Using unique daily fund-manager trade data, we examine the role of institutional trading in influencing firm performance. We show that short-horizon informed trading by multiple institutional investors effectively disciplines corporate management. Our focus is on short-term “swing” trades, sequences with three phases (e.g., buy-sell-buy). We find swing trades increase stock price informativeness, are profitable after costs, and improve market efficiency. This increase in stock price informativeness is associated with subsequent firm outperformance. Trades are most beneficial with optimal stock holdings that reflect the information acquisition incentives of investors as well as liquidity costs.

We study the effect of investor horizons on corporate behavior. We argue that longer investor horizons attenuate the effect of stock mispricing on corporate policies. Consistent with our argument, we find that when a firm is undervalued, greater long-term investor ownership is associated with more investment, more equity financing, and less payouts to shareholders. Our results do not appear to be explained by long-term investor self-selection, monitoring (corporate governance), or concentration (blockholdings). Our results are consistent with a version of market timing in which mispriced firms cater to the tastes of their short-term investors rather than their long-term investors.

We study the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the relationship between corporate governance and company performance. We consider 5 measures of corporate governance during the period 1998–2007. We find a significant negative relationship between board independence and operating performance during the pre-2002 period, but a positive and significant relationship during the post-2002 period. Our most important contribution is a proposal of a governance measure, namely, dollar ownership of the board members, that is simple, intuitive, less prone to measurement error, and not subject to the problem of weighting a multitude of governance provisions in constructing a governance index.

In this paper, we document that an application of a moving average timing strategy of technical analysis to portfolios sorted by volatility generates investment timing portfolios that substantially outperform the buy-and-hold strategy. For high-volatility portfolios, the abnormal returns, relative to the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and the Fama-French 3-factor models, are of great economic significance, and are greater than those from the well-known momentum strategy. Moreover, they cannot be explained by market timing ability, investor sentiment, default, and liquidity risks. Similar results also hold if the portfolios are sorted based on other proxies of information uncertainty.

The trading of securities on multiple markets raises the question of each market’s share in the discovery of the informationally efficient price. We exploit salient distributional features of multivariate financial price processes to uniquely determine these contributions, thereby resolving the main drawback of the widely used Hasbrouck (1995) methodology, which merely provides upper and lower bounds of a market’s information share. We show how tail dependence of price changes, which may emerge as a result of differences in market design, can be exploited to estimate unique information shares. Two empiricalapplications illustrate the practical use of the new methodology.

We use UK data to show that firms that sponsor a defined-benefit pension plan are less likely to be targeted in an acquisition and, conditional on an attempted takeover, they are less likely to be acquired. Our explanation is that the uncertainty in the value of pension liabilities is a source of risk for acquirers of the firm's shares, which works as a takeover deterrent. In support of this explanation we find that these same firms are more likely to use cash when acquiring other firms, and that the announcement of a cash acquisition is associated with positive announcement effects.

We study the value of stock liquidity in the market for corporate control and show that the target firm’s liquidity has an impact on the transaction itself and on the resulting merged entity. We use a sample of U.S. merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions (1987–2007) to show that acquiring a more liquid firm makes the stock of the acquirer more liquid. This has consequences for M&A activity and pricing. Public acquirers are more likely than private acquirers to acquire more liquid targets. Liquidity also translates into a greater likelihood of completing the deal and higher compensation for the target.

Asymmetric information models suggest that a borrower’s choice of debt maturity depends on its private information about its default probabilities, that is, borrowers with favorable information prefer short-term debt while those with unfavorable information prefer long-term debt. We test this implication by tracing the evolution of debt issuers’ default risk following debt issuances. We find that short-term debt issuance leads to a decline inborrowers’ asset volatility and an increase in their distance to default. The opposite is true for long-term debt issues. The results suggest that borrowers’ private information about their default risk is an important determinant of their debt maturity choices.

Theory suggests that controlling shareholders can influence firm value through both shared benefits creation and private benefits consumption. Using negotiated control-block transfers from 31 countries, we look beyond ownership concentration and investigate how controlling shareholder heterogeneity influences the relative importance of these two effects. We document that a control transfer precipitates positive firm outcomes particularly when the vendor has maintained control over an extended period and the acquirer displays a strong incentive to engage in restructuring. In such cases, we observe a sustained positive price reaction, more focused corporate investments, lower leverage, higher operating efficiency, and superior long-term performance.

This study examines the role that chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence plays in an explanation of international mergers and acquisitions during the period 2000–2006. Using a sample of CEOs of Fortune Global 500 firms over our sample period, we find that CEO overconfidence is related to a number of critical aspects of international merger activity. Overconfidence helps to explain the number of offers made by a CEO, the frequencies of nondiversifying and diversifying acquisitions, and the use of cash to finance a merger deal. Although overconfidence is an international phenomenon, it is most extensively observed in individuals heading firms headquartered in Christian countries that encourage individualism while de-emphasizing long-term orientation in their national cultures.

