I am grateful to Professor A. Andrewes, Mr P. A. Brunt and Mr G. L. Cawkwell for their advice and criticisms; for such defects as remain in this paper I am solely responsible.

¹ Hell. Oxy. 6(1) 1–3.

² It is here assumed that the events described in Hell. Oxy. 6 (1) belong to winter 396/5 and that 9 (4) 1 marks the beginning of a new year in spring 395. (Cf. Meyer, E., Theopomps Hellenika 58 ff.Google Scholar; Beloch, K.J., Griechische Geschichte iii ²1, 66Google Scholar, Jacoby, F., FGH iiC, 10 f.Google Scholar, Bartoletti, V., Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, xiv f.Google Scholar) It is then very likely that the mission of Timocrates, which must in any case belong after the landing of Agesilaus in Asia (cf. Pareti, L., Studi minori di storia antica ii 92Google Scholar), is to be placed after the revolution at Rhodes in summer 396 (cf. Beloch, , GG iii ²2, 216Google Scholar). P certainly does not imply (as is claimed by Barbieri, G., Cenone 91 f.Google Scholar) that the sending of Timocrates preceded the embassy to Persia, in which case it would have to be placed in 397; quite the contrary in fact: it is precisely the activities described in 7 (2) 1 which demonstrate, in P's opinion, that Epicrates and Cephalus were hostile to Sparta before Timocrates’ arrival.

³ The qualification ὡς λέγεται here should not be taken to imply that P is inclined to deny the truth of the statement; προσποιούμενοι rather suggests that he accepted it.

⁴ Those detailed in 7 (2) 1.

⁵ They will no doubt have coincided to some extent with the γνώριμοι καὶ χαρίεντες (cf. Meyer, o.c. 49, Perlman, S., CQ lviii [1964] 66Google Scholar).

⁶ 7 (2) 1. The embassy, for which cf. Isae. xi 8, Androt. 324F18 = Philoch. 328F147, was probably sent out in autumn 397, since Pharax was navarch for 398/7 and took up his command in spring of the latter year, though early 396 is perhaps not im possible, as Pharax's command may have been prolonged well into that year, cf. Pareti, o.c. 88 ff., Jacoby, o.c. 8. It is said that no protest was made about the execution of the envoys (cf. Cloché, P., La politique étrangère d'Athènes de 404 à 338 avant J.–C. 11 f.Google Scholar; Accame, S., Ricerche intorno alla guerra corinzia 48Google Scholar; Barbieri, o.c. 164); for this there is no evidence either way.

⁷ 7 (2) 2. It is, however, worthy of notice that P does not say that Epicrates and Cephaius spoke in favour of acknowledging Demaenetus, for ταῦτα refers only to the sending of arms and men and the embassy to Persia.

⁸ Cf. Beloch, , Die attische Politik seit Perikles 111Google Scholar; Meyer, o.c. 50, Barbieri, o.c. 163, Perlman, o.c. 67. To regard Thrasybulus and those associated with him as in settled control is difficult in view of the decisions of the assembly recorded in Hell. Oxy. 7 (2) 1, which directly contradict what is known of their policy.

⁹ To refer it to championship of the amnesty (cf. Beloch, , Die attische Politik 114 f.Google Scholar) is awkward, since Anytus and Cephaius both supported Andocides at his trial (Andoc. i 115, 150). Interpretation of that highly personal affair in terms of political groupings (cf. Sealey, R., Historia v [1956] 182Google Scholar) is unnecessary and unwise.

¹⁰ The basic difference of opinion was clearly over the proper time to go to war. Cf. Meyer, o.c. 51, Cloché, , REA xxi (1919) 162Google Scholar, Politique étrangère 9, 12, Barbieri, o.c. 165, Perlman, o.c. 67.

¹¹ Xen. Hell. iii 5.8–15.

¹² Cf. Accame, o.c. 43 ff., Perlman, o.c. 72.

¹³ Cf. Xen. Hell. ii 4.2, Lys. fr. 78, Hell. Oxy. 17 (12) 1, Dein, i 25, Diod. xiv 6.3, 32.1, Plut. Lys. 27, Pelop. 6, Justin v 9.4 f. For the antithesis between the demos, which saved the City, and the Spartans, who betrayed it, to have its full effect, the blame for the fall of the oligarchy has to rest on the Spartans alone; to do justice to the efforts of the exiles, and consequently to the help given them by the Thebans, would have undermined the workings of the contrast, and this is probably why that help is passed over in silence.

¹⁴ There is nothing untoward about the similarity of the remark of Thrasybulus in Hell. ii 4.41 (cf. Accame, o.c. 45); the point was a sound one to make in either situation.

¹⁵ Cf. supra, n. 13.

¹⁶ Cf. Xen. Hell. iii 5.2.

¹⁷ As is suggested by Accame, o.c. 43.

¹⁸ Cf. Accame, o.c. 44.

