^{page 33 note 1} See the Battle of Plataea, by G. B. Grandy; published among the Supplementary Papers of the Eoyal Geographical Society, 1894.

^{page 33 note 2} Op. cit. pp. 43 fol.

^{page 33 note 3} I find from Holm, Grk. Hist. ii. 75Google Scholar (E.T.) that Delbrück ‘explains the movements of both armies on the basis of correct military principles.’ I have not seen Delbrück's book.

^{page 33 note 4} ix. 16 fol.

^{page 33 note 5} ix. 20.

^{page 33 note 6} ix. 80 fol. cf. c. 83.

^{page 33 note 7} ix. 78 fol., Lampon of Aigina urges Pausanias to maltreat the body of Mardonios: c. 80, Aiginetans buy golden spoil from Helots on pretence that it is brass: c. 85, pretended tomb of Aiginetans at Plataiai.

^{page 34 note 1} Relating the fate of Amompharetos, Aristodemos, Kallikrates, etc. and the rescue of the concubine of Pharandates.

^{page 35 note 1} P. 5 fol. Cf. Leake, , North. Gr. ii. 334Google Scholar and map.

^{page 35 note 2} But modern traffic now follows the loop to the left, which actually passes through Kriekúki.

^{page 35 note 3} See Grundy, pp. 6, 9.

^{page 35 note 4} Grundy, p. 15.

^{page 35 note 5} Mentioned in Thuc. iii. 24, a passage to be discussed later.

^{page 35 note 6} And is an improvement upon the generally received view, in which Hysiai is put at Kriekúki or E. of it, and Erythrai still further E. Grundy, p. 11 fol

^{page 36 note 1} ix. 19:

^{page 36 note 2} ix. 22 fol.: death of Masistios and repulse of the cavalry.

^{page 36 note 3} ix. 25:

^{page 36 note 4} Here must be noticed the strange, but in my opinion quite true, tale of Plutarch relative to the Athenian conspiracy frustrated by Aristeides (c. 13). I cannot follow Holm, (Grk. Hist. ii. 113Google Scholar) in regarding it as ‘altogether improbable.’ On the contrary it is all of a piece with the conduct of the Athenians during the campaign.

^{page 36 note 5} ix. 25:

^{page 37 note 1} P. 16. Cf. Leake, , North. Gr. ii. 332Google Scholar fol.

^{page 37 note 2} P. 16. Leake, , North. Gr. ii. 333Google Scholar. Mr. Grundy states that this spring is 16 stades rom Plataiai. Comparing this with the 12 stades of Apotripi he writes,— ‘It is easy to imagine that a mistake of 4 stades was made in a measurement of the distance by the eye alone: it is not so easy to suppose that the error amounted to 8 stades in a calculated distance of 20.’ Correcting the measurement as above the error comes to a choice between 6 and 8 stades,—an immaterial difference. Be it remembered also that the point to which the measurement is taken (the temple of Hera) is not yet established.

^{page 37 note 3} P. 27.

^{page 37 note 4} P. 33.

^{page 38 note 1} Stream A5 on Mr. Grundy's map.

^{page 38 note 2} Yet Mr. Grandy writes (p. 33): ‘It will be seen on the map that the distance from the position of the Spartans near the spring which Leake (rightly, I think, as I have previously said) identifies with Gargaphia, accords closely with the distance given by Herodotus.’

^{page 38 note 3} Thuo. iii. 24: Grundy (p. 10 fol.) quite accurately gives the route followed by the fugitives.

^{page 38 note 4} Plut. Arist. xi.:

^{page 39 note 1} In other words, taking the path chosen by the Corinthians in their march from the Heraion to the scene of action, as related in Herod, ix. 69: Such would not of course be the usual path from Plataiai to Thebes, but it might well have been followed by the fugitives, whose objective was not Thebes, as it had the advantage of bringing them nearer the passes into Attica while avoiding the obviously dangerous route along the base of Kithairon.

^{page 39 note 2} The words are inserted for no other purpose than to define exactly the preceding phrase —a phrase which was equally applicable to the alternative path mentioned by me. It is ordinarily assumed that the fugitives passed the monument in question. For this opinion I can see no warrant, and I must refuse to acknowledge with Mr. Grundy, that ‘it is evident that Thucydides understood the Ὴρῷον to be less than three-quarters of a mile from Plataea.’ The outcome of this assumption is Mr. Grundy's hypothesis of a triple phase of the Greek second position. AÛthat Thucydides says, is that the fleeing Plataians ran about a mile along that road to Thebes which lay to the left, or west, of the monument: that they actually passed the monument is nowhere stated.

