¹ So Coulanges, N.-D. Fustel de, (Questions historiques (Paris, 1893) 121–211Google Scholar, an analysis adopted in various forms by numerous scholars; see literature cited in Fuks, A., JHS xc (1970) 78CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and, most recently, Deininger, J., Der politische Widerstand gegen Rom in Griechenland, 217–86 v. Chr. (Berlin, 1971) 217–19, 226–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² Mommsen, T., Römische Geschichte (Berlin, 1903) ii 42–5Google Scholar; Niese, B., Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten seit der Schlacht bei Chäronea (Gotha, 1903) iii 338, 344Google Scholar; Colin, G., Rome et la Grèce de 200 a 146 avant Jésus-Christ (Paris, 1905) 619–25Google Scholar; Niccolini, G., La confederazione achea (Pavia, 1914) 187, 190, 192–4Google Scholar; Lehmann, G., Untersuchungen zur historischen Glaubwürdigkeit des Polybios (Münster, 1967) 325–9Google Scholar; Larsen, J. A. O., Greek Federal States (Oxford, 1968) 489–90.Google Scholar

³ Briscoe, J., Past and Present xxxvi (1967) 15–19.Google Scholar

⁴ Sanctis, G. De, Storia dei Romani (Florence, 1964) iv 3.132–3, 136–9, 141, 149Google Scholar; Fuks, , JHS xc (1970), 78–9, 86–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar; cf. Morgan, M. G., Historia xviii (1969) 435–6, 438, 440Google Scholar; Schwertfeger, T., Der achaiische Bund von 146 bis 27 v. Chr. (Munich, 1974) 10–12, 16–17.Google Scholar

⁵ Sanctis, De, Storia dei Romani iv 3.144–6, 151–4Google Scholar; Fuks, JHS xc (1970) 79, 84–9.Google Scholar

⁶ Polyb. xxxviii 1.1–2:

⁷ Polyb. xxxviii 1.3: 1.5:

⁸ Polyb. xxxviii 1.4: 1.6: 1.7: 1.9: cf. 3.2; Diod. xxxii 26.1.

⁹ Polyb. xxxviii 3.6–11: cf. Diod. xxxii 26.2–5.

¹⁰ Polyb. xxxviii 3.13, 9.4–5, 10.8, 10.12–13, 11.6–11, 12.5–10, 13.6–8, 15.8, 16.1–10, 17.9–10. The same conclusions expressed in Pausanias: vii 14.4–6, 15.2, 15.7, 16.6. Observe, however, that he contrasts the recklessness and deficiencies of the demagogues with ἀτυχία, thus returning to more normal Greek usage; vii 14.6: It does not follow that he is here repeating a source engaged in polemic against Polybius; as Wachsmuth, C., LeipzStudClassPhil x (1887) 294–6Google Scholar; Segre, M., Historia i (1927) 229, n. 131Google Scholar; Hitzig, H. and Bluemer, H., Pausaniae Graeciae Descriptio (Leipzig, 1904) ii 2.798.Google Scholar

¹¹ Polyb. xxxviii 18.7–12. Elsewhere in Polybius' work ἀτυχία or forms thereof is used without consistent meaning. Generally it signifies simply setback or disaster, with the victims to be pitied; i 55.2, 81.1, 82.10, ii 6.1, 56.6, iii 3.6, 5.6, 20.6, 63.6, 84.13, 85.7, iv 7.3, 13.3, 33.11. 56.1, v 67.4, 74.3, vi 2.5, vii 7.1, 14.5, ix 22.9, 33.2, 39.3, xiv 5.10, xv 22.3, 25.9, 25.24, xxiii 9.2, 10.2, 10.11, xxix 20.4, xxxix 3.3. But on occasion, as here in Book xxxviii, it carries the sense of deserved or self-caused disaster; i 21.9, 37.6, iv 19.13, 21.7, vi 8.6, vii 14.6, ix 12.10, xv 21.5, xviii 14.14, 15.6, xxii 13.9, xxiii 3.5, 10.14, xxx 8.4, 9.21, xxxii 2.8, xxxviii 8.11. And once even equivalent to disgrace; xii 13.5, 14.2.

¹² Polyb. xxxviii 16.7: Cf. Polybius' similar conclusion on the outbreak of the Macedonian revolt under Andriscus. He had endeavoured strenuously to find a rational cause, but, in the end, ascribed it to δαιμονοβλαβεία; xxxvi 17.1–4, 17.13–15.

¹³ Polyb. xxxviii 4.7:

¹⁴ Polyb. iii 4.12–13, 5.6; cf. Walbank, F. W., A Historical Commentary on Polybius (Oxford, 1957) i 302–4Google Scholar; Polybius (Berkeley, 1972) 29–30, 173–4.

¹⁵ Polyb. xxxviii 4.5–9.

¹⁶ On the deportation, Polyb. xxx 7.5–8, 13; Paus, vii 10.7–11; Livy xlv 31.5–11. The Achaean embassies seeking release of the hostages: Polyb. xxx 29.1, 30.1, 32.1–9, xxxii 3.14–17, xxxiii 1.3–8, 3.1–2, 14.

¹⁷ Polyb. xxx 7.5–7, 13.8–10.

¹⁸ Polyb. xxx 32.8:

¹⁹ Polyb. xxxiii 1.3–8.

²⁰ Polyb. xxx 29.1–7.