¹⁹ Diod. xiv 82.4. For the lesson to be drawn cf. Xen. Hell. iv 2.11 f.

²⁰ Who were concerned to exploit Athens for their own ends, cf. Hell. Oxy. 17 (12) 1, 18 (13) 1.

²¹ Xen. Hell. iii 5.16. His narrative obscures the fact that Athens was declaring war, since the alliance was with the Boeotians, not with Thebes alone (IG ii² 14 = Tod, , GHI 101Google Scholar, Lys. xvi 13) and Lysander was already in Boeotian territory. Cf. Accame, o.c. 46.

²² Cf. Cloché, REA, o.c. 165; Politique étrangère 14.

²³ For instance Cephalus, for whose attitude to Thebes cf. Beloch, Die attische Politik 117.

²⁴ As suggested by Perlman, o.c. 79.

²⁵ Cf. Accame, o.c. 49, Perlman, o.c. 68.

²⁶ Arist. Eccl. 194 f.

²⁷ Lys. xvi 13; to be dated perhaps in 393 or early 392.

²⁸ Lys. xvi 14, borne out by xiv 14, which must refer to the Haliartus campaign because there was no battle (xiv 5, cf. Xen. Hell. iii 5.22, Paus, iii 5.4 f.).

²⁹ Lys. xiv 14. The passage should not, however, be pressed, since the orator may have exaggerated the temptations to which the hoplites were exposed in order to emphasise the fact of their resistance to them, which is his main point.

³⁰ Paus, iii 5.4, Plut. Lys. 29.

³¹ Lys. xvi 15 f.

³² Xen. Hell. iv 2.23, Dem. xx 52 f. This was presumably the cause of annoyance with Corinth referred to by Arist. Eccl. 199 f. (Some take it to be the enmity between the two cities which existed during much of the fifth century, but Praxagora's speech deals with policy since 395, so an allusion to the Corinthian War is desirable.)

³³ He probably commanded at Coronea too. Whether he is the orator of Arist. Eccl. 195 f. cannot be determined; there were many speakers in favour of the alliance. To draw a parallel between these lines and Lys. xvi 17 is tempting, but probably fanciful.

³⁴ It has been argued that the alliances with the Locrians and Eretrians (IG ii² 15, 16 = Tod 102, 103) were the work of Thrasybulus and reveal his egalitarian attitude towards the allies, which was superseded by the ruthless imperialism of Conon. (Cf. Accame, o.c. 99 f., 129, 134 f., 139.) But, even if Thrasybulus was responsible, a point which remains uncertain, military alliances of this kind, created in response to the necessities of war, will hardly serve to demonstrate the attitude of their authors to the entirely different question of relations with potential members of a revived Athenian empire.

³⁵ Isoc. iv 154, v 63, ix 54 f.

³⁶ Isoc. iv 154.

³⁷ Isoc. ix 52, 55.

³⁸ Thus at iv 142 it is said that if the king had been left to his own devices the fleet might have had to be disbanded, but thanks to Conon and the Corinthian allies (!) the soldiers won a difficult victory. The object here is to show up the king's incompetence and weakness and his dependence on outside help. The military success is Conon's in v 63 and ix 56, whilst the king gets no credit for assembling the fleet: note the carefully impersonal (v 63) and ναυτικοῦ σνλλεγέντος (ix 56). The former passage is intended to demonstrate to Philip that individuals can accomplish great tasks singlehanded; hence not only the king but Evagoras too goes unmentioned. The latter simply glorifies Evagoras and Conon at the king's expense.

³⁹ Cf. Diod. xiv 39.3, Nep. Con. 2.1, 5.1 f., Justin vi 3.4 f.

⁴⁰ Dem. xx 69.

⁴¹ Isoc. v 64, vii 12, 65, ix 56, 68, Dem. xx 68, Dein, i 76. The peculiar claim that Sparta offered the hegemony to Athens (Isoc. vii 65, ix 68) has as its more modest basis in historical fact Sparta's acceptance in 392/1 of the existence of the Athenian fleet. The exaggeration in vii 65 is due to the orator's desire to stress the difference in Athenian relations with Sparta under the oligarchy and under the restored democracy; in ix 68 the motive seems to be no more than a general inflation of the conse quences of the battle to the greater glory of Evagoras. It is sometimes more broadly stated that Cnidus freed the Greeks (Isoc. v 63, ix 56, 68, Dein, i 14, iii 17).

⁴² Dem. xx 68, cf. 70, 74, Dein, i 75.

⁴³ Dem. xx 69, xxii 72–5 = xxiv 180–3.

⁴⁴ Dem. xx 68, x 34 with the comments of Didymus. The treatment of Cnidus in Plat. Menex. 244d–245a is too distorted by laboured rhetorical paradoxes to be of any value.

