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TEORIA DELLA SCELTA RAZIONALE E SCIENZA POLITICA: UN INCONTRO CON POCHI FRUTTI?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 July 2018

Donald P. Green  and
Ian Shapiro

Introduzione

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Dalla pubblicazione di Social Choice and Individual Values di Kenneth Arrow nel 1951, si è avuta un'esplosione dell'approccio rational choice negli studi di scienza politica. Negli anni Cinquanta e nei primi anni Sessanta, la teoria della scelta razionale rappresentava poco più di un ramo secondario all'interno di una disciplina – la scienza politica – dominata da varie forme di analisi behaviorista e istituzionalista. Oggi, di contro, essa si è diffusa ben oltre le sue prime pubblicazioni e i suoi esoterici adepti. È ben rappresentata nelle principali riviste e convegni della disciplina, e i suoi sostenitori sono richiesti da tutti i più importanti dipartimenti americani di scienza politica. La teoria della scelta razionale ha esteso il suo ambito di applicazione oltre la teoria politica e la politica americana, dapprima negli studi di relazioni internazionali e più di recente nella politica comparata. A dire il vero, quasi nessuna area della scienza politica è rimasta immune dalla sua influenza. Un conteggio degli articoli rational choice pubblicati dall'American Political Science Review dal 1952, presentato nella figura 1, attesta una crescita quanto-mai sostenuta. Invisibile nel 1952, a distanza di quarant'anni la scuola della scelta razionale annovera quindici articoli su quarantuno nella rivista di punta della disciplina.

Summary

Summary

Rational choice theory has expanded rapidly in political science, touching any area of research. Many perceive this growing success as a substantial improvement in the study of politics. In the authors’ view, however, the case has yet to be made that rational choice models have advanced the understanding of how politics works in the real world.

Type
SAGGI
Information
Italian Political Science Review / Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica , Volume 25 , Issue 1 , April 1995 , pp. 51 - 89
Copyright
Copyright © Societ Italiana di Scienza Politica 

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