²¹ Polyb. xxx 32.10–12. Polybian references to οἱπολλοί and τὸ πλῆθος here (xxx 32.8, 32.11, xxxiii 3.2) are not to be taken as allusions to the lower classes; as Deininger, , Widerstand, 212–13Google Scholar. The hostility to Callicrates' party is depicted as general and widespread, not attached to class membership; cf. Polyb. xxx 29.1.

²² The Polybian attitude to Callicrates is well known and consistent; cf. Polyb. xxiv 8–10; and see Gruen, , ‘Class Conflict in Greece and the Third Macedonian War’ (AJAH i (1976) 32–5)Google Scholar. Polybius himself was finally instrumental in obtaining release of the exiles; Polyb. xxxv 6; Plut, . Cato, 9.2–3.Google Scholar

²³ Polyb. xxxix 1.

²⁴ Cf. Polyb. xxx 29.1; Larsen, , Greek Federal States 483–4.Google Scholar

²⁵ Polyb. xxxii 7.1. On the relationship with Polybius, see evidence and discussion in Syll. ³ 626 and notes.

²⁶ C. 154 Callicrates dissuaded the Achaeans from joining a Rhodian war on Crete, asserting that this might evoke Roman disapproval; Polyb. xxxiii 16.2–8. Whether his stance had been concerted in advance with Rome is unattested and an unnecessary assumption. Callicrates had adopted a similar posture with regard to aid for Ptolemy in 169/8; Polyb. xxix 23–25. The decision to stay out of a distant war was a prudent one, especially since both Rhodes and Crete had claims on the Achaeans. One need not infer Roman dictation here.

²⁷ Polyb. xxx 32.8, 32.12.

²⁸ Polyb. xxxii 6.

²⁹ Polyb. xxxii 5.1–3.

³⁰ Polyb. xxiv 10.14: xxx 32.11: Zonaras, ix 31, asserts even that many of the exiles committed suicide—doubtless an error, based on Zonaras' confused reading of Dio or Dio's of Polybius and the fact that when decision was made to release the hostages, many of them were already dead; Polyb. xxxii 3.14–15.

³¹ Polyb. xxx 32.3–7.

³² Polyb. xxxi 33.5, xxxii 2.1, 2.10–12; Appian, , Syr. 47Google Scholar; Diod. xxxi 29; Zon. ix 25. See esp. Polyb. xxxii 2.12: [the senate]

³³ Polyb. xxxiii 1.6.

³⁴ Polyb. xxxv 6.1–2 = Plut. Cato, 9.2–3; Paus. vii 10.12; Zon. ix 31. Hostages from other Greek states, it seems, were released as well; Polyb. iii 5.4; Zon. ix 31.

³⁵ On the earlier stages of the dispute, see Plut, . Cleom. 4.1Google Scholar; Polyb. ii 54.3, ix 33.11–12; Livy xxxviii 34.8; Paus, vii 11.1–2.

³⁶ Polyb. xxxi 1.6–7. Surely not on Roman initiative, as is implied by Larsen, , Greek Federal States 485.Google Scholar The senate would hardly investigate a territorial squabble in the Peloponnese unless requested to do so.

³⁷ Paus, vii 11.1–3. Mention of Argos rather than Megalopolis is probably an error by Pausanias, as generally thought; De Sanctis, , Storia dei Romani, iv 3.129, n. 139Google Scholar. But an additional Spartan dispute with Argos cannot be ruled out.

³⁸ Polyb. xxxi 6.1–5.

³⁹ Paus, vii 11.2:

⁴⁰ Cf. Niese, , Geschichte iii 318, n. 6Google Scholar; contra: Lehmann, , Untersuchungen 312, n. 362.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Cf. the reference to Corcyra of a controversy between Ambracia and Athamania at about this same time; IG ix 690; SEG iii 451; Holleaux, M., Études d'Épigraphie et d'Histoire Grecques (Paris, 1957) v 433–47Google Scholar; Sherk, R. K., Roman Documents from the Greek East (Baltimore, 1969) no. 4.Google Scholar Other instances: Dispute between Priene and Magnesia referred to Mylasa c 161 ?; Inschr. v. Priene, 531; Sherk, Roman Documents, no. 7, with bibliography. Dispute be tween Itanus and Hierapytnia referred to Magnesia c 140?; IC iii 4, no. 9 and no. 10; bibliography in Sherk, Roman Documents, no. 14; add Spyridakis, S., Ptolemaic llanos and Hellenistic Crete (Berkeley, 1970) 55–9Google Scholar. Dispute between Sparta and Messene referred to Miletus c 140; Syll.³ 683. And see below, p. 51.

⁴² Syll. ³ 665. The Roman intervention is men tioned in lines 42–50. Whether this refers to Gallus' action or to another Roman mission is uncertain. In any case, Rome' representatives clearly opted for the status quo. And the recalcitrance of the Spartans, resulting in a fine, was dealt with by Greek judges, not by Roman dictation.

⁴³ Paus, vii 11.3. Schwertfeger, , Der achaiische Bund 8, n. 20Google Scholar, suggests, without argument, that Pausanias has confused Pleuron with Heraclea.

⁴⁴ Polyb. xxxi 1.6–8.

⁴⁵ The tale is accepted without question by Colin, , Rome et la Grèce 500Google Scholar; rightly doubted by Niese, , Geschichte iii 319, n. 1.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Polyb. xxxii 7.1–4; cf. xxx 20.8–9. On the initial expulsion, see Roussel, P., Délos, colonie athénienne (Paris, 1916) 16–17, 384–5.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Polyb. xxxii 7.5:

⁴⁸ Polyb. xxxii 11.5–6.