⁴⁵ Lys. ii 56–60. The speech belongs to 392 or 391, when disillusion with Conon and Cnidus was at its height. No mention is made of the Peace of Antalcidas, and it is plain from the tone of the passage that the war is still in progress. (The present tense ἐγγίγνεχαι in ii 60 would hardly be adequate after the Peace.) Cf. Treves, P., Riv. Fil. lxv (1937) 280 ff.Google Scholar The supposed difficulties seem to me purely imaginary.

⁴⁶ There may well be a reference to the rise of Dionysius, but the sources say nothing of any tyranny which came into being in the period after Cnidus.

⁴⁷ They could of course be described as enslaved in the period between Aegospotami and Cnidus; what matters is the rejection of the view that Cnidus brought them freedom. Cf. Beloch, , GG iii ²1, 87.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Isoc. iv 119. Isocrates talks of the two treaties, whereas Lysias contrasts only two de facto situations. The natural explanation of this is that the war was still in progress at the time when Lysias was writing. That is, his treatment, determined by the require ments of rhetorical symmetry, depends on the state of affairs c. 391, when the Peace of Antalcidas had not yet been made, and not on his views about the existence of the ‘Peace of Callias’. This does not however strengthen the case for the authenticity of the ‘Peace of Callias’; once the Peace of Antalcidas had come into being, the same requirement of symmetry guaranteed the invention of the ‘Peace of Callias’.

⁴⁹ Xen. Hell. iv 8.4 f.

⁵⁰ Plut. Artax. 21, cf. Ages. 23.

⁵¹ Before Cnidus: Ctes. 688F30, Hell. Oxy. 20 (15) 5, Diod. xiv 39.2, 79.5, 7, 81.4, Nep. Con. 4.3; at and after Cnidus: Xen. Hell. iv. 3.11, 8. 2, 6, Dem. xx 68, Diod. xiv 85.2, 4; at the time of his arrest: Xen. Hell. iv 8.16, Nep. Con. 5.3. Cf. Barbieri, o.c. 135 ff., Cawkwell, G. L., NC xvi (1956) 73.Google Scholar

⁵² Xen. Hell. iv 8.12, 16, Diod. xiv 85.4, Nep. Con. 5.1–3.

⁵³ Xen. Hell. iv 8.1 f. The enthusiastic cities were of course in no position to resist. Apart from the overwhelming superiority of the Persians, some at least of the cities had sent troops with Agesilaus (cf. Xen. Hell. iv 3.17) and so were abnormally weak.

⁵⁴ It is dangerous and misleading to speak of adhesion to Conon and quite wrong to equate that with adhesion to the alliance of Athens, as does Cloché, , REA, o.c. 169.Google ScholarCf. the remarkable assertion of Courby, F., BCH xlv (1921) 183Google Scholar, that ‘les Athéniens remportent la victoire de Cnide.’ Such inaccuracy has, however, a long history: Paus, vi 7.6, claiming to quote Androtion, says that Conon persuaded the demos of Rhodes (sc. in 396) to revolt from the Spartans and enter the alliance of the king and the Athenians. The honours to a Rhodian in 394/3 (IG ii² 19) prove nothing about relations between the cities.

⁵⁵ Cf. Robert, L., Rev. Phil. lx (1934) 43 f.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Diod. xiv 84.3. For Ephesus cf. Paus. vi 3.16, who also mentions Samos; for Erythrae cf. Tod 106. Despite (or perhaps because of) the change at Mytilene, the harmost of Methymna survived until 389, cf. Diod. xiv 94.4, Xen. Hell. iv 8.29.

⁵⁷ xiv 84.4.

⁵⁸ As does that of Accame, o.c. 97, cf. also Barbieri, o.c. 155.

⁵⁹ Thus Barbieri, loc. cit.

⁶⁰ Cf. Xen. Hell. iv 8.6 on the object of securing the adherence of the Hellespontine cities.

⁶¹ The view that the ΣΥΝ alliance belongs soon after Cnidus was restated by Cawkwell, , NC, o.c. 69 ff.Google Scholar, and convincingly defended by him, JHS lxxxiii (1963) 152 ff., against the objections of Cook, J. M., JHS lxxxi (1961) 67 ff.Google Scholar The capricious distribution of the coins largely deprives of its force the potential objection that no ΣΥΝ coins of Chios have been found.

⁶² Xen. Hell. iv 8.6, cf. 3.

⁶³ Isoc. xix 18–21. The Siphnian exiles will have joined the expedition before it reached Paros in the hope of restoration to their own city in due course. Events at Paros and the exodus from Siphnos pro voked by the approach of the Persians suggest that Pharnabazus' methods had changed for the worse. On the Cyclades in general cf. Lys. ii 59, Isoc. iv 119. The reference to Paros in Plat. Menex. 245b is totally unhelpful and almost certainly corrupt.

⁶⁴ Though Nicophemus was of course an Athenian (Xen. Hell. iv 8.8).

⁶⁵ There is thus no argument from analogy for the dating of IG xii 1. 977 = Tod 110.

