2 This latter influence being due considerably to his collegiality with prominent neuroscientist and Anglican Priest, Professor Alasdair Coles.

3 And as has been highlighted by the Covid-19 pandemic, material online is now just as influential for the proliferation of ideas as writing in physical print (if not more influential).

4 Of course, the reverse is also true, that one’s views of personhood, eschatology, mind-body relation and ethics mutually affect one’s position on theological anthropology.

5 As well as the traffic to their (now) online lectures (lectures to be examined in the main text below), the lecture of Wright in particular has drawn the attention of scholarly journals such as Philosophia Christi and the Heythrop Journal. Cf. S. Goetz, ‘Is N.T. Wright Right about Substance Dualism?’, Philosophia Christi 14.1 (2012), pp. 183-92 and B.L. Rickabaugh, ‘Responding to N.T. Wright’s Rejection of the Soul’, Heythrop Journal 59.2 (2018), pp. 201-20. In addition, it has attracted the interest of ‘ClosertoTruth’ – a highly respected broadcast and digital media that proliferates the ideas of world-renowned scholars to academic and popular audiences alike (see specifically the recently broadcasted interview with Wright entitled ‘Theological Anthropology: What Is Human Mind?’ Available at: https://www.closertotruth.com/series/theological-anthropology-what-human-mind#video-58154 [accessed 8 July 2021] – an interview in which Wright reiterates much of what he originally expressed in his lecture on theological anthropology [to be expounded and analysed below]).

6 N.T. Wright, ‘Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body: All for One and One for All, Reflections on Paul’s Anthropology in his Complex Contexts’, paper given at the Society of Christian Philosophers’ Regional Meeting, Fordham University, 18 March 2011, available at: http://ntwrightpage.com/Wright_SCP_MindSpiritSoulBody.htm (accessed 13 December 2018).

7 M.B. Thompson, original (solo) lecture given as ‘The “Soul” in the New Testament’, 29 November 2015 (available at: http://downloads.sms.cam.ac.uk/2166546/2166551.m4v) but developed more fully, and then given in partnership with A. Coles, as ‘Neuroscience, the Bible and Soul’, 29 April 2017, available at: http://downloads.sms.cam.ac.uk/2477706/2477711.m4v (accessed 13 December 2018), lectures given at the Faraday Institute for Science and Religion, University of Cambridge.

8 Anthropologically, Plato argued that a man (Plato using the term in the gender-inclusive sense) is a material being, governed by his ‘soul’ (a term having no religious connotations in Plato, it simply meaning a being’s ‘principle of life’). In contrast to the souls of other living beings, Plato viewed a man’s soul as different because of its rational capacity and ability to understand the world of the ‘Forms’ – a world man really understands before having been taught them (needing only a guiding teacher to help him realize them). He deduced from this the soul’s having known the Forms before human (bodily) birth (Meno, 82b-86b), hence concluding a soul’s being pre-existent and being one of the (eternal) Forms (Phaedo, 81c-d). Being one of these pre-existent Forms, the soul functions at its best and fullest when not confined by its body. The material body contains, restricts, and indeed stifles the soul, which functions at its best when freed from (the prison of) its body.

9 As Wright is so keen to affirm, ‘…the central message of the New Testament … isn’t that we [have a “soul” which needs “saving”, and] are to escape the world and go to heaven, but rather that God’s sovereign saving rule would come to birth “on earth as it is in heaven”’ (Wright, ‘Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body’, p. 2). Wright’s crusade against Christian Platonic soteriology and anthropology is particularly prominent in his book Surprised by Hope (London: SPCK, 2007), but is a message he has been preaching throughout his career. While not being quite such a theological motto for Thompson, he brings a different colour to the emphasis in stating that ‘saving souls’ (e.g. as used in the book of James) can simply mean ‘to make you well’; and ‘salvation’ in the Old Testament means not ‘going to heaven’ but rather ‘being saved from death’ – salvation being closely connected with the concept of shalom/real prosperity (M.B. Thompson, ‘Neuroscience, the Bible, and the Soul’, mins 18.55-19.58).

