¹ Unlike the major wars, the Mexican War and the Spanish-American War were chiefly significant, so far as enduring economic reactions are concerned, for the effects following the acquisition of substantial new territories. The economic results of the attainment of independence following the Revolution are omitted as being unique.

² Hersch, L., “The Demographic Effects of Modern Warfare,” in Inter-Parliamentary Union, What Would Be the Character of a New War?.(London, 1931), 274–314.Google Scholar

³ Ibid., 285.

⁴ Thompson, W. S. and Whelpton, P. K., Population Trends in the United States (New York, 1933), 1. The loss of some 100,000 Tories is to be remembered.Google Scholar

⁵ Livermore, T. L., Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America, 1861–65. 2d ed. (Boston, 1901).Google Scholar

⁶ L. C. Duncan, The Comparative Mortality of Disease and Battle Casualties in the Historic Wars of the World, n.p., n.d., 27–28.

⁷ W. S. Thompson and P. K. Whelpton, 303. To the extent that immigrants prevented from coming because of war-caused conditions simply postponed coming to the next decade the loss is exaggerated. This also applies to the formula used above in estimating losses.

⁸ The formula used results in a substantial reduction of this figure because of immigration restrictions in the 1920's.

⁹ Thompson and Whelpton, 266.

¹⁰ Mendershausen, H., The Economics of War, rev. ed. (New York, 1943), 321 and chart opposite 363.Google Scholar

¹¹ Ayres, L. P., The War With Germany (Washington, 1919), 124Google Scholar. See also Ashburn, P. M., The History of the Medical Department of the United States Army (Boston, 1939Google Scholar); and L. Hersch, “The Demographic Effects of Modern Warfare.” The loss from disease in the Spanish-American War was a notorious exception to the general decline.

¹² New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931.

¹³ Ibid., 175.

¹⁴ Among various corrections that might be added that for changes in the price level may be noted. The destruction of durable goods used for civilian purposes has been relatively small in American wars.

¹⁵ It is quite probable that a period of falling prices exerts the greatest pressure to introduce more efficient methods of production. In times of war the pressure of competition is greatly reduced and speed in production is likely to be more stressed than lowered costs.

¹⁶ Administrator of Veterans Affairs, Annual Report for 1942 (Washington, 1942).Google Scholar

¹⁷ J. M. Clark suggests that the peak of pension outlay for the World War may be reached at an earlier date. The Cost of the World War to the American People, 198.

¹⁸ Wright, C. W., An Economic History of the United States (New York, 1941), 707.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Since defense needs rather than economic objectives gave the chief impetus to the construction of the Panama canal its enduring reactions on the location of industry and trade might be listed here.

²⁰ The chief effect here would arise from whatever portion of the protective system can be attributed to war. In more recent years the high income tax rates may have checked both individual initiative and corporate enterprise.

²¹ A series of useful graphs and some discussion of the impact of war on business activity in American history can be found in Silberling, N. J., The Dynamics of Business (New York, 1943), chap. iv.Google Scholar

²² For a discussion of the possible reactions after the present war see Lester, R. A., “The Effects of the War on Wages and Hours,” in The American Economic Review; 1943, Vol. 33, Supplement, 227–37.Google Scholar

²³ Though we know that recent wars have tended immediately to draw workers to the cities from rural areas and women into gainful employment the census returns do not clearly show any enduring results, or else they were counteracted by other forces, though the World War led to an enduring migration of Negroes to the North. The percentage of females 10 years of age and over gainfully employed was lower in 1920 than in 1910 or 1930. The rate of increase in the percentage of the population living in places of 8,000 or more inhabitants was nil in the decade 1810–1820, and in the decade 1910–1920 it was lower than in the preceding or following decades. The rate for 1860–1870 was a trifle above that for 1850–1860 and much above that for the succeeding decade.

²⁴ See Jameson, J. F., The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement (Princeton, 1926)Google Scholar; Fite, E. D., Social and Industrial Conditions in the North During the Civil War (New York, 1910)Google Scholar; and certain articles in Clarkson, J. D. and Cochran, T. C., eds., War as a Social Institution (New York, 1941).Google Scholar

²⁵ J. M. Clark, 223. See chap, xiv for a detailed analysis of the factors involved.

²⁶ Kuznets, S., National Income and Its Composition, 1919–1938 (New York, 1941), I, 137.Google Scholar

²⁷ It should be added that, due to age and sex differences, the productive capacity of those meeting with accidents would average below that of war casualties.

²⁸ The correction in the preceding footnote would also apply to losses from influenza and lower immigration.

²⁹ The loss from this cause in the case of the Civil War was probably greater relative to the national income of the period.

³⁰ Logically there should be added to the loss of labor power due to war most of that arising in peace-time from the diversion of productive man power into the armed forces or military training. As compared with the substantial burden this has involved in many European countries the loss in the United States has been so slight that it is ignored. See Hirst, F. W., The Political Economy of War (London 1915), chap. iv. J. M. Clark raises the question whether the loss of immigrants caused by the World War can be considered an economic loss. The Costs, 186, 208–216.Google Scholar

³¹ National Income, I, 269.

³² Theoretically there should be an addition made up by the interest earned on whatever might be saved out of the larger national income that would have accrued without the losses of capital and population growth. Compounded over the years this would make a substantial absolute sum but small relative to the increasing national income.

³³ The Office of War Information recently estimated that 20,000,000 people were suffering because of relatively fixed sources of income in the face of the rising cost of living.