This address considers the role of culture in economic history. It argues that AngloSaxon culture was an important factor determining where and when industrialization began and spread. The contrast between Anglo-Saxon individualism and Japan’s more collective culture also is important in understanding the differences between Japanese and American industrial practices today. I predict that Japan’s collective culture may give it an economic edge in the coming years despite its current difficulties. And I advocate greater attention to culture by both economists and historians in the practice of economic history.

The greater flexibility associated with workers being able to choose the time and circumstance of their work allowed cottage manufacture to compete with technically more productive manufactories by rendering it more effective at harnessing a part time or offpeak workforce whose opportunity cost was low. Not only did this mean that cottage manufacture was better suited to the employment of women and children, who preferred flexibility in their hours and place of work, but also that the greater seasonality of labor supply in England led that economy to rely more on cottage manufacturing than did the United States during early industrialization.

A case study, a formal model, and an anaLysis of Census of Manufactures data support a conclusion that cost heterogeneity was a major source of the “compliance crisis” affecting a number of National Recovery Administration “codes of fair competition.” Key elements of the argument are assumptions that progressives at the NRA allowed majority coalitions of small, high-cost finns to impose codes in heterogeneous industries, and that these codes were designed by the high-cost firms under an ultimately erroneous belief that they would be enforced by the NRA.

The Near East was subject to many of the same fiscal and monetary forces that affected Europe and parts of Asia during the early modem era. For almost two decades during the seventeenth century, debased European coinage circulated widely in Ottoman markets at values far above their specie content. This article provides an explanation in terms of Ottoman fiscal deficits, currency instability, currency substitution, and decline in local silver mines all of which led to the closure of mints. The reasons behind the conspicuous absence of Ottoman copper coinage during this period are also explored.

The battle over gold is typically explained as driven by proinflation debtors. However, going off gold would also have caused a depreciation, raising tradable prices relative to nontradables prices and helping producers of exportable primary products. An analysis of Congressional votes on monetary legislation indicates that higher constituency debt levels were not associated with opposition to gold, whereas mining and agricultural production were. This suggests that gold politics was at least as much about the impact of the exchange rate on relative prices as it was about inflation of the overall price level.

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 imposed a binding minimum wage on the southern seamless hosiery and lumber industries. However, the process of adjusting to the new minimum differed across the two industries. Seamless hosiery firms substituted capital for labor and converted or replaced old machinery. Southern lumber firms employed fewer workers relative to northern and western firms, however, changes in their resource base and war-related government purchases prevented an absolute decrease in employment levels. Numerous southern lumber firms continued to pay less than minimum rates by illegally evading the act or taking advantage of the intra-stage exemption.

This article reviews Mancur Olson’s ideas concerning the impact of institutions on growth rates and national competitive performance. We suggest that Olson’s “ideal typical” methodology limits the usefulness of his approach and that institutional structures and strategies can be dependent variables. In comparing the performance of three European countries in the postwar period, we argue (contrary to strict Olsonian principles) that changing market and political environments helped to determine the kind of institutional forms that emerged. We question the weight that Olson places on the role of institutional structures and strategies on long-run economic performance.