetics and Platonists, good health and wealth (Diog. Laert. vii 103) and, perhaps, good reputation (Leeman, A. D., Mnemosyne v [1952] 57–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar, with reference to Sen. Ep. 102, 3 ff.). Cicero's report, graviter et copiose de hoc ipso, nihil esse bonum nisi quod est honestum cubantem disputavisse, does not contradict. No Peripatetic has ever called wealth or health a value unless accompanied by virtue (cf. Stob, ii 7.14, p. 126 Wachs.).

7 Ἄσκησις following intellectual instruction and leading to the ἑκτικόν of virtue: S VF i 370; iii 138; 214; 471 ff. Accordingly, the therapy of affections begins with intellectual understanding and has to be completed by ἄσκησις = SVF iii 490. Cf. also Scarpat, G., La lettera 65 di Seneca, Brescia 1967, 213Google Scholar.

8 The special relation between officia and praecepta is frequently discussed in Stoic texts: SVF iii 496; 685 ff. ; Cic. ce off. iii 5; Clem. Al. paed. i 107; Simplic. in Epict. ench. 30 p. 82 ff. Dübner.

9 ‘Orthodox’ arguments: 23; 25–26; 31–34; 36; 47–49, ‘unorthodox’ arguments 27/28; 40–46; 50–51.

10 SVF i 375 (Aristo) ἀρετή = ὑγίεια; iii 197 (probably Diogenes of Babylon) iii 278 (Arius Didymus' survey of Stoic ethics) The third definition seems to be explicitly refuted in Seneca's letter.

11 SVF iii 421/422; cf. Sen. Ep. 94, 13: aut inest pravis opinionibus malitia contracta aut, etiam si non est falsis occupatus, ad falsa proclivis est.

11a Seneca does not always argue very consistently in these two letters. 94,36 and 94,13, for instance, clearly refer to the Posidonian concept (cf. Galen, , ὅτι ταῖς τοῦ σώμ. κράσεσι p. 78Google Scholar) 8 ff. Müller; Sen. de ir. ii 19/20), but 94,55 apparently reproduces a different anthropology: erras, si existimas nobiscum vitia nasci (cf. Pohlenz, M., Die Stoa ii 120Google Scholar), which can be found in 94,29, too: omnium honestarum rerum semina animi gerunt (cf. Cic. de fin. v 43).

12 Pohlenz, M., De Posidonii libris περὶ παθῶν (Fleck. Jb. Suppl. 24) 1898Google Scholar; K. Reinhardt, RE 22, 559 ff.

13 Education begins with the irrational part of the soul: Gal. ὅτι ταῖς τοῦ σώμ. κράσεσιν p. 78 f. Mü.; Gal. Plac. p. 445 Mü.; Sen. de ir. ii 18 ff.∼Sen. ep. 94, 40 ff. 51. Possibilities of influencing the irrational part: Gal. Plac. p. 451 ff. Mü.∼Sen. ep. 94, 28; 47; Gal. Plac. p. 392 f. Mü.∼Sen. ep. 94, 40 f.

Natural inequality of men: Gal. Plac. p. 443 Mü.; Gal. ὅτι ταῖς τοῦ σώμ. κράσ. passim∼Sen. ep. 94, 30; 40; 50: 95, 36f.

Σπέρματα τῆς κακίας and the like: Gal. ὅτι ταῖς τοῦ σώμ. κράσ. p. 78 f. Mü.; Gal. Plac. 437 Mü.; Gal. π. ἠθών p. 88, Walzer∼Sen. ep. 94, 13; 7; 36 but, on the contrary, ep. 94, 56. Refutation of the parallel between physical health and moral sanity: Gal. Plac. p. 410 ff. Mü.

14 Panaet. fr. 108 v. d. Str. As for Posidonius, he distinguished between virtues of the ἄλογον, being merely ἔξεις, and virtues of the λογικόν, being ἔξεις as well as ἐπιστῆμαι (Gal. Plac. p. 590 Mü.).

15 Aristo: scientia et habitus animi (Sen. ep. 94, 47) or disciplina et exercitatio (94, 48); cf. Scarpat 1. c. 195.

15a Leeman, A. D. (Mnemosyne vi [1953] 307–313CrossRefGoogle Scholar) assumes that Seneca's project of writing a comprehensive work on moral philosophy was inspired by Posidonius' ἠθικὸς λόγος, and that he was deeply influenced by Posidonius', systematics and dialectics (Mnemosyne vii [1954] 233–240Google Scholar).

16 ἤθη/πάθη/πράξεις: EN 1103a17 ff.; 1105b25 ff.; cf. hist. an. 631b7.

17 Ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ ἄλίως ἔχειν: EN 1134b31 ff.; 1143b3; φρόνησις defined as the understanding καθ' ἕκαστα and opposed to σοφία: EN 1140b21 ff.

18 Strabo (xiii 1. 54) blames Posidonius for his ἀριστοτελίζειν. That seems to refer to very substantial Peripatetic elements in his doctrine rather than to a general attitude, as K. Reinhardt was inclined to believe. But Reinhardt was certainly right in stressing the fact that Posidonius is repeatedly referred to as a quite unorthodox Stoic throughout the literature of the imperial period. The Platonist Galen spoke of him as the ἐπιστημονικώτατος of all the Stoics (ὅτι ταῖς τοῦ σώματος κράσεσιν p. 77 Müller).