10 Descartes’ view (or the view classically associated with his name [whether he actually believed the ‘Classic Cartesian’ view is a question for elsewhere]) arose from his rationalist conviction and first principles of knowledge, viewing rational knowledge as the purest way of knowing, with knowledge gained through empirical perception being a secondary and less certain basis of knowledge (in reliance on the use of the body for acquiring such knowledge). In light of this conviction, and famous ‘I think therefore I am’ dictum, it was not a far step for him then to consider the mind as a ‘thinking substance’ and a substance distinct from, and separate to, the body. In Descartes’ view, this thinking substance (the immaterial mind/soul) did the work of pure rational thought (such as doubting, affirming, understanding, willing, denying, imagining) but for secondary and less pure modes of knowledge (such as memory and sense-perception), the soul needed the body. He thought that interaction between this soul/mind and its body occurred in the pineal gland, a tiny gland in the brain which he viewed as significant in playing a role in bodily causation (as well as in the secondary modes of knowing). While this pineal gland of ‘interaction’ was later shown to be a fundamental mistake of biology (science revealing it in fact to be an endocrine organ – one producing the hormone melatonin), it gained his position the title: a (substance) dualist ‘interactionist’ view – the soul/mind interacting with its body. But while affirming such interaction, in the Cartesian view, the highest mental functions are carried out purely by the soul, whereas lesser mental functions and more physical functions are carried out by the body.

11 It is easy to see why such thinking appeals to the Christian Cambridge neuroscientist, Professor A. Coles. He and Thompson in fact joined together for the second of Thompson’s lectures at the Cambridge Faraday Institute’s forum, mutually affirming one another’s insights into their respective disciplines of neuroscience and biblical studies while rejecting what they regard as the standard conception of an immaterial soul.

12 Thompson, ‘Neuroscience, the Bible and the Soul’ (mins 7.30-8.25).

13 Thompson, ‘Neuroscience, the Bible and the Soul’ (mins 16.05-20).

14 Wright, ‘Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body’, p.6.

15 Specifically, the early Augustine is pointed to as having been influenced in this way (Augustine’s theology developing in his subsequent years where such thought was modified and honed).

16 The pronoun ‘her’ has been used here to convey a clearer meaning in the sentence’s grammar. In accordance with traditional anthropological terminology, Augustine would have commonly used the pronoun ‘his’ – in the inclusive sense of the term – to denote a ‘man’ (in the singular sense of ‘mankind’). While a long-held practice throughout history, current anthropology tends to prefer the term ‘humanity’ instead of ‘mankind’ but leaving scholars with the problem of having no associated pronoun to employ. To avoid, therefore, the cumbersome use of ‘his/her’ or ‘their’ throughout the article, when speaking of ‘a human’, ‘humanity’ or ‘a (human) person’, in the instances where it arises, the pronoun ‘her’ will continue to be used – while recognizing that ‘his’ in such instances would be likewise entirely appropriate.

