Scholars who have conducted research on the different peoples of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have, as a general rule, focused their studies on the process by which the various national minorities gained their independence from “Turkish” rule. To study this complex problem, historians of the Balkans and of Middle Eastern countries other than Turkey have selected a methodological framework which seeks to analyze the nature of the struggles that led to the eventual emergence of nation-states such as Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, and Syria.

Libya enjoyed steadily rising oil revenues after 1960 and became a significant member of the world's trading community. By 1980, oil revenues were over US $20 bn and these enabled development spending to approach US $10 bn per year as well as permitting large allocations to consumption, defence, and international ventures. The sums involved in the three sectors cannot be defined precisely as defence spending, and the cost of such military campaigns as the 1981 intervention in Chad are not available. Whether such data were precisely known or not, the spending options were limited to these three sectors, and trade-offs had to be made between them when financial resources became constrained. The first two sectors, development and consumption, were of great interest to the population in general, while defence and international ventures were of interest to the leadership as well as having appeal to that special constituency which populated the military establishment of the country.

The cultural heritage of any one nation constitutes its collective experience and memory. Passed down from generation to generation, it contains a multitude of institutions, beliefs, and values that continue to act on the minds of people and affect their behavior. As an expression of the national identity, it is usually very wary of sudden change and prefers undisturbed continuity, its legitimate aims being self-preservation and the very existence of the nation as a group. It has its own checks and balances to allow any dose of change when the need for such arises. By an intricate historical process, it develops its own principles of inclusion and exclusion so that any change accepted or any change rejected will not affect its capacity for continued life and growth, but will rather enhance it.

At a time when the history of relations between the United States and the former Iranian regime (as well as other autocratic states) is being reconsidered, it is important to recognize that U.S. support for one-man rule in Iran did not commence in 1953 subsequent to the fall of the government of Dr. Mossadegh. A study of the diplomatic records of the U.S. State Department and the British Foreign Office indicates an earlier beginning.

For a generation of scholars aware of the informal ways in which power is acquired and built up in the Middle East, yet dissatisfied with Western “institutional” approaches, Albert Hourani's insightful essay on the politics of notables has had a profound impact. Describing a form of politics that existed in the urban centers of the Ottoman empire, Hourani distinguishes between two political roles: that of governing, which belonged to the Ottoman authorities; and that of directing and mobilizing local opinion, which lay in the hands of certain urban grandees. grandees. These two kinds of power were interrelated. The grandees became truly influential only by having connections with the Ottoman authorities, who in turn needed them because of the social influence they possessed. When Ottoman power became weakened, or during interregnums, these notables came forward to form coalitions that were used to lead revolts and occasionally displace the ruling authority altogether. A politics of notables, therefore, exists when men possessing an independent source of power and access to the ruler are able to attain a measure of free action and so shape political activity.

Under the titular leadership of Ayatollah Khomaini, Iran is struggling to establish an Islamic republic. Such a system of government, based on an Islamic constitution and underpinned by Islamic laws which are “all-encompassing and complete,” is strongly believed by him and his followers to be the panacea for all the socioeconomic and political ills of Iran and, for that matter, the whole Islamic world.

The recent Iranian revolution has brought into light the question of the nature and significance of both the logic and the sociology of long-term social and economic development in that country. This subject is of considerable interest in its own right, but it is of even greater significance for a realistic understanding of the country's recent developments, its present situation, and its future prospects. For it was mainly the Jack of such an understanding and insight which led the vast majority of modern Iranian intellectuals and educated masses of all political and ideological persuasions to misconstrue the logic of the events since 1963, and fail to predict the form, content, and consequences of the recent revolution.

Defining the role of women in Islamic society has been an issue for debate in post-revolutionary Iran, particularly in light of recent rulings affecting women. This is not merely a theoretical debate but a crisis situation where some women who participated in the revolution alongside men now find themselves in a peculiarly difficult position in relation to society and the current government. Ali shariati (d. 1977), through his publihsed works and transcribed lectures during the 1960s and 1970s, has had a tremendous impact on the direction of this debate. Completely rejecting the role of women in both western and traditional societies, Shariati offers a third alternative: the figure of Fatima, daughter of the Prophet Mohammad and wife of Ali, the first Imam of the Shi'is as the personification of women's role.