⁴⁹ Paus, vii 11.4–8.

⁵⁰ Paus, vii 11.4.

⁵¹ Paus, vii 11.5.

⁵² Paus, vii 11.7–8.

⁵³ For example, the assertion that Oropus was an Athenian dependency (Paus, vii 11.4) is, at best, misleading, if not altogether erroneous: cf. U. v. Wilamowitz, , Hermes xxi (1886) 101–2Google Scholar; Ferguson, W. S., Hellenistic Athens (London, 1911) 325, n. 2.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Syll. ³ 675.

⁵⁵ Polyb. xxxiii 2 = Gellius, vi 14.8–10; Plut., Cato, 22.1Google Scholar; Cic. Acad. ii 137; De Rep. iii 9 = Lactan-tius, Inst. Div. v 14.3–5.

⁵⁶ Syll. ³ 675, lines 6–19.

⁵⁷ Syll. ³ 675, lines 23–5:

⁵⁸ Notice too the decree's reference to Oropus as Syll. ³ 675. line 20. A self-interested statement, of course, but not easily compatible with Pausanias' [the Athenians] vii 11.4.

⁵⁹ So Colin, , Rome et la Grèce 504–7Google Scholar, the fullest discussion; similarly, Larsen, , Greek Federal States 486–7Google Scholar. Some lean more heavily on the inscription: Niese, , Geschichte iii 319–20Google Scholar; Dittenberger, , Syll. ³675, n. 3Google Scholar; others on Pausanias: Sanctis, De, Storia dei Romani iv 3.82–83Google Scholar; Lehmann, , Untersuchungen 315–19Google Scholar. Deininger, , Widerstand 220–1Google Scholar, does not even betray awareness of the epigraphic document.

⁶⁰ Syll. ³ 675, lines 1–2.

⁶¹ Polyb. xxxii 3.14, xxxiii 1.3, 3.2; noted by Wilamowitz, , Hermes xxi (1886) 103.Google Scholar

⁶² Syll. ³ 675, lines 18–19: Oropus, of course, alluded to the favour of Rome in seeking Achaean aid, but only in vague terms; lines 11–12, 21–2: She had obviously obtained no concrete satisfaction from the senate.

⁶³ It was about this same time that both Rhodes and Crete sought Achaean support in their conflict; Polyb. xxxiii 16.1–8. And a few years later, when Andriscus overran Macedonia, the people of Thessaly applied first to Achaea for succour; Polyb. xxxvi 10.5; cf. Livy Per. 50.

⁶⁴ Cf. Colin, Rome et la Grèce 507.

⁶⁵ Notice the remarks of Colin, , Rome et la Grèce 611–12, n. 7Google Scholar: ‘c'est une source assez mediocre… mais son récit, pris en lui-meme, se suit bien, sans contradictions. En l'absence de moyens de contrôle, nous n'avons pas de raisons pour le supposer inexact.' A naïve and unacceptable methodology.

⁶⁶ The portrait goes unquestioned by some scholars. Cf. the elaborate denunciation of Achaean moral decline by Lehmann, , Untersuchungen 318–20.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Paus, vii 11.7–13.1.

⁶⁸ Though there is no reason to believe that the returnees pushed Achaea in an anti-Roman direction. Only three hundred survived, according to Paus. vii 10.12. And of these, the only notable ones known are Polybius and Stratius, neither of whom sought conflict with Rome; Polyb. xxxii 3.14–15.

⁶⁹ Zon. ix 31.

⁷⁰ Of his previous career nothing is reported save for the fact that in 168 he was confined in Egypt and released upon request of the Roman legate C. Popillius Laenas; Polyb. xxx 16.2. That hardly justifies the notion that he thereafter pursued a ‘pro-Roman’ policy in Achaea; as Niese, , Geschichte iii 339Google Scholar; Sanctis, De, Storia dei Romani iv 3.129Google Scholar; Lehmann, , Untersuchungen 316Google Scholar; n. 373; cf. Larsen, , Greek Federal States 490: ‘probably enough to make him something of a pro-Roman’.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Such, at least, may be inferred from the fact that Diophanes, an important Achaean politician in the 190s and 180s, was son of a Diaeus; Paus, viii 30.5, viii 51.1. He is last mentioned in 169–if that is, in fact, the same Diophanes: Polyb. xxix 23.2. On his career, see Lehmann, , Untersuchungen 266–84Google Scholar. Whether the younger Diaeus was son of Diophanes cannot be known, but probably of the same family; cf. Niese, , Geschichte iii 339Google Scholar. This does not, however, make him a partisan of Callicrates, as suggested by Lehmann, , Untersuchungen 323–4Google Scholar; properly criticised by Deininger, , RE Suppl. xi 521–3, ‘Diaeus’.Google Scholar

⁷² It was once believed even that Diaeus was among the restored exiles, on the basis of Polyb. xxxviii 17.9: But that is improbable in the extreme. Schweighäuser's old emendation of to now generally accepted, may well be right; the reference is simply to Damocritus—who had been recently exiled; Paus. vii 13.5. In any case, Polybius, himself among the returnees, would hardly characterise the restoration as

⁷³ Assertions along these lines by Niese, , Geschichte iii 337–8Google Scholar, Colin, , Rome et la Grèce 611Google Scholar, et al. are based principally on hindsight.