17 A fuller understanding of Plato’s anthropology is beneficial for understanding why biblical scholars are averse to its influence. Plato actually viewed the human soul as being tripartite, the top part being the logistikon – the reasoning part of the soul, the bottom part being the epithumetikon – the part responsible for the bodily desires, and the middle part being the thumoeides – what Plato calls the ‘spirit’ part (i.e. the part representing the passions, such as anger, shame, ambition). For him, the rational aspect of the human soul is always trying to control the ‘spirit’ and bodily desires parts. The example commonly given to illustrate Plato’s view is the instance of seeing a beautiful person; when doing so, the reasoning part of a human soul is filled with wonder at the person’s beauty, the bodily aspect wants to move forward to suggest the pleasures of sex to that person, but the spirit part recognizes the shame that would bring (so the spirit, though not as dignified as the reason, helps it keep the bodily desires in check) (Phaedrus, 253d-257b). A human being needs all three, but reason must dominate, and when this happens, then well-being results for the person. Although all three aspects are part of the soul, (what contemporary theologians and philosophers would call) the ‘soul’ of this soul is really the logistikon. This, while in a material body, is hindered from fully searching for truth – Plato being famous for describing the soul as imprisoned in the body. So, on this view, the reasonable soul is seeking freedom from the confines of the body, in order to return to the forms (but being eternal, will then end up being reincarnated in another earthly form, until it has led a suitably philosophic life, at which point it is able to fully jettison thumoeides and epithumetikon, and never come back to earth – remaining with the forms forever). Although the mature Plato moved beyond this position outlined, this is the view entailed in the legacy of Platonism. As is clear, this view is very stark in its denigrating of the body, viewing it as part of the evil material world, and so such a view puts forward an unhelpful dualism that sees the soul at odds with the body in the human. It is additionally unhelpful for Christian theology because of its ‘eschatology’, being in discord with Scripture’s emphasis on personal (as part of the corporate) resurrection at the eschaton.

18 Passages such as the following are cited as examples of Calvin’s imbibing this Platonic import: ‘Indeed, from Scripture we have already taught that the soul is an incorporeal substance; now we must add that, although properly it is not spatially limited, still, set in the body, it dwells there as in a house; not only that it may animate all its parts and render its organs fit and useful for their actions, but also that it may hold the first place in ruling man’s life, not alone with respect to the duties of his earthly life, but at the same time to arouse him to honour God.’ J. Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion (trans. F.L. Battles; Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), I.xv.6, p. 192.

19 See, for instance, the Anglican post-communion prayer – a liturgical example of an anthropology espousing a dualism of body and soul. The congregation pray ‘Almighty God, we thank you for feeding us with the body and blood of your Son Jesus Christ. Through him, we offer you our souls and bodies to be a living sacrifice…’ Church of England, Common Worship: Services and Prayers for the Church of England (London: Church House Publishing, 2000) (the same anthropology as articulated in the original Book of Common Prayer).

20 H. Wheeler Robinson, The Christian Doctrine of Man (Edinburgh: Clark, 1911), p. 69.

21 R. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1951-55), 1:194.

22 While dualism has historically been the dominant anthropology, it has had different manifestations through Church history, ranging from holistic dualism in the early Church Fathers (e.g. Irenaeus), through Augustinian forms in the fourth and following centuries, through to Thomistic dualism in the medieval period, through Cartesian dualism in the modern period, to the holistic dualism again of Wheeler Robinson. Dualism in some variety was the dominant view of constitution throughout the history of the Church. However, there was always a minority tradition that instead advanced trichotomy, a view affirming that a human is a ‘body, soul and spirit’. While not a topic explored in this article, a helpful analysis and critique of this view is given in Berkhof’s comprehensive review; L. Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1939), pp. 191-94.

23 O. Cullmann, ‘Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead: The Witness of the New Testament’ (1955 lectures), first published as “Unsterblichkeit der Seele und Auferstehung der Toten” Theologische Zeitschrift (1956).

24 The terms ‘holistic’ and ‘monistic’, for many, came (and have come) to be understood as meaning the same thing (though as the rest of the article displays, that equation is unfortunately fallacious [cf. n. 51]).

25 Jewett’s study concluded it is actually the kardia (not soma) that is more like the ‘I’ in Paul; R. Jewett, Paul’s Anthropological Terms: A Study of Their Use in Conflict Settings (Arbeiten zur Geschichte des antiken Judentums und des Urchristentums 10; Leiden: Brill, 1971). Gundry concluded his study confirming that soma in fact refers to the physical aspect of man in Paul; R.H. Gundry, Soma in Biblical Theology with Emphasis on Pauline Anthropology (Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series 19; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

26 J. Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), pp. 54-78.

27 ‘Constitutional’ here meaning ‘what constitutes [makes up]’ (a human).