⁶⁶ As is believed by Swoboda, H., RE xi 1328Google Scholar, Barbieri, o.c. 161. The state of the evidence for the date of the restoration of Athenian control over the Delian amphictyony (cf. IG ii² 1634, Coupry, J., BCH lxii [1938] 237 ff.)Google Scholar does not permit any confident conclusion, but in any case armed intervention would hardly have been needed. The recovery of Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros (cf. Xen. Hell. iv 8. 15, Andoc. iii 12, 14) must belong between Cnidus and spring 392, when Antalcidas set off for Sardis, but again there is nothing to suggest that this required active intervention. The inhabitants had not been expelled at the end of the Peloponnesian War (cf. Beloch, , GG iii ² 1, 79 n. 1Google Scholar), and Spartan control had presumably been broken when Pharnabazus and Conon sailed northwards after the battle. For the inhabitants to renew relations with Athens was possible at any time after this without further military action. The recovery of Carpathos is ascribed to Conon on the strength of IG xii 1. 977 = Tod 110, generally dated c. 393, but no arguments have been adduced since those of Foucart, P. (BCH xii [1888] 159 f.)Google Scholar and the remarks of Cook (o.c. 68) are just. Internal evidence shows only that the decree belongs after the battle of Cnidus and perhaps before the final success of the oligarchic coup at Rhodes in 389. The Athenian interference on Carpathos may therefore belong to the last campaign of Thrasybulus: orders might be given to Cnidus (if the restoration is correct) for the sake of Athenian morale, even after Cnidus had relapsed into Spartan hands, and so it would be rash to take the autumn of 391 as terminus ante, whilst on the other hand a reference to Lindus is not impossible if the decree dates from a time of division and upheaval on Rhodes. From the scraps of IG ii² 17 nothing can be gained.

⁶⁷ Xen. Hell. iv 8.9.

⁶⁸ Conon justifies his plan to Pharnabazus by demonstrating that it serves Persian interests: Sparta will be gravely hurt and Athens deeply grateful. But again it could be argued that this was only a pretext to persuade Pharnabazus to further the interests of Athens, with which Conon was really concerned.

⁶⁹ Cf. the brief but brilliant analysis of Cawkwell, NC, o.c. 72 ff.

⁷⁰ Cf. Xen. Hell. iv 8.10.

⁷¹ IG ii² 1656 = Tod 107A; συναναστήσοι in Xen. Hell. iv 8.9 suggests that Conon knew it.

⁷² IG ii² 1657–64.

⁷³ Cf. Isoc. v 64, Dem. xx 72–4, Nep. Con. 4.5, Diod. xiv 85.3, Paus i 2.2, Diog. Laert. ii 39.

⁷⁴ Cf. Barbieri, o.c. 162, 167 f. The importance of the walls as an imperialist symbol should not be underestimated, as it is by Cloché, , Politique étrangère 17 f.Google Scholar; in 392/1 Sparta merely accepted what she was powerless to prevent, as Cloché himself recognises, o.c. 24.

⁷⁵ IG ii² 18, 20 = Tod 108, 109, cf. Beloch, , Die attische Politik 121 f.Google Scholar; contra Sealey, o.c. 183.

⁷⁶ Lys. xix 20.

⁷⁷ Cf. Beloch, , Die attische Politik 121Google Scholar, Swoboda, o.c. 1331, Barbieri, o.c. 173, 188. No such plan appears among the Spartan accusations against Conon in 392. Diodorus is perhaps wrong in saying that an alliance with the Corinthian allies was concluded by Pharnabazus (xiv 84.5, accepted by Beloch, , Die attische Politik 118Google Scholar; cf. Justin vi 5.11): the exhortations of Pharnabazus to the allies in Xen. Hell. iv 8.8 do not presuppose an alliance between them and the king, for the acceptance of Persian money would be quite enough to create, at least in Persian eyes, a duty of loyalty. But it seems that after Conon's return, and probably with his blessing, Epicrates and Phormisius went on an embassy to Susa (Plato frr. 119 ff., Plut. Pelop. 30, Athen. 251a, Arist, i p. 283D, cf. Schol, iii p. 277D, who misdates the reference to 386).

⁷⁸ Arist. Plut. 173, Androt.324F48 = Philoch. 328F150.

⁷⁹ Cf. Sealey, o.c. 184: Iphicrates' grandfather named his son after Conon's father. A less pregnant statement of the facts would be that the fathers of Conon and Iphicrates were both called Timotheus. The supposed service of Iphicrates with Conon in 394/3 is pure conjecture. The co-operation between Iphicrates and Callias in the Corinthiad in 390 (Xen. Hell. iv 5.13) shows merely that neither commander was given to treason.

⁸⁰ Arist. Eccl. 104.

⁸¹ Cf. Schol. Ran. 367.

⁸² For the increase in ecclesiastic pay cf. Arist. Eccl. 183–8, 289–310, 380, Plut. 329 f., AthP. 41.3.

