War crimes are among the most serious crimes; that is why international courts and tribunals have jurisdiction to prosecute and punish them. However, serious though they are, it is not legitimate to punish them in such a way as to exceed the bounds of respect for human rights. The author considers that, when the perpetrators of war crimes are prosecuted and punished, criteria inherent to the rule of law like those applied by the European Court of Human Rights (such as legality and proportionality) must be met.

This article seeks to explore the reasons why sanctions for international humanitarian law (IHL) violations are so difficult to put into effect. Beyond the lack of willingness of states to do so for political reasons, some more technical aspects should be emphasized. The implementation of sanctions is too often seen solely through the prism of international law, without enough attention being paid to the complexity and diversity of municipal legal systems. The author puts forward the idea that efficiency starts with a clear sharing of competencies. Three main issues are discussed: first, the influence of the sharing of competencies within the state (between the judiciary, the executive and the legislature) on the implementation of sanctions; second, the broad interpretation of their powers by regional or international bodies in charge of monitoring and reviewing human rights protection; and, third, the creation of new or specific bodies in charge of dealing with and if necessary punishing gross violations of humanitarian law.

Transitional justice aims at once to restore victims' dignity, build confidence between warring groups and foster the institutional changes needed to bring about a new relationship within the population, in order to usher in the rule of law without endorsing practices that amount to total or partial impunity. In situations of post-conflict, however, governments are also faced with other pressing needs, such as disarming fighting forces, improving civilian security, compensating victims and relaunching the economy of a society in ruins. This article explores the relationship between these needs and transitional justice mechanisms, and critically evaluates their influence on the forms justice has taken in post-conflict situations.

Using the case of Morocco's Equity and Reconciliation Commission as an example, this article analyses how transitional justice is by definition the place where ethics and reasons of state, the will to see justice done and the balance of power meet. Therein lie both the strength and the ambiguity of transitional justice. The sanction-free approach adopted in the specific case of Morocco limited the Commission's effectiveness by not establishing the truth about past human rights violations or creating an environment conducive to greater democratic reform.

The participation of victims in criminal proceedings is generally a rather new phenomenon. While there is a certain tradition of victim participation as “partie civile” in the criminal proceedings of some national jurisdictions, it is a novelty in international criminal trials. The drafters of the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute chose to design a rather broad victim participation scheme. Although it is hailed as an important and effective instrument for giving victims of gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law a voice, the procedural and substantive details are far from being settled. Some of the most significant issues are discussed in this article, including the question whether and how victim participation may influence sentencing and punishment.

Despite the growing attention being paid to “victims” in the framework of criminal proceedings, this attention does not seem to be meeting their needs under either national criminal justice systems or the international regime. In the latter, the difficulties encountered by the victims are aggravated by factors specifically arising from the prosecution and punishment of mass crimes at international level. This has prompted the authors to point out that the prime purpose of criminal law is to convict or acquit the accused, and to suggest that the task of attending to the victims should perhaps be left to other entities.