^{page 39 note 3} P. 35 note. An example of wrong method adopted by Mr.Grundy, from Leake, , North. Gr. ii. 354Google Scholar, a passage which Mr. Grundy quotes with approval. Mr. Grundy makes much of Plutarch's failure to mention the νῆσος It will be seen that Plutarch is in the right: the situation of the νῆσος is of no moment, as we might guess from the fact that not one of the Greek contingents ever reached it.

^{page 40 note 1} Plut. Arist. xi.:

^{page 40 note 2} Herod. ix. 25:

^{page 40 note 3} P. 36 note: ‘I think that the words of Herodotus…can only mean that the was on the left of the Greek line, for the can only be the plain between Plataea and the Thespian Asopus, on which, by-the-bye, according to Thucydides the must have stood.’ Cf. p. 17: ‘the of the hero Androcrates, which Herodotus tells us was the other extremity of the line, i.e., on the left wing.’ The same assumption is made by Stein (note in loc.) and Grote, , (Hist. v. 19note 2)Google Scholar, but is rightly combated by Mr.Hunt, (Amer. Journ. of Arch. vol. vi. 471)Google Scholar.

^{page 40 note 4} The same conclusion seems to follow from Paus. ix. 4, 2, where the Temple of Eleusinian Demeter, the of Leïtos and the Spring Gargaphia are apparently grouped together as contiguous to one another. We may note here that Mr. Grundy is altogether wrong in imagining (p. 34) the temple of Demeter here spoken of by Pausanias to be different from that mentioned by Herodotos in his account of the battle.

^{page 40 note 5} Taking into consideration what is told us of the heroön by Plutarch in the passage already quoted, I see in the modern name Platáni (= Plane tree), borne by the locality indicated, a traditional survival of the old Hellenic See Leake's map. The huts round the chapel have apparently disappeared, but the memory of the name remains.

^{page 40 note 6} P. 2.

^{page 40 note 7} The description of the position and its advantages, as given in Diod. xi. 30, 5 is clearly simply modelled upon that of Thermopylai, and cannot be pressed into service here.

^{page 41 note 1} Pp. 22, 43.

^{page 41 note 2} The situation finds its counterpart in the battle of Blenheim. The Asopos did not constitute a more formidable obstacle than did the river Nebel and the marshes on its banks. Compare also the passage of the Granikos by Alexander.

^{page 41 note 3} Cf. Holm, , Grk. Hist. ii. 75Google Scholar (E.T.): ‘the Greeks were well-handled bodies of heavilyarmed infantry.’

^{page 41 note 4} Cf. ix. 25: 31: 49:

^{page 41 note 5} ix. 21.

^{page 42 note 1} Thuc. v. 71.

^{page 42 note 2} Xen., Hell. iv. 2, 19Google Scholar. And at that battle of Mantineia in which Epameinondas fell in 362 B.C. the Tegeans apparently stood next to the Thebans, i.e. the leaders, in this case on the left wing. Cf. Diod. xv. 85, 2: The point is that they stand shoulder to shoulder with the premier corps, whatever its position.

^{page 42 note 3} ix. 28:

^{page 42 note 4} In the second position the Megarians are third in the line, reckoning from the left, i.e. they stand next on the right of the Plataians and Athenians. This place apparently corresponds to that which they held in the first position: for there also they occupied the left centre (cf. ix. 21: this can only have been on the left and left centre of the line). To this we ought to add the consideration that, if the Tegeans had been on the wing in the first position, they would have urged that as an argument here.

^{page 43 note 1} The turn of expression in the concluding sentences (chap. 28) is designedly invidious,— Who does not recognize the curl of the lip in this?

^{page 43 note 2} Observe how skilfully the history of the various soothsayers (ix. 33–38 init.) is used in order to interrupt the narrative and to give the impression of delay in the action.

^{page 43 note 3} ix. 37: Cf. chap. 41:

^{page 43 note 4} Partly also Herodotos design to give expression to his own opinion on the situation.

^{page 43 note 5} ix. 44 fol.