⁸³ Cf. Beloch, , Die attische Politik 119Google Scholar, Accame, o.c. 139, Sealey, o.c. 183. Evidence is again lacking. Even if Conon was an official member of the embassy to Sardis in 392 and it was certain that Callimedon was related to Agyrrhius, there is no reason to assume without further grounds that members of the same embassy must be political friends.

⁸⁴ Cf. Cloché, , REA, o.c. 187Google Scholar, Accame, o.c. 139.

⁸⁵ Lys. xix 19.

⁸⁶ Cf. Hell. Oxy. 15 (10) 1, Xen. Hell. iv 8.8, Diod. xiv 81.4, Lys. xix 12 f., 36.

⁸⁷ It is not my intention to discuss in detail the chronology of the later years of the Corinthian War. The system adopted here is in essence that of Beloch, , GG iii ²2, 217 ff.Google Scholar; cf. also Accame, o.c. 103 ff., Meloni, P., Athen. n.s. xxviii (1950) 300 ff.Google Scholar, Ryder, T. T. B., Koine Eirene 166 ff.Google Scholar Accame's dating of the discussions at Sardis to 393 (o.c. 113 f.) overlooks the fact that at the time of the congress of Sparta Corinth could still be said to be in some sense independent of Argos; cf. Griffith, G. T., Historia i (1950) 243.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Xen. Hell. iv 8.12.

⁸⁹ Xen. Hell. iv 8.14, cf. Wilcken, U., APAW 1941Google Scholar, no. 15, 10, Ryder, o.c. 28.

⁹⁰ Xen. Hell. iv 8.15: συνθέσθαι.

⁹¹ Cf. Martin, V., MH i (1944) 19 f.Google Scholar

⁹² For the precedence of Sardis over Sparta cf. Martin, o.c. 20, MH vi (1949) 131 ff., Accame, o.c. 111 ff., Barbieri, o.c. 175 ff.; the opposite view is argued by Judeich, W., Philol. lxxxi (1926) 142 ff.Google Scholar, Momigliano, A., Ann. Pisa 1936, 98 ff.Google Scholar By the terms proposed at Sparta Athens was to keep her islands and Thebes was to retain the hegemony of the Boeotian League. These points are intelligible only as attempts to iron out the differences revealed at Sardis. Cf. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. v., SB Berlin 1921, 735Google Scholar, Beloch, , GG iii ²1, 81 f.Google Scholar, Foucart, , Mém. Acad. Insc. xxxviii (1909) 169Google Scholar, Barbieri, o.c. 179.

⁹³ Cf. Treves, o.c. 129.

⁹⁴ Sardis: Xen. Hell. iv 8.15; Sparta: Philoch. 328F149. The refusal to abandon the Asiatic Greeks is also cited as a motive for rejecting peace by Plat. Menex. 245b–c. It has been disputed whether the reference is to Sardis or to Sparta; Philochorus has even been forced into agreement with modern interpretations of Plato's words. (Cf. Accame, o.c. 121 f., Ryder, o.c. 30 ff.; contra, Barbieri, o.c. 178.) The problem seems to be an illusion. The congress of Sparta grew out of the wrangle at Sardis, and Plato, not surprisingly, gives an account, perverse and distorted by rhetorical paradoxes, of the results of both sets of negotiations taken together. There is no call to deny (as do Accame, o.c. 117 ff., Ryder, o.c. 32 f.) that Persia had an interest in the conference at Sparta, though it is uncertain whether she sent a representative; presumably Tiribazus sanctioned the amendments to the terms proposed at Sardis and gave a proleptic blessing to such further discussions as Sparta might initiate, whilst undertaking to seek the king's approval of the amended conditions.

⁹⁵ Thus concern for their fate was ample reason for Athens to refuse the peace, pace Accame o.c. 124; cf. Barbieri, o.c. 170, 181, 188.

⁹⁶ Andoc. iii 1.

⁹⁷ Andoc. iii 2.

⁹⁸ 5.

⁹⁹ 7.

¹⁰⁰ 9.

¹⁰¹ 10.

¹⁰² 12.

¹⁰³ 15.

¹⁰⁴ 23.

¹⁰⁵ 29–31.

¹⁰⁶ Andoc. iii 37–40.

¹⁰⁷ 25.

¹⁰⁸ 28.

¹⁰⁹ 32.

¹¹⁰ Arist. Eccl. 193–203. On the date of the Ecclesiazusae it is unlikely that agreement will ever be reached. The scholiast dates the play to 392, and is followed by Cloché, , REA, o.c. 170Google Scholar, Beloch, , GG iii ²2, 226Google Scholar, Jacoby, , FGH iiib Supp. 1, 514, but at 201–3 and 355 f.Google Scholar there are unmistakable allusions to the failure of peace negotiations in winter 392/1. Some therefore date the play to 391 (thus Wilamowitz, o.c. 737, Accame, o.c. 112, 125) on the assump tion that the reference to Epierates' beard in 71 must precede his exile and that the play was therefore produced after the rejection of peace by the assembly but before the condemnation of the envoys. (Cf. Wilamowitz, loc. cit., Accame, o.c. 126, Treves, o.c. 134.) This assumption is quite unjustified; in the passage concerned only beards are in point, so no reference to Epicrates' flight need be expected, whilst his notorious beard might well be remembered long after he had gone into exile. It is therefore possible to put the play in 390 (as formerly Beloch, , Die attische Politik 357Google Scholar), a date to which 197 f. are perhaps more applicable, since Athens’ first serious naval efforts after Persian subsidies had been cut off were made in spring and summer 390 with ships presumably built or fitted out in the winter of 391/0. But decision between 391 and 390 can only be arbitrary.