⁷⁴ Paus, vii 12.2. The mission can hardly have come during Menalcidas' generalship. Probably some years earlier, perhaps in connection with the boundary dispute against Megalopolis; see above.

⁷⁵ Syll ³ 665.

⁷⁶ Paus, vii 12.3–4; for Callicrates' attitude, see Paus, vii 12.2, 12.8.

⁷⁷ Paus, vii 12.4:

⁷⁸ Paus, vii 9.5; cf. Polyb. xxiii 4.7–15; Livy xxxix 48.2–4.

⁷⁹ Paus, vii 12.4–6.

⁸⁰ Notice, for example, that, despite the settlement of 184/3 which banned Achaean jurisdiction in capital cases, the League condemned a Spartan to death in 171; Livy xlii 51.8.

⁸¹ Paus, vii 12.6–7.

⁸² Paus, vii 12.7–9. The presence of Diaeus and Callicrates on the same mission does not argue for political collaboration. One could rarely predict what Callicrates might do; cf. his actions in 180; Polyb. xxiv 8.8–9; and Pausanias' doubts; vii 12.8; Lehmann, , Untersuchungen 321Google Scholar; Deininger, , Widerstand 221–1, n. 10Google Scholar. Callicrates may have gone to shore up his own political position, weakened by the restoration of Achaean exiles.

⁸³ See Pausanias'—perhaps unintentionally—dry remark; vii 12.9:

⁸⁴ For this interpretation, see Niese, , Geschichte iii 340Google Scholar; Sanctis, De, Storia dei Romani iv 3.132–133Google Scholar; Larsen, , Greek Federal States 492Google Scholar. The assertion of Justin, xxxiv 1.5, sed legatis occulta mandata data sunt, ut corpus Achaeorum dissolvermi, is worthless, based on the activities of the embassy in 147.

⁸⁵ Polyb. xxxvi 11.

⁸⁶ Livy, Per. 50: Thessalia…per legatos Romanorum auxiliis Achaeorum defensa est; cf. Polyb. xxxvi 10.5.

⁸⁷ Paus, vii 12.9.

⁸⁸ E.g. Polyb. xxi 1.1–4, xxii 7.5–7, xxiii 9.11–14, xxiv 1.4–7, 2.1–5; Livy xxxviii 32.9–10. Cf. the very similar results from Roman responses to Rhodes and Lycia in 188 and 178; Polyb. xxii 5.1–7, xxv 4.1–6.1.

⁸⁹ Polyb. iii 5.6; Paus, vii 13.1.

⁹⁰ The defeat came in 148, so it is implied by Livy Oxyr. Per. 50; cf. Livy Per. 50; Zon. ix 28; Diod. xxxii 9a; Florus, i 30.4; Eutrop. iv 13; Oros, iv 22.9. Probably in the early spring.

⁹¹ Paus, vii 13.2. The episode in no way indicates that Metellus ‘had been instructed to hold a watching brief over Greece’; as Morgan, , Historia xviii (1969) 433 and n. 61.Google Scholar

⁹² Paus, vii 13.3–5.

⁹³ Cf. Dio, lxxii 1; Zon. ix 31.

⁹⁴ Paus, vii 13.5.

⁹⁵ On the chronology of Metellus' campaign against Andriscus, see the careful discussion by Morgan, , Historia xviii (1969) 426–7Google Scholar. The preten der's uprising is recorded by Zon. ix 28.8—plausibly situated in the winter of 148/7 by Morgan, op. cit., 431–3. Hence, the assertions of Niese, , Geschichte, iii 341Google Scholar, and Sanctis, De, Storia dei Romani, iv 3.135Google Scholar, that Diaeus was faced with a directive from a victorious general, are unwarranted.

⁹⁶ Paus, vii 13.5–6.

⁹⁷ The events registered in Paus, vii 13.7–8—whose narrative here need not be contested.

⁹⁸ Polyb. xxxviii 18.6 alleges that Diaeus executed a Corinthian and his sons for communicating with Menalcidas and for Roman sympathies—a remark that has led some to see him as on an anti-Roman path by mid-147; Deininger, , Widerstand 222Google Scholar; cf. Niese, , Geschichte iii 341, n. 4Google Scholar. A faulty conclusion. Quite apart from Polybian malice against Diaeus, the statement occurs in the chronological context of late 146, the execution having come βραχεί χρόνῳ πρότερον. That Diaeus would openly order the slaying of an opponent on grounds of pro-Roman sentiments in 147—when he was himself cooperating with Metellus—is unthinkable.

⁹⁹ For the chronology, see Morgan, , Historia xviii (1969) 436–7 and n 73.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ So Paus, vii 14. 1—the most explicit account. Justin's formulation, xxxiv 1.5, that the whole League was to be dissolved, is clearly exaggerated. Equally vague is Florus, i 32.2: libertate a Romanis data. The excuse used, that the four cities were newcomers to the Confederacy (Paus, vii 14.1), is, of course, spurious. So also is the pretext, given by other sources, that the cities had once belonged to Philip; Livy Per. 51; Dio xxi 72.1.