19 Αἰτιολογία apart from moral dogmatism was also taught by the Cyrenaics: Sext. adv. math. vii 10 f.; Sen. ep. 89, 12.

20 K. Reinhardt, RE 22, 631–633. Perhaps Seneca's tragedies have to be understood as contributions to ἠθολογία; cf. J. Hadot l.c. 190 f.

20a SVF iii 474 (Chrysippus); cf. J. Hadot l.c. 21.

21 Refutation of praecepta: Epict. diss. ii 2. 31; ii 16. 24; meditation of basic decreta: Epict. diss. vii 2. 1; xi 34. 1; cf. Sen. de benuf. 7. 3. Cf. J. Hadot l.c. 53; 60 f.

22 Aristo invented the parable of the archer in order to refute the teaching of moral praecepta (Sen. ep. 94, 3): The bowman has to learn to handle his bow, not to study the objects he is going to aim at. Chrysippus (Cic. de fin. iii 22) and Panaetius (fr. 109 van der Straaten) approved of the comparison, whereas Plutarchus (de comm. not. 1071 C) objected, perhaps influenced by Posidonius.

23 Edelstein, L., The Idea of Progress in Classical Antiquity, Baltimore 1967, 167Google Scholar ff.

24 The subdivision of the pars moralis philosophiae according to the orthodox Stoic tradition can be seen from Diog. Laet. vii 84. Panaetius', system is described by Cicero, (de off. ii 18Google Scholar) and Seneca (ep. 89, 14; to be added in van der Straaten's collection).

Diogenes Laertius ascribes the orthodox subdivision to Posidonius as well. This is apparently wrong (Dihle, A., Der Kanon der zwei Tugenden, Köln 1968, 27CrossRefGoogle Scholar f.).

25 Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus, Berlin 1930, 104 f.; 140 ff. Cf. Neuenschwander, H. R., Mark Aurels Beziehungen zu Seneca und Posidonius (Noctes Romanae 3), Bern 1951, 60–65Google Scholar.

26 A. Dihle, l.c. passim.

27 Kabiersch, J., Untersuchungen zum Begriff der Philanthropie bei Kaiser Julian, Wiesbaden 1960, 49Google Scholar ff.

28 Loenen, D., Eusebeia en de cardinale deugden (Med.-Nied. Akad. Wet. Lett. 23, 4), 1960Google Scholar.

29 SVF ii 35 f.; Sen. ep. 88, 26; 89, 5; cf. Pohlenz, M., Die Stoa ii 106Google Scholar. Posidonius himself described poetry as μίμησις θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπείων (Diog. Laert. vii 60).

30 A. Dihle, l.c. 23 ff.

31 Marcus Aurelius offers both the bipartition and the tripartition (iii 1; vii 31 and vi 23; viii 27). Slightly different is Epict. diss. ii 14.19.

32 Cf. Pohlenz, M., Die Stoa i 88Google Scholar f.; 105.

33 A selection from the great bulk of parallels is given by A. Dihle, l.c. 25 f.

34 Diog. Laert. vii 84. The treatment Reinhardt gives to the τόπος ὑποθετικός in Posidonius' philosophy seems to me not quite satisfactory (RE 22, 769). Neither he nor Marrou, H. I. (Clément ďAlexandrie, Le pédagogue, Paris 1960Google Scholar, Introduction 10) has duly noted that Seneca coined the term praeceptio or pars praeceptiva (Sen. ep. 95, 1; 65) in order to denote the whole non-dogmatic section in Posidonius' system, of which suasio, exhortatio, consolatio are merely sub-sections (95, 66; 94, 49). Marrou is right in objecting the parallel between praeceptio in Seneca and διδασκαλικὸς λόγος in Clement (paed. i 1.2.1). Praeceptio in the more general sense of instruction is widely used in the language of Roman law, in Cicero and elsewhere (cf. Cic. part. or. 123), but Seneca took the word to translate the Greek term παραινητική. Reinhardt, Marrou, , and Laffranque, Marie in her most learned book (Poseidonios, Paris 1964, 466Google Scholar f.) do not fully take into account the strict bipartition into a dogmatic and a non-dogmatic part Posidonius had in his system. This is, in fact, the most striking innovation. Diogenes Laertius says that all the distinguished Stoics from Chrysippus onwards adopted the same subdivision of the pars moralis. This cannot possibly be true in the case of Posidonius (cf. A. Dihle loc. cit. 27).

35 This does not apply, perhaps, to the τόπος περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος; cf. Hierocl. ap. Stob, i 3 p. 63 f.; ii 9 p. 181 f W.

36 Cf. Hor. ep. ii 1.127 and the quotation from Phaedo, Sen. ep. 94,41. The topic is treated by Guillemin, A. M., REL xxxii (1954) 272Google Scholar f., and J. Hadot, l.c. 16.

37 Phil. Lariss. and Eudor. ap. Stob, ii 7.2 W. The subdivision of δικαιοσύνη according to the partners of man (θεοί, ἄνθρωποι, ἀποιχόμενοι) may also be inspired by Posidonius, (Ps. Aristot. virt, et vit. 1250b15Google Scholar ff.; Diog. Laert. iii 83; Cic. part. or. 78), whereas the orthodox Stoic subdivision is different (Stob, ii 7 p. 6o, 23 W.).

38 Euseb. praep. ev. viii 7.5.

39 Rabbow, P., Seelenführung, München 1954Google Scholar, and Hadot, J., Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der Seelenführung, Berlin 1969, 8Google Scholar ff.