¹¹¹ Cf. Cloché, , REA, o.c. 171 ff.Google Scholar, Wilamowitz, o.c. 736. The reading ὀργιζεται, with παρακαλούμενος causal, is hardly suitable; what is wanted is some explanation of why σωτηρία was not achieved. From the point of view of sense ὡρᾴζεται, with παρακαλούμενος concessive, is by no means unattractive.

¹¹² 356.

¹¹³ Cf. the just comment of J. van Leeuwen ad loc.: ‘delirantis et vere vesani hominis sunt quae sequuntur.’ His own view is that Thrasybulus uttered the threat that the Athenian fleet would blockade the Peloponnese and cut off supplies: But the wild pear seems to be Thrasybulus’ speech itself.

¹¹⁴ Cf. Accame, o.c. 128, 134, Barbieri, o.c. 190 f.

¹¹⁵ 361 f. There is thus no justification for the view that the rejection of peace was the work only of the so-called radical democrats. (Cf. Beloch, , GG iii ²1, 82Google Scholar, Jacoby, , FGH iiib Supp. 1, 519Google Scholar, Accame, o.c. 127, 131 ff., 139, Sealey, o.c. 185. The only friend of Conon whose attitude to peace is known is Hieronymus, and he was in favour, cf. Arist. Eccl. 201.) The same is true of the condemnation of the envoys; it is unnecessary to look for party political motives to explain Callistratus' action.

¹¹⁶ Lys. ii 58.

¹¹⁷ ii 59 f.

¹¹⁸ ii 63. Cf. Treves, o.c. 282.

¹¹⁹ Xen. Hell. iv 8.19–21, Diod. xiv 97.2 f. Cf. Momigliano, , Riv. Fil. lxiv (1936) 54.Google Scholar It is most probable that Ecdicus sailed shortly after taking office, that is in late summer 391, cf. Pareti, o.c. 100, Accame, o.c. 132, and that Teleutias replaced him extra ordinem as early as was practicable in the following year. The arrival of Teleutias need be postponed till later in the year only if it is assumed that he was navarch for 390/89, against which cf. Pareti, loc. cit.

¹²⁰ Diod. xiv 97.3. Thus Samos is friendly to Sparta when Teleutias puts in there.

¹²¹ Xen. Hell. iv 8.22. The inactivity of Ecdicus at Cnidus presumably accounts for the winter of 391/0.

¹²² Xen. Hell. iv 8.23 f., Diod. xiv 97.4.

¹²³ Xen. Hell. iv 8.24.

¹²⁴ As is suggested by Accame, o.c. 119.

¹²⁵ Arist. Ecel. 104, which strictly speaking proves no more than that Agyrrhius was an important politician of the time against whom the charge of effeminacy could be or had been made.

¹²⁶ Lys. xix 21–3.

¹²⁷ Xen. Hell. iv 8.25; note especially the article before βοηθείας. Cf. Accame, o.c. 7 ff. The view that Thrasybulus' campaigns belong to 389 and 388 (cf. Beloch, , Die attische Politik 125, 127, 345 f.Google Scholar, GG iii² 1, 90, 2, 224 f., Schwahn, W., RE vi A.573Google Scholar, Accame, o.c. 133 ff.) depends partly on the belief that Teleutias was navarch for 390/89, but chiefly on the assumption that Arist. Plut. 550 refers to Thrasybulus Steirieus and implies that he was still alive in February 388. This assumption would not be justified even if Thrasybulus were the subject of εἶναι, but since the subject is in fact Dionysius, the most that the line could be held to prove is that Dionysius was still alive. The form of the comparison also makes unlikely the view (cf. Beloch, , Die attische Politik 126Google Scholar) that Thrasybulus' arrogant behaviour had led to foolish accusations of tyrannical ambition against him, since the natural way to express this point would be to say, not that Dionysius was like Thrasybulus, but vice versa. The reference may of course be to Thrasybulus Collyteus and Dionysius the Athenian general, in which case the passage has no relevance to this context.

¹²⁸ Cf. xiv 94.2: διατρίβων; 3: μετά τινα χρόνον.

¹²⁹ IG xii 1. 977 = Tod 110.

¹³⁰ Diod. xiv 94.2. During which campaign he visited Clazomenae (cf. IG ii² 28 = Tod 114) is uncertain.

