Those who have been following international headlines for the past year can observe the increased prevalence of discussions on nuclear weapons, including between the United States and North Korea. In the margins of the discussions, the law and policy discussions around nuclear non-proliferation become very relevant. After all, the devastating humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons are very clear. “Studies have shown that the detonation of nuclear weapons would cause widespread death, injury and damage, especially if it occurred in or near a populated area.” There would be extensive casualties from severe burns and blunt force trauma that would occur in the moments after the detonation, as a result of blast effects and the release of thermal radiation. As such, most communities would not necessarily have the capacity to enact appropriate response mechanisms. “[A]ssessments undertaken by the ICRC have highlighted that there is a lack of capacity in most countries and at the international level to adequately respond to a nuclear detonation, and to provide assistance that would benefit a substantial portion of survivors in the aftermath.” Amid these considerations, the first-ever nuclear ban treaty, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (Treaty), was negotiated in the halls of the UN headquarters in New York. Before analyzing the Treaty itself, a word on how it came about and the legal framework that preceded it.

The 2000–2005 al Aqsa Intifada spawned a horrific wave of violence in and near Jerusalem. Numerous individuals and entities were sued in U.S. courts, by both foreign and American victims, relying on a variety of liability theories and statutes. The seminal Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) case was filed in 2007 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York as Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Organization. It also named the Palestinian Authority (PA) and individuals including Yasser Arafat.

On April 24, 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its opinion in Jesner v. Arab Bank. In only the third case in which the Supreme Court has considered the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) since its enactment in 1789, the Court held that foreign corporations may not be defendants in suits brought under the ATS. In foreclosing foreign corporate liability under the ATS, the Court limited the pool of possible ATS claims that can be brought. However, it left open the question of whether U.S. corporations could be sued under the ATS.

On May 11, 2018, the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Court) delivered a judgment against Mali concerning its Persons and Family Code (Family Code). This case is groundbreaking because it is the first time that the African Court has found violations of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol) and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (African Children's Charter).

Given the high number of international crimes, it is practically impossible to prosecute all potential perpetrators at the international level. Impunity gaps at the national level aggravate this situation since they practically turn the International Criminal Court (ICC) into the lone or at least most visible enforcer of international criminal law (ICL). Thus, the Court suffers from a situation and case overload that manifests itself at the level of preliminary examinations conducted by its Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) which, in turn, suffers from “overall basic size and capacity constraints.” This situation leaves the Court/the OTP no other choice than to deliver mere distributive (instead of retributive) criminal justice, where the main challenge is not so much the fair or just delivery of sanctions to individual defendants, but the fair distribution of justice to a selected number of suspects/perpetrators. Against this background the rational and transparent selection and prioritization of situations and cases turns out to be of utmost importance for the success and legitimacy of the Court.

On December 14, 2017, the International Criminal Court's (ICC) Assembly of States Parties (ASP or Assembly) adopted a resolution activating the ICC's jurisdiction over the crime of aggression as of July 17, 2018. As a result, the leaders of states now face the possibility of being held individually criminally responsible for unlawful acts of inter-state armed force. The resolution has thus rightly been hailed as historic—notwithstanding the significant limitation on the Court's jurisdiction accepted as the price of activation.

On December 5, 2017, the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers (Committee) issued an interim resolution concerning the European Court of Human Rights case of Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan. In this resolution, the Committee, for the first time ever, launched infringement proceedings against a member state of the European Convention of Human Rights (Convention).

On February 8, 2018, the U.K. Supreme Court delivered its judgment in R (Bancoult No 3) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. The case concerned a challenge to the validity of a Marine Protected Area (MPA) extending 250,000 square miles around the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT or Chagos Archipelago). Declared in 2010, the MPA was justified on the ground of environmental protection and resulted in a ban on all commercial fishing in this zone. The appellant alleged that the MPA had been established for an improper purpose—to prevent the Chagos Islanders from resettling the Archipelago. He claimed that this was evidenced by a diplomatic cable sent from the U.S. embassy in London. It recorded a 2009 meeting in which U.S. and British officials discussed the reasons behind the MPA. The cable was subsequently leaked via the WikiLeaks website and published in two national newspapers. Accordingly, as Lady Hale rightly observed, “[t]he crucial legal issue in this case is therefore the admissibility of the cable.”

On July 18, 2018, the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted a resolution on the crisis situation in Nicaragua, almost thirty-nine years after the date of the triumph of the Nicaraguan Revolution over the dictator Anastasio Somoza. The crisis started three months earlier, on April 18, 2018, unexpectedly, when pro-government groups violently crushed a protest demonstration against reforms to Nicaragua's social security system announced by President Daniel Ortega's wife, Rosario Murillo. The “reforms” increased the contributions to be paid by workers and pensioners and decreased their benefits, in order to shore up the failing social security system, widely seen as a source of discretionary funds abused by previous governments. Corruption was not unique with Ortega. Arnoldo Aleman, for example, a former president of Nicaragua (1997–2002), was convicted in 2003 of money laundering, fraud, embezzlement, and electoral crimes, and sentenced to twenty years in prison. The demonstrators against the social security reform resented paying for the state's mismanagement of the system. Subsequently, as the demonstrations increased, the protesters equated Ortega with Somoza and called for his departure as they had done for Somoza's. Since April 18, some 400 Nicaraguan demonstrators have been killed and over 2,000 have been injured.

In response to the large number of irregular migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea from Libya to southern Italy, frequently using overcrowded, unseaworthy vessels, and often facilitated by migrant smugglers, on October 9, 2015, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2240. This resolution authorizes member states to intercept, inspect, and seize vessels suspected of being used to smuggle migrants or to traffic persons. Initially limited to one year, these measures were renewed through two further UNSC resolutions on October 6, 2016, and October 5, 2017.

On May 24, 2017, the Security Council (Council) adopted Resolution 2354 on countering terrorist narratives, endorsing a proposal developed by its Counter-Terrorism Committee for a “Comprehensive international framework to counter terrorist narratives” (Comprehensive Framework). With this resolution, adopted unanimously by the Council and co-sponsored by close to sixty governments, the Council urged member states to implement the Framework in order to promote positive and credible alternatives to audiences receptive to extremist ideology.

On September 17, 2018, the International Criminal Court (ICC) Trial Chamber VII delivered its re-sentencing decision for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, and Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, following the ICC Appeals Chamber judgment that had reversed the initial sentences against the men in March 2018. The Chamber “sentenced M. Bemba to one year imprisonment and fined him EUR 300,000. M. Kilolo and M. Mangenda were sentenced each to a total of 11 months of imprisonment. M. Kilolo was also fined EUR 30,000.” Because of the time they had already spent in detention, the sentences were considered to have already been served and the fines were ordered to be paid within three months.