28 Cf. the compendium edited by W.S. Brown, N. Murphy and H.N. Malony, Whatever Happened to the Soul?: Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998) and J.B. Green, What about the Soul? Neuroscience and Christian Anthropology (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2004).

29 J.B. Green, ‘On Doing Without a Soul: A New Testament Perspective’, paper given at Biola University’s Conference ‘Neuroscience and the Soul’, July 2013, available at: https://cct.biola.edu/on-doing-without-a-soul-a-new-testament-perspective/ (accessed 8 July 2021).

30 Of the other appearances of psuche, he sees the best translation as being ‘soul’ in 33 of those instances (but usually as a direct translation of nephesh from an OT citation), as ‘one/person’ in 10 instances, ‘I/you/us’ in 7, ‘self’ in 3, and ‘being’, ‘mind’, ‘heart’, ‘spirit’ in 4 individual instances.

31 Wright helpfully identifies that the word ‘dualism’ has been used in numerous ways in theology. He cites ten (though as will be seen, his category 1 needs augmenting, with letter ‘g’ needing further clarification).

Category 1 – those dualisms/dualities that would be at home within ancient Jewish thought:

a. A heavenly duality: not only God exists, but also angels and perhaps other heavenly beings;

b. A theological or cosmological duality between God and the world, the creator and the creature;

c. A moral duality between good and evil;

d. An eschatological duality between the present age and the age to come;

Category 2 – those dualisms that would not be at home within ancient Jewish thought:

e. A theological or moral dualism in which a good god or gods are ranged, equal and opposite, against a bad god or gods;

f. A cosmological dualism, a la Plato, in which the world of space, time and matter is radically inferior to the noumenal world; this would include, perhaps, dualisms of form and matter, essence and appearance, spiritual and material, and (in a Platonic sense) heavenly/earthly (something like this characterising the thought of Philo);

g. An anthropological dualism which postulates a radical twofoldness of soul and body or spirit and body (again, familiar in Philo);

Category 3 – three other dualities that might possibly be at home within ancient Jewish thought:

h. An epistemological duality between reason and revelation (though Wright comments that such a dualism may be problematic, since it is really the epistemological face of the cosmological dualism mentioned above);

i. A Sectarian duality in which the sons of light are ranged against the sons of darkness, as in Qumran;

j. A psychological duality in which the good inclination and the evil inclination seem to be locked in perpetual struggle, as in Rabbinic thought.

Wright, ‘Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body’, p. 4, originally penned in his The New Testament and the People of God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), pp. 253-54.

32 See, for instance, Wright, ‘Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body’, p. 12.

33 Wright, ‘Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body’, p. 15.

34 Specifically citing those of Bultmann, Cullmann and Dunn.

35 This is seen particularly in Wright’s own and other maxim (seen in the earlier footnote) – one of aversion to Platonism: ‘The central message of the New Testament isn’t that we are to escape the world and go to heaven, but rather that God’s sovereign rule would come to birth “on earth as in heaven”’ (e.g. Wright, ‘Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body’, p. 2).

36 D.A. Carson, ‘Systematic Theology and Biblical Theology’, in T.D. Alexander and B.S. Rosner (eds.), New Dictionary of Biblical Theology (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 2000), p. 89.

37 In Wright’s wider work, he often affirms that as God’s image bearers to the world, humans have been made to rule over, and sum up the praises of, creation – a telos finding its ultimate fulfilment in the person of Jesus Christ (cf. Wright, ‘Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body’, p. 12 [but is a phrase regularly heard in his popular books and preaching]).

38 Wright is fond of saying that philosophers are experts at focusing on issues in 2D, that theologians look at in 3D. His feeling is that were philosophers to look at their issues through the 3-dimensional lens that theologians do, they would find more resources for answering their questions than their 2-dimensional paradigms allow (cf. Wright, ‘Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body’, p. 15). This is possibly true and highlights the richness of theology, but a philosopher might potentially respond, with an analogy from cricket, that if fielding a ball proves difficult when it’s rolling along the ground, is the fielder more likely to catch it when it’s flying through the air?

