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Extraordinary Antitakeover Provisions and Insider Ownership Structure: The Case of Converting Savings and Loans

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2009

Glenn W. Boyle ,
Richard B. Carter  and
Roger D. Stover
Glenn W. Boyle
Affiliation:
University of Otago, Department of Finance and Quantitative Analysis, Dunedin, New Zealand
Richard B. Carter
Affiliation:
Iowa State University, College of Business Administration, Department of Finance, 386 Carver Hall, Ames, IA 50011-2063.
Roger D. Stover
Affiliation:
Iowa State University, College of Business Administration, Department of Finance, 386 Carver Hall, Ames, IA 50011-2063.
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Abstract

Insider ownership and antitakeover provisions both affect a firm's vulnerability to takeover, its value, and its managers' incentives and utility. We examine the simultaneous determination of insider ownership and takeover protection using data from mutual savings and loan associations converting to stock form. At low levels of insider ownership, we find that ownership is negatively related to the number of extraordinary antitakeover provisions; at higher levels, ownership is not related to the number of antitakeover provisions. These results are consistent with insider entrenchment.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , Volume 33 , Issue 2 , June 1998 , pp. 291 - 304
Copyright
Copyright © School of Business Administration, University of Washington 1998

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