¹⁰¹ An exaggerated claim, as Polybius points out; xxxviii 9.1–2—though one that is repeated and embellished by some later sources; Livy Per. 51: legati Romani ab Achaeis pulsati sint; Strabo viii 381; Dio xxi 72.2; Justin xxxiv 1.9. Pausanias' narrative is fullest and reports no violence against Romans; vii 14.2–3. That is confirmed by Cic. Imp. Pomp. 11: legati quod erant appellati superbius…ius legationis verbo violatum. Cf. the cautious statement of Florus, i 32.3: legatosque Romanos, dubium an et manu, certe oratione violava. That notice, with Critolaus as its subject, is probably conflation of two separate Achaean meetings.

¹⁰² Polyb. xxxviii 9.3–5.

¹⁰³ Polyb. xxxviii 10. 1–5: Similarly Dio xxi 72.2. Only a brief and uninformative notice in Paus, vii 14.3. The Latin sources omit this embassy altogether—perhaps unwilling to report any hesitancy or drawing back on the part of Rome.

¹⁰⁴ E.g. Niese, , Geschichte iii 340, 342–4Google Scholar; Sanctis, De, Storia dei Romani iv 3.132, 136–42Google Scholar; Larsen, , Greek Federal States 492–4Google Scholar; Morgan, , Historia xviii (1969) 435–41Google Scholar; Fuks, , JHS xc (1970) 78–9, 86–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schwertfeger, , Der achaiische Bund 7–12Google Scholar; more cautiously, Colin, , Rome et la Grèce 615–20.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ Morgan, , Historia xviii (1969) 433–8Google Scholar. Though the conclusion is unpersuasive, Morgan deserves credit for recognising and confronting the question.

¹⁰⁶ That is clear from Livy's lengthy account of Paullus' activities: mainly sight-seeing and listening to complaints about fifth-columnists; xlv 27–31, 34.9; cf. Plut. Aem. Paull. 28; Polyb. xxx 13, xxxii 5.6; Paus, vii 10.7–11. There was brutal retaliation against Epirote areas which had proved hostile in the war—but no ‘settlement’ by the commission; Polyb. xxx 15; Livy xlv 34.1–6; Plut. Aem. Paull. 29.1–30.1; Strabo vii 327. Rome felt free to arrange affairs in Haliartus, Thisbae, and Coronea; Polyb. xxx 20; Sherk, Roman Documents, no. 2 and no. 3. But these were towns which had fought against her and been subdued. Otherwise, we hear of no territorial changes in Greece, apart from the detaching of Leucas from Acarnania; Livy xlv 31.12. Plutarch's vague statement, [Paullus] counts for little; Aem. Paull. 28.1.

¹⁰⁷ The idea that Caesar's mission was a delaying tactic until the senate could send out a senior magistrate in 146—so Morgan, , Historia xviii (1969) 440—begs the same question.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ Examples are numerous and need not be rehearsed here. See e.g. Polyb. xxii 10–12; Paus. vii 8.6, 9.1; Livy xxxix 33 (on Metellus in 186/5); Polyb. xxiii 4; Livy xxxix 36–7, 48; Paus, vii 9 (on Ap. Claudius in Greece in 184/3); Polyb. xxii 13–14, xxiii 1–2; Livy xxxix 33–35, 47 (on Ap. Claudius in Macedon in 184/3); Polyb. xxiii 5 (on Flamininus in 183/2); Polyb. xxiii 9, xxiv 9.12 (on Philippus in Greece in 183/2); Polyb. xxiii 8–9 (on Philippus in Macedon in 183/2); Livy xlii 47 (on Philippus in 172); Polyb. xxxi 1, 6 (on Gallus in 164).

¹⁰⁹ Polyb. xxiii 9.13:

¹¹⁰ Polyb. xxiii 17.3, xxiv 1.6–7.

¹¹¹ Pausanias' report that the senate instructed Sulpicius Gallus to dislodge as many cities from Achaea as possible in 164 is almost certainly confused and bogus; vii 11.3; see above. Even if it be accepted, however, the patres plainly showed no inclination to implement those instructions.

¹¹² See esp. Livy xlii 43.5: ibi iam motus coeperat esse discedentibus a societate communis concilii Boeotorum quibusdam populis. On the circumstances, confused in the extreme, see Polyb. xxvii 1–2; Livy xlii 38.3–5, 43–4.

¹¹³ Cf. Paus, vii 14.6, 16.9. See the discussions of Accame, S., Il dominio romano in Grecia dalla guerra acaica ad Augusto (Rome, 1946) 193–6Google Scholar; Roesch, P., Thespies et la confederation béotienne (Paris, 1965) 69–71.Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ Polyb. xxxviii 9.6:

¹¹⁵ Polyb. xxxviii 9.8:

¹¹⁶ So Niese, , Geschichte iii 343, n. 6: ‘kaum glaublich’Google Scholar; De Sanctis, , Storia dei Romani iv 3.140, n. 153: ‘al che senza dubbio nessuno imparziale presterà fede’Google Scholar; Fuks, , JHS xc (1970) 86–7Google Scholar: ‘The ruling of the Senate, delivered by Orestes, was no doubt tantamount to a deliberate breaking up of the Achaean League, immediate, or to follow, and no amount of explaining away by Polybius can obscure this’.

¹¹⁷ Cf. Colin, , Rome et la Grèce 618–19, n. 4: ‘il lui arrive souvent de se laisser influencer outre mesure per la tradition officielle de Rome’.Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ E.g. Polyb. xxx 18.1–7, xxxi 2.1–7, 10.7, 21.6, xxxii 10, xxxiii 18.10–11. And see the fuller collection of instances in Walbank, , JRS lv (1965) 5–7Google Scholar; Polybius 168–71.