Material adverse change (MAC) clauses are a ubiquitous feature of acquisitions and exhibit substantial cross-sectional variation in the number and types of events that are excluded from being material adverse events (MAEs). MAEs are the underlying cause of 69% ofacquisition terminations and 80% of renegotiations. These renegotiations lead to substantial changes in the price offered to target shareholders. Acquisitions with fewer MAE exclusions are characterized by wider arbitrage spreads during the acquisition period and are associated with higher offer premiums. We conclude that MAC clauses have an economically important impact on the dynamics of corporate acquisitions.

Our objective in this paper is to examine whether one can use option-implied information to improve the selection of mean-variance portfolios with a large number of stocks, and to document which aspects of option-implied information are most useful to improve their out-of-sample performance. Portfolio performance is measured in terms of volatility, Sharpe ratio, and turnover. Our empirical evidence shows that using option-implied volatility helps to reduce portfolio volatility. Using option-implied correlation does not improve any of the metrics. Using option-implied volatility, risk premium, and skewness to adjust expected returns leads to a substantial improvement in the Sharpe ratio, even after prohibiting short sales and accounting for transaction costs.

We investigate the pricing of risk-neutral skewness in the stock options market by creating skewness assets comprised of two option positions (one long and one short) and a position in the underlying stock. The assets are created such that exposure to changes in the underlying stock price (delta), and exposure to changes in implied volatility (vega) are removed, isolating the effect of skewness. We find a strong negative relation between risk-neutral skewness and the skewness asset returns, consistent with a positive skewness preference. The returns are not explained by well-known market, size, book-to-market, momentum, short-term reversal, volatility, or option market factors.

The trading of shares of the same firm in multiple markets has become common over the last 30 years, but there is little empirical evidence on the extent to which investors actively exploit multimarket environments. We introduce a volume-based measure of multimarket trading to address this question. Analyzing a large set of cross-listed firms, we find higher multimarket trading among markets with similar designs and strong enforcement of insider trading laws and for firms with higher institutional ownership. These findings are important for firms evaluating the benefits of cross listing and for markets competing for order flow.

We show that contractual risk-taking incentives for chief executive officers (CEOs) increased at large U.S. commercial banks around 2000, when industry deregulation expanded these banks’ growth opportunities. Our econometric models indicate that CEOs responded positively to these incentives, especially at the larger banks best able to take advantage of these opportunities. Our results also suggest that bank boards responded to higher-than-average levels of risk by moderating CEO risk-taking incentives; however, this feedback effect is absent at the very largest banks with strong growth opportunities and a history of highly aggressive risk-taking incentives.

We study a sample of Form 13F filings where fund advisors seek confidential treatment for some or all of their 13(f)-reportable positions. Consistent with the hypothesis that managers seek confidentiality to protect proprietary information, we find that confidential positions earn positive and significant abnormal returns over the post-filing confidential period. We also find that managers are more likely to seek confidential treatment of illiquid positions that are more susceptible to front-running. Overall, our analysis highlights important benefits of reduced disclosure that are relevant to the current policy debate on hedge fund transparency.

Factor models yield an R2 insignificantly different from 0 for one-third of hedge funds in a broad sample. These funds illustrate the concept of market neutrality and feature lower volatilities, higher Sharpe ratios, and higher alphas than other funds, indicating that they provide a successful alternative investment. However, large portfolios of zero-R2 funds contain fully half the volatility of portfolios of other funds, suggesting that they feature substantial systematic risk. Furthermore, these funds display an increased probability of failure even after controlling for idiosyncratic volatility. These results indicate the presence of an omitted factor that exposes investors to significant downside risk.

We examine the effects of nonmonetary benefits on overall executive compensation from the perspective of the living environment at the firm headquarters. Companies in polluted, high crime rate, or otherwise unpleasant locations pay higher compensation to their chief executive officers (CEOs) than companies located in more livable locations. This premium in pay for quality of life is stronger when firms face tougher competition in the managerial labor market, when the CEO is hired from outside, and when the CEO has short-term career concerns. Overall, the geographic desirability of the corporate headquarters is an effective substitute for CEO monetary pay.

We examine how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) affects pre-repurchase earnings management and its association with post-repurchase firm performance. Unlike prior pre-SOX studies, our post-SOX results indicate that open-market repurchasers do not engage in pre-buyback downward accrual-based earnings management. Audit committee independence, reforms in corporate governance structures, and changes in executives’ equity holdings prompted by SOX may explain the findings. Post-SOX, the significant negative association between pre-repurchase abnormal accruals and post-repurchase performance disappears, the market reaction to repurchase announcements becomes significantly less favorable, and there is no evidence of any shift away from accrual-based to real earnings management.

We identify large discontinuous changes, known as jumps, in daily stock prices and explore the role of jumps in cross-sectional stock return predictability. Our results show that small and illiquid stocks have higher jump returns to the extent that cross-sectional differences in jumps fully account for the size and illiquidity effects. Based on value-weighted portfolios, jumps also account for the value premium. On the other hand, jumps are not the cause of momentum or net share issue effects. The findings of our study shed new light on stock return dynamics and present challenges to conventional explanations of stock return predictability.