¹³¹ Xenophon explains (Hell. iv 8.27) why the people of Byzantium were glad to see numerous Athenians (i.e. Thrasybulus' forces) in their city; where the particular political motive did not apply, the reaction may have been different.

¹³² Xen. Hell. iv 8.26, Diod. xiv 94.2. A fragment of the alliance with Seuthes is preserved (IG ii² 21). For the cities of the Hellespont in general cf. Xen. Hell. iv 8.27, 33 f.; to claim from these passages that Thrasybulus kept on good terms with the satraps (cf. Beloch, , Die attische Politik 129Google Scholar, GG iii² 1, 93) is to go beyond the evidence.

¹³³ Dem. xx 59, cf. IG ii² 24. He probably also won over Samothrace, cf. Xen. Hell. v 1.7.

¹³⁴ Xen. Hell. iv 8.27, cf. Dem. xx 60. On the status of Byzantium from 394 to 390 cf. Cawkwell, , JHS, o.c. 152 f.Google Scholar

¹³⁵ Xen. Hell. iv 8.28, Diod. xiv 94.3.

¹³⁶ There is no reason to suppose that there had been a recent movement towards Sparta in the cities of Lesbos. The pluperfects κατεπεφεύγεσαν (Xen. Hell. iv 8.28) and ἀφειστήκεσαν (Diod. xiv 94.3) should be allowed their full value. The latter is a further interesting example of the continuity of conception which existed at Athens concerning the empire; fifth-century rebels were still rebels in 389, despite the intervention of the Spartan hegemony.

¹³⁷ Diod. xiv 94.3.

¹³⁸ Xen. Hell. iv 8.28–30, Diod. xiv 94.3 f.

¹³⁹ Diod. xiv 99.4 f., cf. Accame, o.c. 10.

¹⁴⁰ Xen. Hell. iv 8.30, Diod. xiv 99.4 f.

¹⁴¹ 28.5.

¹⁴² xiv 99.4.

¹⁴³ Thus Accame, o.c. 8, 129, 135, 137, 139. There is no support in the sources for the supposition (cf. Beloch, GG iii² 1, 91, Accame, o.c. 136, Sealey, o.c. 184) that Thrasybulus and Agyrrhius were personal or party rivals at this time. For more reasonable judgments cf. Treves, o.c. 134, Barbieri, o.c. 193, 209.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. IG ii² 24a. 3–6, b.5 f., 13; 28 (= Tod 114).7 f., 13–17, 22–5; xii 1. 977 (= Tod 110). 19–21.

¹⁴⁵ On the shortage of money at this time cf. Arist. Eccl. 823–9, 1006 f. The decree of Euripides was a recent measure intended to raise money; it is therefore generally held that the decrees dealing with salt and coinage (814–22) had the same purpose and were also recent. This is plausible but not quite certain. The point that all these decrees have in common is that the people later changed its mind and rescinded them; it is not necessary to suppose the additional link of a common object.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Lys. xxviii 5, xxix 2.

¹⁴⁷ Cf. Beloch, , Die attische Politik 127Google Scholar, GG iii² 1, 91, Schwahn, o.c. 574, Cloche, , REA, o.c. 189 ff.Google Scholar, Bizos, M., Lysias Discours (ed. Gernet-Bizos, ) ii 143 f.Google Scholar, Accame, o.c. 137.

¹⁴⁸ Lysias' attitude to Thrasybulus is ambivalent, cf. xxviii 8.

¹⁴⁹ xxviii 1. Cf. Dem. xix 180. It is of course possible that the chief prosecutor devoted the whole of a much longer speech to this theme, but such a speech would be gravely inconsistent with that of Lysias, and it might be supposed that prosecutors usually worked in greater harmony than is suggested by Ps.–Lys. vi 42.

¹⁵⁰ xxviii 11.

¹⁵¹ Hyp. iv 1, 7 f.

¹⁵² xxviii 2, cf. 4.

¹⁵³ xxviii 11.

¹⁵⁴ xxix 2. probably here means the affairs of the city, though elsewhere in the speech (8, 11) it refers to the money. Cf. xxix 14: Ergocles went out

¹⁵⁵ xxviii 4. It is surely implied that the people would have approved the actions of Thrasybulus if only they had been honestly and efficiently carried out.

¹⁵⁶ xxviii 5.

¹⁵⁷ xxviii 10.

¹⁵⁸ Cf. Arist. Eccl. 197 f.

¹⁵⁹ xxviii 3 f. Philocrates was not tried by the full assembly, and so the speech against him makes no direct appeal to trierarchs or eisphora-payers. Their sufferings are, however, exploited and contrasted with the profits made by Ergocles and company in a manner reminiscent of that adopted here (xxix 4, 9).

¹⁶⁰ xxviii 14.