39 Though these warnings are already heeded by most contemporary dualistic philosophers. Cf. J.W. Cooper, Body, Soul and Life Everlasting (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1989); J.P. Moreland and S. Rae, Body and Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis of Ethics (Downers Grove, IL: Inter Varsity Press, 2000); J. Farris, The Soul of Theological Anthropology (London: Routledge, 2018); J.J. Loose, A.J.L. Menuge and J.P. Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2018).

40 No responsible contemporary dualist advances an outdated Cartesian view – a view out of touch with the neuroscience. And only one (atypical) thinker attempts to build his view on Kantian idealism. On a similar line of critique, Wright’s ‘ten theological uses of “dualism”’ (a list that is otherwise very insightful) is categorically under-nourished, having no anthropological category for a biblical holistic dualism. His list portrays the view that any anthropological dualism postulates a division between soul and body (comparable to that of Plato or Philo [Wright, ‘Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body’, pp. 3-4]), whereas the responsible and best Christian dualisms advance not a ‘radical twofoldness’ (‘division’) between soul and body, but an integrated, holistic unity, like that espoused by Wheeler Robinson.

41 While in a theological and general sense, Scripture speaks of resurrection and re-creation synonymously, in a philosophical technical sense, there would be a difference between the two, as identified by the main text.

42 J. Locke, Essay II, xxvii, 1.

43 Green’s approach to the issue was not a rigorous conceptual engagement. Instead, it was a general New Testament reflection on the nature of ‘sin and freedom’. J.B. Green, Body, Soul and Human Life (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008), ch. 3. (Green admits in an earlier section of the book ‘…I make no promises that the biblical account I will narrate will be satisfying to contemporary philosophers…’ [p. 34]).

44 Thompson, ‘The “Soul” in the New Testament’, min 33.28–34.40.

45 Green, Body, Soul and Human Life, p. 46.

46 Distinguished from Systematic Theology, Philosophical Theology defined is ‘a matter of thinking about the … doctrines of the Christian faith from a philosophical perspective; it is a matter of employing the resources of philosophy to deepen our grasp and understanding of them.’ A. Plantinga “Christian Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century”, in S. Griffioen and B. Balk (eds.), Christian Philosophy at the Close of the Twentieth Century: Assessment and Perspective (Kampen: Uitgeverij Kok, 1995), p. 41; Cf. Crisp ‘[Philosophical theology is] the consideration of philosophical issues in particular theological traditions.’ O. Crisp, ‘Analytic Theology’, Expository Times 122.10 (2011), p. 471, or Wood, ‘Philosophical Theology uses the tools of philosophy to investigate the theological claims made by a specific religious tradition’. W. Wood, ‘Analytic Theology as a Way of Life’, Journal of Analytic Theology 2 (2014), p. 45.

47 Wright, ‘Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body’, p. 6. This statement is in contrast to Thompson’s ‘Paul couldn’t conceive of unembodied life’ (‘The “Soul” in the New Testament’, min 23.55).

48 Wright, ‘Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body’, p. 6.

49 This argument is made particularly clearly by J.W. Cooper, Body, Soul & Life Everlasting (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1989). While the following two paragraphs above are responding to Wright and Thompson, the arguments of these paragraphs are influenced by the thinking of Cooper (from pp. 55-66 and 94-178 respectively of the book Body, Soul & Life Everlasting).

50 The term used in Scripture, which appears in the plural in the OT passages in which it occurs, is the Hebrew word ‘rephaim’ (which is translated as ‘shades’).