¹¹⁹ Walbank, , Polybius, 171–81.Google Scholar

¹²⁰ In fact, their judgments clearly incline to the negative: Florus, i 32.1: haec [Corinth]—facinus indignum—ante oppressa est quam in numero certorum hostium referretur; Cic. Imp. Pomp. 11: legati quod erant appellati superbius, Corinthum patres vestri, totius Graecae lumen, exstinctum esse voluerunt; De Off. iii 46: sed ulilitatis specie in re publica saepissime peccatur, ut in Corinthi disturbatione nostri; cf. Livy Per. 51; Eutrop. iv 14.1. Even harsher is the verdict of Justin xxxiv 1.3: quaerentibus igitur Romanis causam belli—but drawn, as it is, from Pompeius Trogus, this does not really qualify as part of the Roman tradition.

¹²¹ Polyb. xxxviii 9.6: [the senate's instructions to Caesar] etc.; see above n. 114.

¹²² He was with Scipio Aemilianus in Carthage and then on various exploratory voyages, before returning to Greece in 146; cf. Walbank, , Polybius 10–12.Google Scholar

¹²³ Polyb. xxii 10, 12.5–10; Paus. vii 8.6, 9.1; Livy xxxix 33.3–8. The eventual outcome, after another embassy, was a compromise settlement arranged by arbiters in Rome; Polyb. xxiii 4.7–15; Paus, vii 9.5; Livy xxxix 48.4.

¹²⁴ Polyb. xxiii 9.5–7. For the embassies and the senate's demeanour, see Polyb. xxii 11.3–4, 13.8–14.6, xxiii 2, 3.1–3, 8.1–2; Livy xxxix 26.14, 29.1–2, 33.3–4, 34.3–35.2, 47, 53.10–11; Appian Mac. 9.6; and the discussion in Gruen, ‘The Last Years of Philip V’ GRBS xv (1974) 225–39.

¹²⁵ Polyb. xxiv 1.2–3, 14.1, 14.10, 15.1, 15.7–12.

¹²⁶ Polyb. xxv 4.5–8, 5.1–6.1; Livy xli 6.11–12, 25.8.

¹²⁷ Livy xlv 34.10–14.

¹²⁸ I Macc. 8.31–32; cf. 9.1–27; Jos. Ant. xii 420–434.

¹²⁹ Polyb. xxxi 10.6–9, 17–19.

¹³⁰ Appian Syr. 47; Zon. ix 24; cf. Polyb. xxxii 11.1, 11.8–9, 12; Diod. xxxi 34.

¹³¹ Polyb. xxxiii 11.5–7, xxxix 7.6; Diod. xxxi 33.

¹³² Appian Mith. 6–7; cf. Polyb. xxxvi 14.1–5; Diod. xxxii 20; Livy Per. 50; Plut. Cato 9.

¹³³ Polyb. xxiv 8.2–3. Polybius himself offers the same sentiments; xxiv 10.11–12.

¹³⁴ Cf. the elaborate intimidation of Rhodes in 167—where, despite appearances, it is hard to believe that Rome seriously contemplated making war; Polyb. xxx 4; Livy xl 20–25; Diod. xxxi 5; cf. Niese, , Geschichte iii 192.Google Scholar

¹³⁵ Niese, , Geschichte iii 343–4Google Scholar; Larsen, , Greek Federal States 493Google Scholar; Fuks, , JHS xc (1970) 87, n. 60Google Scholar; Deininger, , Widerstand 226Google Scholar; Schwertfeger, , Der achaiische Bund 11.Google Scholar

¹³⁶ Polyb. xxxviii 9.3–6; cf. 11.2.

¹³⁷ Paus, vii 14.4: cf. vii 14.3:

¹³⁸ See above, p. 57.

¹³⁹ Polyb. xxxviii 10.1–2; Paus, vii 14.3. On Thearidas, cf. Syll. ³ 626, n. 2.

¹⁴⁰ Paus, vii 14.3–4.

¹⁴¹ Polyb. xiii 10.8, 10.12–13, xxxviii 11.6–11, 12.5–10, 13.6–8.

¹⁴² Paus, vii 14.4.

¹⁴³ Yet that interpretation seems to have gone unquestioned; cf. Niese, , Geschichte iii 344Google Scholar; Sanctis, De, Storia dei Romani iv 3.141Google Scholar; Colin, , Rome et la Grèce 620Google Scholar; Lehmann, , Untersuchungen 325Google Scholar; Deininger, , Widerstand 226–7.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁴ Polyb. xxxviii 10.6–8, 11.7–11, 12.6–7.

¹⁴⁵ Polyb. xxxviii 10.8–11.6; Paus, vii 14.4–5.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Larsen, , Greek Federal States 493: ‘This incident made war inevitable. The deliberately planned insult and frustration must have seemed more offensive to the Romans than the outbreak of mob spirit at the time of the visit of Orestes’.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁷ Cf. Paus, vii 14.4: Polybius' narrative makes it clear that Caesar invited the Spartans to Tegea and that it was only after that invitation that Critolaus decided to cancel the meeting; Polyb. xxxviii 11.2–3.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. Polyb. xxxviii 10.7: τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

¹⁴⁹ Polyb. xxxviii 11.2:

¹⁵⁰ So Polyb. xxxviii 10.10.