¹⁶¹ Cf. Lys. ii 55, 63 f., xii 70, xiii 46, xviii 24 f., xxv 20, 32 f., xxx 18, Isoc. xv 316, Dem. x 45, xviii 99, 208, xxiv 5, 216, Ps.–Andoc. iv 1. If Thrasybulus was known for moderation in his dealings with the allies, he was an odd choice to lead such an expedition.

¹⁶² xxviii 15. Cf. Lys. xii 68, xviii 5, xxv 23, 33, xxvi 23, xxvii 3, xxxiv 3, 9, Andoc. iii 12, Dem. v 17, x 45, xviii 99, 208, xx 18, xxii 16, Ps.–Dem. xiii 16, Ps.–Andoc. iv 11 f., 19. The same view is implied by the denials at Isoc. xii 68 and Aesch. ii 74–7. Cf. Dem. xv 4.

¹⁶³ xxviii 5 f.

¹⁶⁴ The significance of Ergocles' third piece of advice, that Thrasybulus should marry the daughter of Seuthes, is less apparent, as it does not seem to allude to any sinister precedent; there is probably a reminiscence of Alcibiades' Thracian strongholds. Perhaps the fact that she was a king's daughter made her suitable for a would-be tyrant, whilst the fact that she was a barbarian might underline Lysias' fundamental point, that Ergocles and his friends had made themselves

¹⁶⁵ Cf. Xen Hell. i 1.35, iv 8.33, v 1.28.

¹⁶⁶ Cf. Lys. xii 68, xiii 14, 46, xiv 38 f., xviii 5, xxx 10, xxxiii 5, Andoc. iii 11 f., 31, 36, 39, cf. Dem. xx 68, xxii 12, xxiv 216.

¹⁶⁷ xxviii 11.

¹⁶⁸ xxviii 7, 11.

¹⁶⁹ Cf. Lys. xii 68–70, xiii 5 f., 14–16, xiv 38 f., xviii 5, Andoc. ii 27, Isoc. xii 114–18.

¹⁷⁰ xxviii 7, cf. 6.

¹⁷¹ For the link between sycophancy, democracy and its fall, cf. Lys. xxv 3, ig, 24, 27, 29, Isoc. viii 122 f., 133, xv 21, 23, 164, 300, 318.

¹⁷² xxviii 17.

¹⁷³ Xen. Hell. iv 8.31.

¹⁷⁴ Cf. Beloch, , Die attische Politik 127 f.Google Scholar, GG iii² 1, 91, Accame, o.c. 136, Sealey, o.c. 184; contra, Cloché, , REA, o.c. 187.Google Scholar Agyrrhius may have been general in preceding years and there is of course no question of direct competition between him and Thrasybulus.

¹⁷⁵ Xen. Hell. iv 8.31–4. We know nothing of the attitude of Thrasybulus to the indiscretions of Iphicrates at Corinth, pace Accame, o.c. 133. There may well have been a general reaction against Iphicrates' behaviour, and his reappearance at this time is more likely to be due to the shortage of competent generals than to the death of his supposed opponent Thrasybulus.

¹⁷⁶ Xen. Hell. iv 8.35.

¹⁷⁷ Cf. Cloché, , REA, o.c. 187.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁸ Cf. Xen. Hell. v 1.2, Arist. Plul. 174.

¹⁷⁹ Xen. Hell. v 1.5–9.

¹⁸⁰ Xen. Hell. v 1.26, IG ii² 29 (= Tod 116).6, 11–15.

¹⁸¹ Cf. Arist. Eccl. 248.

¹⁸² The speech belongs before the expedition of Chabrias in spring 387, probably early in 388, since Eunomus is called as a witness and was clearly still in favour at the time (Lys. xix 23, cf. 43); thus the trial is more likely to have been before he left for Aegina than after his unsuccessful return to Athens later in the year.

¹⁸³ Lys. xix 7.

¹⁸⁴ xix 13, 18.

¹⁸⁵ Cf. xix 11, 21 f., 29, 50.

¹⁸⁶ Diod. xiv 109.3, rejected by Grote, G., History of Greece viii 72 n. 2, ix 34 n. 1Google Scholar, who argues for 384. But the language of Lys. xxxiii 7 suggests that the war is still in progress. For the Asiatic Greeks to be under Persian domination presupposes only Cnidus, not the Peace, whilst a reference to Sparta as hegemon in 388, to which Grote takes exception, is acceptable when the object is to point out that she is disgracing her station. The prospect for Athens of a naval war against Sparta, Persia and Dionysius, which Ando-cides thought relevant as early as 391, fits perfectly the circumstances of 388.

¹⁸⁷ Lys. xxxiii 3.

¹⁸⁸ Cf. Lys. ii 57–9.

¹⁸⁹ xxxiii 4–9.

¹⁹⁰ IG ii² 28 = Tod 114.

¹⁹¹ Cf. Cloché, , REA, o.c. 185Google Scholar, Accame, o.c. 145.

¹⁹² Arist. Plut. 178.

¹⁹³ Xen. Hell. v 1.10 ff.

¹⁹⁴ IG ii² 21.2, 21 f.