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X. The Modern Indonesian Intelligentsia as Protagonist of Political Modernization

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 April 2010

Sartono Kartodirdjo
Affiliation:
Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta

Extract

Numerous writings on intellectuals as learned or professional middle class have been published since the sixties for the obvious reason that this social group played a central role in the struggle for independence from which they emerged as the new leaders or ralers of new nations. Furthermore, being protagonist of change the intelligentsia showed their pre-eminence in giving their society a modern shape. Those studies show clearly the striking similarities of the characteristics of the intelligentsia from various developing countries. Their emergence was closely related to the expansion of western education, their marginal socio-historical location created the propensity to protagonize modernization, their oppositional role was inherent in their being a counter-elite in the colonial power structure. More similarities or parallel development can be brought up in our comparative study between India and Indonesia by asking the following questions: (1) Within the frame-work of the colonial setting what kind of factors were at work in creating the intelligentsia; (2) To what extend did endogenous factors impede the mobility and dynamics of the intelligentsia; (3) Did the intelligentsia's social origin put constraints on their capacity to accommodate themselves to new situations; (4) In fulfilling their function as intellectuals did they succeed in playing their leadership role in the nationalist movement; (5) Which structural conduciveness was necessary in order to provide a leverage to antagonize the establishment; etc. What kind of political commitment one came across among the intelligentsia? Were new ideologies quite instrumental in endorsing the intelligentsia's political role? Did they succeed in realizing political modernization?

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Research Institute for History, Leiden University 1986

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References

Notes

1 See Shils, E, ‘The Intellectuals in the Political Development in New States’, inCrossRefGoogle ScholarKautsky, J H, Political Change in Under-developed Countries (New York 1962) 195234, alsoGoogle ScholarBenda, H J, ‘Non-western Intelligentsi's as Political Elite’, in Kautsky, Political Change, 235264,Google ScholarNiel, R van, The Emergence of the Modem Indonesian Elite (The Hague 1970),Google ScholarMisra, B, The Indian Middle Class (London 1961)Google Scholar

2 For good models of comparative studies, see eg Bendix, R, Nation Building and Citizenship (NewYork 1969)Google Scholar, also B Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (New York 1967)

3 For a general description of the period covered in this paper, see Wertheim, W F, Indonesian Society in Transition (The Hague 1956)Google Scholar

4 One instance of this rapid growth is the increase of the number of first schools, from 27 in 1899 to 83 in 1914, le an increase of 30096 within 15 years See Nasution, , The Development of a Public School System m Indonesia 1892-1920 (University of Wisconsin 1967) 108Google Scholar

5 The establishment of technical schools in chronological order Tender School (1854), Dokter Java School (1857), School for the Civil Service (1879), Institutes of Higher Learning came very late, I e in the twenties, the THS Bandung (1919), the RHS Jakarta (1924), the GHS Jakarta (1926), the Colleges for Agriculture and for the Arts, were founded in the late 1930s and early 1940s

6 See Table 1, from Nasution, The Development, 383 The increase of the number of Indonesian pupils at European schools was due to the fact that there was a strong tendency among the aristocracy to send their children to those schools because there was a bis influx from the lower classes to the Dutch Native Schools In 1900 there were 17, 025 Europeans and only 1, 615 Natives with primary education SeeFurnivall, J S, Netherlands India (Cambridge 1944) 370Google Scholar

7 See Table 2, from Nasution, The Development, 344 It shows a tendency of increase of the number of pupils from the lower ranking pnyayi The high-ranking pnyayis sent their children to European schools, cf Table 1

8 See Table 3, from Furnivall, Netherlands India, 377 Quite remarkable is the small number of university students The ratio between students of high schools, vocational schools and the University clearly indicates the restrictions imposed on education

9 By way of an illustration the following data will give an idea about the late start of technical education A technical school was opened in Surabaya in 1901, a second one also in Surabaya (1912), the third one in Yogyakarta (1917), then the fourth in Bandung (1920) See Furnivall, , Netherlands India, 371Google Scholar

10 It should be noted that due to the dual and restricted system of occupation and vocational training, since the late twenties there was a slowing down of vertical social mobility See Table 4

11 See Kartini, Lettersfrom ajavanese Princess (Kuala Lumpur 1976)

12 For a detailed study about Boedi Oetomo, seeNagazumi, A, The Dawn of Indonesian Nationalism (Tokyo 1972) Table 5 (p 136) shows clearly that Boedi Oetomo is a pnyayi associationGoogle Scholar

13 For an essay on PI, see Ingleson, J, Perhvmpunan Indonesia and the Indonesian Nationalist Movement (Cheltenham 1975)Google Scholar

14 Ibidem, 11-12

15 Mannheim, Cf K, Essays on the Sociology of Culture (London 1956)92170Google Scholar

16 See Ingleson, Perhimpunan Indonesia, 11–12

17 See Misra, , The Indian Middle Class, 333, 334, 336Google Scholar Cf Table 3 from Furnivall, Netherlands India, 377