¹⁵¹ Polyb. xxxviii 11.6.

¹⁵² Polyb. xxxviii 12.1–3. The same legation may be referred to by Paus, vii 15.1—who, however, puts it after the Roman decision for war. That the senate had sent envoys in the meanwhile is unlikely, despite Pausanias' allusion to ambassadors whose report helped determine the war declaration. A. Postumius was in Greece in the late spring or summer of 146. But evidently after war had been declared; Polyb. xxxix 1.11–12; cf. Münzer, F., RE, xxii, 1, 905 ‘Postumius’, n. 31Google Scholar; Morgan, , Historia xviii (1969) 441, n. 89.Google Scholar

¹⁵³ Polyb. xxxviii 11.10: cf. Diod. xxxii 26.3. On eranos loans, see Fuks, , JHS xc (1970) 80, n. 13Google Scholar; contra: Lehmann, , Untersuchungen 326, n. 393Google Scholar, with literature cited there. That these were measures designed for the military emergency, and not items of social reform, is adequately argued by Fuks, op. cit. 79–81.

¹⁵⁴ Polyb. xxxviii 11.7–9; cf. 13.8; Diod. xxxii 26.4.

¹⁵⁵ Polyb. xxxviii 10.10.

¹⁵⁶ The timing was accidental; Polyb. xxxviii 12.2: κατὰ τύχην ἐλθόντες εἰς τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν.

¹⁵⁷ Polyb. xxxviii 12.3–4.

¹⁵⁸ Polyb. xxxviii 12.8: Diod. xxxii 26.4.

¹⁵⁹ Polyb. xxxviii 13.3: The advocates of compromise were few; Polyb. xxxviii 12.6: Polybius names only Stratius and Evagoras, xxxviii 13.4. On Stratius, see Deininger, , RE, Suppl. xi 1257–8Google Scholar; on Evagoras, Habicht, C., Chiron 2 (1972) 117–18.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁰ Polybius' formulation is clearly retrospective: xxxviii 13.6; Diod. xxxii 26.5. Pausanias erroneously makes this a declaration of war on Rome; vii 14.5. On opposition to Critolaus, see Polyb. xxxviii 12.6, 13.1–5. It is not certain how much truth lies in Polybius' allegation that Critolaus was given monarchical authority; xxxviii 13.7.

¹⁶¹ Paus, vii 15.2:

¹⁶² Paus, vii 14.6, 15.9; Livy Per. 52.

¹⁶³ Paus, vii 15.3–4; cf. Zon. ix 31; Florus i 32.3; Oros. v 3.3; Vir. Ill. 60.2. One report had Critolaus take his life by poison; Livy Per. 52.

¹⁶⁴ Larsen's elaborate reconstruction of Achaean strategy is altogether speculative, with not a hint of support in the evidence; Greek Federal States 495 Critolaus' failure to defend Thermopylae, a fact commented on even by Paus, vii 15.3, is enough to demolish the theory.

¹⁶⁵ Polyb. xxxviii 16.11–12:

¹⁶⁶ Polyb. xxxviii 16.11–12:

¹⁶⁷ See the cogent and convincing exposition of Deininger, , Philologus cxiii (1969) 287–91Google Scholar—who, however, does not explore the ramifications. His thesis was anticipated but not argued by Niese, , Geschichte, iii 347, n. 3.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁸ Paus, vii 15.1 puts this decision after and as a result of reports brought back by Roman envoys and messages sent by Metellus. The envoys referred to are probably not fresh delegations in 146, but the missions of Orestes and Caesar. Thus, a telescoped summary implying a cumulative effect. On the appointment of Mummius, see also Justin xxxiv 2.1; Vell. Pat. i 12.1; Vir. Ill. 60.1. It is put after the death of Critolaus by Zon. ix 31, clearly inaccurate.

¹⁶⁹ Florus i 32.3: Metello … mandata est ultio; cf. Val. Max. vii 5.4. Florus' statement is sometimes doubted; Morgan, , Historia xviii (1969) 441, n. 89Google Scholar. Rivalry with Mummius may have impelled Metellus to move more swiftly, in the hopes of finishing off the war himself; Paus, vii 15.1–2; cf. Florus i 32.4; Vir. Ill. 60.1–2, 61.2. But it is most unlikely that he began operations without any authorisation from Rome. Such a fact would certainly have left some trace in our tradition.

¹⁷⁰ On the Arcadians, Paus, vii 15.5–6; cf. Oros. v 3.3; Thebes, Polyb. xxxviii 16.10; Paus, vii 15.9–10; cf. Polyb. xxxviii 14.1–2, xxxix 1.11; the Patrae contingent, Polyb. xxxviii 16.4–9; cf. xxxix 1.11.

¹⁷¹ Such, at least, is indicated by a decree from Troezen listing resources contributed by corporations in compliance with the League resolution; IG iv 757; Maier, F. G., Griechische Mauerinschriften (Heidelberg, 1959) i no. 32Google Scholar. The activities of Diaeus, coloured, of course, in the darkest terms, are given by Polyb. xxxviii 15; Paus, vii 15.7–8. That these were emergency measures, not aimed at overturning the social structure, is capably argued by Fuks, , JHS xc (1970) 81–4Google Scholar; doubts expressed but not elaborated by Musti, D., Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt i 1 (1972) 1168Google Scholar. Notice e.g. that the liberated slaves were to be home-born and bred, the most loyal in a war; not total or indiscriminate manumission; Polyb. xxxviii 15.3, 15.5, 15.10. We may usefully compare the emergency measures taken by Pergamum in 133: privileges accorded to slaves in certain categories, but not to all; OGIS 338.