51 It is common for advocates of monism either to ignore this passage or to defer to Bill Arnold as the monistic authority on the subject. In a chapter entitled ‘Soul-Searching Questions about 1 Samuel 28: Samuel’s Appearance at Endor and Christian Anthropology’ in What about the Soul: Neuroscience and Christian Anthropology (ed. J.B. Green; Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2004) Arnold states that this appearance of Samuel might have been a physically resuscitated appearance of Samuel (as opposed to being Samuel’s ghost/spirit) – asserting this as an alternative reading of the passage to the traditional view. He prefers this resuscitated view because he thinks it is more in line with the worldview of the Hebraic holistic OT, commenting ‘the socio-historical background of the text makes it unlikely that a disembodied “soul” of Samuel could be involved’ (p. 81). He follows this, later, with ‘Recent studies have admitted the Hebrew Bible’s purely physical perception of human personhood, acknowledging the impossibility of developing a Christian dualistic anthropology on the basis of these data’ (p. 83). But these statements make the (common) mistake of assuming that Hebrew holism equates to ontological monism. Once that false equation has been made, exegesis that follows is distorted, meaning Arnold feels there is no option other than the less convincing resuscitation view. But Hebrew functional holism is different to ontological monism, and either ontological monism or dualism are consistent with that functional holism. Cf. J.W. Cooper, Body, Soul and Life Everlasting (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1989). Once this category error is realized, then the ghostly/spirit (dualistic) reading re-commends itself as preferable to Arnold’s resuscitation view – the dualistic view being the more obvious and natural reading of the passage and the view affirmed more thoroughly in the history of interpretation.

52 Contra Thompson who claims the OT knows of nothing between the grave and final resurrection (‘Neuroscience, the Bible and the Soul’, mins 12.30-14.25). Further to the passages above, Steiner has contended that the verses of Ezek. 13.17-21 also give indications of Israel’s belief in disembodied existence after death. His interesting (while contentious) monograph argues that these verses in Ezekiel show an awareness in Israel (and a possible applying) of the practices of necromancy that were being carried out in the nations surrounding them (R.C. Steiner, The Nefesh in Israel and Kindred Spirits in the Ancient Near East, with an Appendix on the Katumuwa Inscription (Atlanta, GA: SBL Press, 2015).

53 Wright, ‘Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body’, pp. 7-8. Wright refers to his book The Resurrection of the Son of God (London: SPCK, and Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003) in the lecture, but such belief is also prominent in other writings such as Surprised by Hope (London: SPCK, 2007). (He also shows awareness of 2 Cor. 5.1-10 as a passage indicating the reality of an intermediate state [Wright, ‘Mind, Spirit, Soul, Body’, pp. 9-10]).

54 Thompson, ‘The “Soul” in the New Testament’, mins 21.27-23.26.

55 He states this first in relation to the Pauline passages and then in relation to all the others. Wright, ‘Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body’, p. 7.

56 Cf. the language used in Heb. 12.22-24 (particularly v.23b), to describe the people of God in the intermediate state.

57 W. Davies and D.C. Alison, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to Saint Matthew (London: A Continuum, 1991), p. 206.

58 D.A. Carson, Matthew: The Expositors Bible Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1984), pp. 254-55. Cf. C.A. Evans, Matthew (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 226.

59 D.L. Turner, Matthew (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008), p. 279.

60 G.R. Osborne, Matthew. I. Zondervan Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2010), p. 397. Because of its history in Platonic philosophy, the word ‘eternal’ (or ‘immortal’) can convey the wrong (and negative) overtones. A biblical theologian, for instance, may hear in this word ‘a ([philosophically] necessary) entity that has always existed, and will always exist forever (like the Platonic realm of Forms).’ But the more Christian theological sense (when referring to a human soul) would be to hear it as ‘a ([philosophically] contingent) entity (created and sustained in existence by God) that survives the death of the body, and – contingent on God’s grace – lives on forever into eternity (temporarily disembodied, then re-embodied at the resurrection)’.