^{page 44 note 1} ix, 45:

^{page 44 note 2} ix. 45: How is this to be reconciled with the words of Artabazos—ix. 41: Cf. Rawlinson, iv. 412 note 9: ‘it is evident from their whole history that the commissariat of the Persians was excellently managed.’

^{page 44 note 3} On the occasion of his visit to Athens as special envoy from Mardonios, Herod, viii. 136. Alexander we there read had a compact of friendship with Athens.

^{page 44 note 4} ix. 45: Cf. chap. 42:

^{page 44 note 5} Hist. of Greece, v. 25.

^{page 45 note 1} Cf. Hom., Il. iii. 90Google Scholar fol. Combat of champions was unsuccessfully used to decide the claims of Sparta and Argos to the Thyreatis, Herod, i. 82 (Thuc. v. 41).

^{page 45 note 2} ix. 49: If it is argued that the cavalry onset was designed to introduce the infantry attack, why did that attack not ensue in due course? Confessedly (according to Herodotos) the cavalry were more successful this day than ever before.

^{page 45 note 3} See Note A on the Asopos of Herodotos.

^{page 46 note 1} Cf. Holm, , Grh. Hist. ii. 60Google Scholar (E.T.).

^{page 46 note 2} Can we, for example, believe that the Athenian version of the retirement of the centre to the Heraion (ix. 52) passed current among the states whose troops were implicated in that movement?

^{page 46 note 3} ix. 49: By a strange inversion the Persian skirmishers lining the Asopos banks are regarded by the tradition as designed to entice the Greeks across the river (chap. 40: ). Such are the marks of a literary battle, not the touches of a man versed in the actual experiences of the field.

^{page 47 note 1} ix. 28:

^{page 47 note 2} Possibly also the Persian change of position, from the left to the right wing, is a genuine incident: the change might very probably be actually made in order to meet the threatened advance of the Greek left.

^{page 47 note 3} This is the truth underlying the garbled account in Plutarch of the grumbling on the part of the Athenians against Pausanias. ‘They thought that Pausanias carried it with a partial and high hand in moving them up and down, like so many Helots, at his pleasure, to face the boldest of the enemy's troops.’ This surely alludes to the disposition of troops previous to the crossing of the river. Plutarch's sequel (the speech of Aristeides and consequent consent of the Athenians to change their position) is merely again the self-laudatory Athenian tradition.

^{page 47 note 4} Contrast the reiterated jubilation found in our Athenian sources over the victory at Marathon with the silence observed with regard to the brilliant achievement of the Spartans and Arkadians at Plataiai.

^{page 47 note 5} ix. 49: Here again the phrasing is used with set purpose.

^{page 47 note 6} Here I may say that I see no sort of evidence for Mr. Grundy's laboured hypothesis of three ‘developments’ of the Greek second position. His theory leaves him with 100,000 men huddled on a single hill, cut off from water, harassed by cavalry, and with morale at zero point. Surely this ‘development’ could issue only in tragedy.

^{page 48 note 1} ix. 54: For Athenian mock modesty, see chap. 46 end.

^{page 48 note 2} ix. 56:

^{page 48 note 3} ix. 62:

^{page 48 note 4}

^{page 48 note 5} This ‘bull-dog obstinacy’ is precisely the quality usually attributed to the Spartans. At any rate Thucydides recognizes this,—v. 73:

^{page 48 note 6} See Note B for the chronology of the events preceding the battle of Plataiai.

^{page 48 note 7} P. 32.

^{page 48 note 8} ix. 50:

^{page 49 note 1} ix. 51: (sc. the ‘Island’),

^{page 49 note 2} Assuming that the town had other sources of supply than the springs commanded by the ‘Island.’

^{page 49 note 3} For what other service engaged the activities of the Helots and light troops in attendance on the hoplites? They were apparently of not the slightest use against the cavalry. We may remark here, by the way, that no one can take seriously their numbers as given by Herodotos.

^{page 49 note 4} ix. 50–57.

^{page 50 note 1} When cut to pieces by the Theban cavalry, ix. 69.

^{page 50 note 2} ix. 51: (sc. the ‘Island’)

^{page 50 note 3} ix. 52: The repetition seems designed to give the impression of panic-stricken retreat. Apparently the town of Plataiai is not approached more nearly than is indicated by the place of the temple. Of course only a small fraction of the centre could have been accommodated within the town: the point is that so far as we can see not a man betakes himself thither.