¹⁷² Polyb. xxxviii 17.1–4, 18.1–2. Also Andronidas, a former adherent of Callicrates; cf. Polyb. xxix 25.1, xxx 29.2. The favourable reaction of Metellus is given by Paus. vii 15.11, who probably refers to the same episode here. But if his chronology is correct— after the fall of Megara—this may be a later effort at negotiation, on Metellus' intiative. The motive— desire to steal a march on Mummius—is, in any case, plausible.

¹⁷³ Polyb. xxxviii 17.1, 17.9.

¹⁷⁴ Polyb. xxxviii 17.1–18.6.

¹⁷⁵ Polyb. xxxviii 17.7:

¹⁷⁶ Cf. Polyb. xxxviii 16.1: 18.7: cf. xxxviii 12.6. So, rightly, De Sanctis, , Storia dei Romani, iv 3.153Google Scholar; Fuks, , JHS xc. (1970) 87–8Google Scholar. See also the decree from Epidaurus, honoring Acheans who perished in the war; IG iv 894.

¹⁷⁷ The thesis is most recently presented in extenso by Deininger, , Widerstand 220–41Google Scholar. See the criticisms, on a different period, by Gruen, , ‘Class Conflict in Greece and the Third Macedonian War’ (AJAH i (1976) 29–60).Google Scholar

¹⁷⁸ Even Fuks, who does not regard Achaean militancy as confined to the lower orders, sees class connotations in these words; JHS xc (1970) 84–6.

¹⁷⁹ Cf. Gruen, op. cit. 34–5, 42, 45, 57, n. 131.

¹⁸⁰ Polyb. xxxviii 10.7, 11.5, 11.7–9, 11.11, 12.4, 12.10, 13.6, 17.1–2. Nor should special significance be attached to the word ὁ ὄχλος, customarily rendered as ‘mob’. In fact, Polybius uses it in these passages as a synonym for τὸ πλῆθος (cf. xxxviii 11.9 with 11.11; 12.4 with 12.10 and 13.6) or for οἱ πολλοί (cf. 17.1 with 17.2).

¹⁸¹ Polyb. xxxviii 10.6–7: The term τῶν ἀνθρώπων shows well enough that Polybius is not speaking of a social class. That is also clear elsewhere. Notice xxxviii 12.6: ὀλίγοις δέ τισι— not τοῖς ὀλίγοις. And τὸ πλῆθος can be used in a positive context; see 18.4.

¹⁸² Polyb. xxxviii 3.8.

¹⁸³ Paus. vii 15.5.

¹⁸⁴ Polyb. xxxviii 16.4–5, xxxix 1.11; cf. Oros. v 3.2.

¹⁸⁵ Some of the devastation, in fact, had recently been caused by the Thebans; Paus, vii 14.7.

¹⁸⁶ Paus. vii 15.3–4.

¹⁸⁷ Paus, vii 15.6; cf. Oros. v 3.3.

¹⁸⁸ Paus. vii 14.6–7.

¹⁸⁹ Paus. vii 14.6, 15.9; Livy Per. 52; Oros. v 3.2.

¹⁹⁰ Paus, vii 15.9–10; cf. 14.6; Polyb. xxxviii 14.1–2, 16.10.

¹⁹¹ Paus, vii 16.10. Cicero does say that Mummius brought many Achaean and Boeotian cities sub imperium populi Romani dicionemque; Verr. ii 1.55. But this was part of the general post-war settlement, not evidence for prior hostilities against Rome; cf. Paus. vii 16.9. Similarly, dissolution of the Phocian and East Locrian Leagues—if that did, in fact, occur—is not proof of their active engagement in the war; as assumed, e.g. by De Sanctis, , Storia dei Romani iv 3.174–5Google Scholar; Accame, , Il dominio 16–17.Google Scholar

¹⁹² Livy, Per. 52. The subsequent comment that both Thebes and Chalcis were destroyed is manifestly inaccurate.

¹⁹³ Polyb. xxxix 6.5.

¹⁹⁴ Polybius may have included the Euboeans among those who suffered in the war; xxxviii 3.8: If so, this need mean no more than the Chalcidians; Polybius is here listing states and territories, not cities. And Euboea, if Pausanias is to be believed, was compensated after the war; vii 16.10. But see Accame, , Il dominio 190Google Scholar, who regards this as a doublet of Paus, vii 14.7.

¹⁹⁵ Little can be made of Zonaras' vague statement that after the Corinthians abandoned their city, ‘the other Greeks’ surrendered; ix 31.

¹⁹⁶ Principal evidence in Paus. vii 15.11–16.10; Zon. ix 31; cf. Polyb. xxxix 2; Livy Per. 52; Oxyr. Per. 52; Florus i 32.4–7; Vir. Ill. 60.1–3; Oros v 3.5–7.

¹⁹⁷ A similar conclusion seems hinted at by McDonald, A. H., Auckland Classical Essays (1970), 128: ‘The situation was one of force and bluff or, at the best, a tragedy of errors’Google Scholar. But he does not explore the subject in any detail.

¹⁹⁸ Dr J. K. Davies deserves thanks for constructive comments and conversations—not necessarily to be confused with concurrence.