61 R.T. France, The Gospel of Matthew (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007), p. 399.

62 France, The Gospel of Matthew, p. 399.

63 Wright, ‘Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body’, p. 8.

64 Wright, ‘Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body’, p. 8.

65 The verse assuring and warning that humans can only destroy the physical body, whereas God could destroy both body and soul in Gehenna.

66 Russell finds the usage of ‘soul’ in this sense in the books of Enoch, Psalms of Solomon, 2 Enoch, Testament of Abraham, 2 Baruch; and the usage of ‘spirit’ in this sense in 1 Enoch, Assumption of Moses, and 3 Baruch. D.S. Russell, The Message and Method of Jewish Apocalyptic (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1964), p. 151.

67 In continuance with the progressive revelation of the Old Testament (then developed through that of the Intertestamental period).

68 A phrase coined by Wright to refer to life in the (re)new(ed) creation.

69 The symbol ‘&’ here is used to connote a particularly close, integrated partnership of the soul and body in their (ordinarily) united functioning – the symbol expressing a closer intimacy of relation than the word ‘and’ might convey.

70 As well as those cited in n. 39, see for instance R. Swinburne’s (contemporary Cartesian) substance dualism in R. Swinburne, Mind, Brain and Free Will (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), the alternative substance dualist view of C. Taliaferro in his Consciousness and the Mind of God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), W. Hasker’s emergent dualism in his The Emergent Self (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), E. Stump’s Thomistic dualism (here termed dualist because of its being able to endorse the survival of the soul into the intermediate state) E. Stump, ‘Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism without Reductionism’, Faith and Philosophy 12 (1995), pp. 505-31 – to name but a few. See also W. Lycan’s ‘Giving Dualism its Due’, Australian Journal of Philosophy 87.4 (2009), pp. 551-63, a materialist philosopher’s acknowledgment of the lack of justification for the arguments given against a substance dualist position.

71 In response to the concern, then, that the writings of certain theologians through history might show hints of Platonic or (Classic) Cartesian dualisms – those colours then being inherited by subsequent traditions and liturgies – the following can be said. Even if the concern is valid (though in this current author’s mind, the claim is commonly over/mis-stated), it is unproblematic so long as the relation of body and soul espoused is biblically understood and the holistic unity of the body and soul upheld. Endorsing ‘body and soul’ anthropology does not commit receiving traditions to Platonic or Classic Cartesian assumptions, rather dualism can still be received with the holistic (soul-body) relation affirmed.

72 This being an issue particularly at the popular level. As seen above, the word ‘soul’ (and [to a slightly lesser extent] other terms – such as ‘heart’, ‘mind’, ‘flesh’, ‘spirit’, ‘body’ etc.) is (and are) used by a number of biblical authors in varying ways – with differing meanings. To denote a ‘one-size-fits-all’ understanding of the term(s), then, is often inadequate and (accidently) misleading.

73 The word Classic needs to be emphasized because contemporary versions of the view, which affirm the body, the neuroscience and advance a holistic understanding, are very much alive today, as seen in the works of Swinburne, Farris and Taliaferro cited earlier.

74 For instance, (alongside the topics highlighted above) the value of the body – with its associated theme of embodiment – continues to receive much focus and celebration in contemporary scholarly work and popular culture (the late/post-modern climate and influence encouraging this body/embodiment focus). The valuing likewise of the soul brings its own theological and missional benefits, offering further of potential interest to studies of human identity, consciousness, mental health and in addition provides the grounds for building a contemporary apologetic. (If constructed philosophically [and while still valuing the physical realm], such an apologetic can be built by presenting the [philosophical] evidence for the existence of the immaterial soul, so allowing the apologist to contend that reality is more than just physical. In thus undermining physicalism, the door is then opened for considering a world beyond the physical – the immaterial world of God and the spirits.)

75 I am grateful to my anonymous reviewers and to Kristi Mair, David Bennett and Ruth Holmes for their constructive comments on earlier versions of this paper.