^{page 50 note 4} See the American Journ. of Arch. vol. vi. (1890) p. 469.

^{page 50 note 5} Yet the identification of the ‘Island’ is generally made the touchstone of theories of Plataian topography. This misconception of the comparative value of the two points is strikingly exemplified by Mr. Grundy, who finds it possible to discuss the operations without reference to the site of the Heraion, other than its incidental mention in a sentence or two on p. 17.

^{page 50 note 6} About eight stades, or one mile, on Mr. Grundy's map.

^{page 50 note 7} ix. 52:

^{page 51 note 1} ix. 69

^{page 51 note 2} And, again, these sections correspond in strength to the wings. The right wing (Lakedaimonians and Tegeans) = ll,500. The left wing (Athenians and Plataians) = 8,600. The united contingents of the centre numbered 18,600. If we take the expression in ix. 69: to give the two extremes of that section, and thus to include the contingents standing between those of Phlious and Megara, we shall find that it numbered 7,300 men. The remainder of the centre was 11,300 strong; the numerical strength of the central sections thus bearing an appropriate relation to the strength of the respective wings. The two sections also contain a nearly equal number of contingents. I think that the mention of the Phliasians is really meant to indicate the point of cleavage of the centre, as above suggested.

^{page 51 note 3} As it is represented in ix. 69: Lower down, the Thebans espy the Megarians

^{page 52 note 1} ix. 56:

^{page 52 note 2} ix. 52: Cf. the expressions used in the fictitious message from Pauaanias, ix. 60.

^{page 52 note 3} ix. 54:

^{page 53 note 1} ix. 61:

^{page 53 note 2} ix. 67: Herodotos has taken care in a previous chapter (ix. 40 end) to prepare for this by magnifying the courage of the Thebans in leading the cavalry charges. When the Athenians co-operate in the assault on the fort (ix. 70)

^{page 53 note 3} Which cuts to pieces the Megarians and Phliasians on their march to the scene of action, ix. 69.

^{page 53 note 4} ix. 50:

^{page 54 note 1} Thuc. v. 71. But there the charge had already begun, and the movement may well have been impracticable. The fact that a court martial condemned the two commanders to banishment proves nothing.

^{page 54 note 2} For Archias see Herod, iii. 55. We need hot enter here upon the vexed question of the Pitanate regiment, the existence of which is denied by Thuc. i. 20.

^{page 54 note 3} So Herodotos (ix. 58 init.) correctly distinguishes between the report brought to Mardonios by his scouting cavalry and the evidence of his own eyes The former refers to the discovery by the cavalry of the true state of the case, notithstanding the presence of the Greek outpost on the hill: the latter indicates that by the time Mardonios made his inspection the rearguard had withdrawn, and the heights upon which the Greek sentinels had been for some days visible were deserted (cf. ).

^{page 54 note 4} ix. 57:

^{page 54 note 5} Ibid.

^{page 54 note 6} ix. 55: (sc. Pausanias)

^{page 54 note 7} ix. 71.

^{page 55 note 1} ix. 53:

^{page 55 note 2} The following also occurs to me,—that Athenian wit gave this turn to the facts in order to exhibit a quasi-comic reductio ad absurdum of the boasted Spartan principle as laid down by Demaratos, Herod, vii. 104: ‘Law forbids them to flee in battle, whatever the number of their foes, and requires them to stand firm and either to conquer or to die.’ The Athenians must have been as weary of hearing this as the Spartans themselves were of hearing about Marathon (Thuc. i. 73).

^{page 55 note 3} Recent Greek history affords an instructive parallel.

^{page 55 note 4} ix. 53:

^{page 55 note 5} ix. 51

^{page 55 note 6} ix. 56:

^{page 55 note 7} It is instructive to notice that it is precisely when in conflict with foreign troops that tactics and strategy are exhibited by the Greek generals, in the earlier period of Greek history. For the whole principle governing such contests was quite other than that governing the intertribal wars. Hence the battles of Marathon, Salamis, and Plataiai stand apart in interest in this respect. It is a difference that is not explicable merely by reference to our fuller knowledge of the details of the operations.

^{page 56 note 1} Aesch. Pers. 812 fol.