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The Moral Justification of Religion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 November 2011

Ralph Barton Perry
Affiliation:
Harvard University

Extract

It is generally agreed that religion is either the paramount issue or the most serious obstacle to progress. To its devotees religion is of overwhelming importance; to unbelievers it is, in the phrasing of Burke, “superstitious folly, enthusiastical nonsense, and holy tyranny.” The difference between the friends and the enemies of religion may, I think, be resolved as follows. Religion recognizes some final arbitration of human destiny; it is a lively awareness of the fact that, while man proposes, it is only within certain narrow limits that he can dispose his own plans. His nicest adjustments and most ardent longings are overruled; he knows that until he can discount or conciliate that which commands his fortunes his condition is precarious and miserable. And through his eagerness to save himself he leaps to conclusions that are uncritical and premature. Irreligion, on the other hand, flourishes among those who are more snugly intrenched within the cities of man. It is a product of civilization. Comfortably housed as he is, and enjoying an artificial illumination behind drawn blinds, the irreligious man has the heart to criticize the hasty speculations and abject fear of those who stand without in the presence of the surrounding darkness. In other words, religion is perpetually on the exposed side of civilization, sensitive to the blasts that blow from the surrounding universe; while irreligion is in the lee of civilization, with enough remove from danger to foster a refined concern for logic and personal liberty. There is a sense, then, in which both religion and irreligion are to be justified. If religion is guilty of unreason, irreligion is guilty of apathy. For without doubt the situation of the individual man is broadly such as religion conceives it to be. There is nothing that he can build, nor any precaution that he can take, that weighs appreciably in the balance against the powers which decree good and ill fortune, catastrophe and triumph, life and death. Hence to be without fear is the part of folly. Behold, the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © President and Fellows of Harvard College 1909

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References

1 Munro and Sellery, Mediaeval Civilization, p. 69.

2 Fragments of Xenophanes. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 115.

3 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, i, 1021-28. Translation by Munro.

4 Isaiah 1 15–17.

5 Munro and Sellery, Mediaeval Civilization, pp. 80, 75.

6 Sayce, Babylonians and Assyrians, p. 253.

7 Wiedemann, Religion of the Ancient Egyptians, p. 250.

8 Cf., e.g., Epictetus, Discourses, chap. 8.

9 Hardy, The Dynasts, Part i, p. 5.

10 Davidson, A Rosary, p. 88.

11 James, Pragmatism, p. 144.

12 Chesterton, The Man who was Thursday, p. 278.