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Nominalism and the Problem of Meaning as Illustrated by Pierre D'Ailly on Predestination and Justification

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 August 2011

George Lindbeck
George Lindbeck
Affiliation:
Yale University
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Extract

It is difficult in our day to understand the appeal of late medieval nominalism for it seems almost schizophrenic in the way it alternates between opposing emphases. It looked at every theological problem from two radically different points of view: from the perspective of God's absolute power, and from the viewpoint of what he has in fact ordained. In the first context, nominalism relied completely on the power of philosophy and logic to define (though not to prove) omnipotence, and insisted on the radically individualistic isolation of man before a God of absolute and arbitrary power; but in the second context, these emphases are in effect reversed and stress is laid on fideism, the community and its authority, and, in the case of many nominalists, on the moral autonomy of man vis à vis God. Furthermore, the reconciliation of these contrary tendencies is primarily logical, or even verbal. Yet nominalism so captivated the minds of many theologians that they were quite content with what seems to us a purely external and artificial unity and consistency.

Type
Research Article
Information
Harvard Theological Review , Volume 52 , Issue 1 , January 1959 , pp. 43 - 60
Copyright
Copyright © President and Fellows of Harvard College 1959

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References

1 It would be more accurate to call this movement of thought “Ockhamism,” “terminism” (the usual medieval designation), or, as Ph. Boehner suggests, “realistic conceptualism” (“The Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham,” Traditio, IV, 1946, 307–335), for this so-called “nominalism” never asserted that universals are merely names, nor denied that universal concepts convey truthful knowledge of external reality.

2 A good summary statement of the objections to such a view is found in Gilson, E., La Philosophie au Moyen Age, Paris, 1947, p. 591.Google Scholar

3 A representative example of such an interpretation is that of Maurer, A., “Scotism and Ockhamism,” in A History of Philosophical Systems, ed. Ferm, V., New York, 1950, 212–226.Google Scholar

4 See especially studies by Moody, E. and Boehner, Ph. listed in “Ockham-Literatur 1919–1949,” Franziskanische Studien, XXXII (1950), 164–183.Google Scholar

5 Incidental references are to be found in various writers, but no extended studies. P. Vignaux paraphrases parts of Ailly's I Sent., q. 9, which deals in part with justification, but does not touch on his doctrine of predestination. See Vignaux, P., Luther, Commentateur des Sentences, Paris, 1935, 79–81, 98–99, 100–105.Google Scholar

6 In the preface to the second volume of the Opera of Luther, Wittenberg, 1546, Melancthon says of the Reformer, “Gabrielem et Cammeracensem [i.e., Ailly] pene ad verbum memoriter recitare poterat.” O. Scheel, Dokumente zu Luthers Entwicklung, 2 Aufl., Tübingen, 1929, text 532, p. 199, 1.37. Cf. H. Denifle, Luther und Luthertum in ersten Entwicklung, 2 Bd., Mayence, 1904, 501, 571, 589, etc.

7 ”La multiplicité des éditions de Pierre d'Ailly de 1484 à 1504 nous montre que … le Commentaire du Cardinal de Cambrai avait gardé jusqu'au début du XVIe siècle une véritable autorité” M. Patronnier de Gandillac, “Usage et valeur des arguments probables chez Pierre d'Ailly,” Archives d'Histoire doctrinale et Littéraire du M.-A., VIII, 1933, p. 44, fn. 1.

8 For the first two, see P. Vignaux, Justification et Prédestination au XIVe Siècle, and M. Schüler, Prädestination Sünde und Freiheit bei Gregor von Rimini, Stuttgart, 1934; for the last, C. Feckes, Die Rechfertigungslehre des Gabriel Biel und ihre Stellung innerhalb der nominalistischen Schüle, Münster, 1925.

9 On Ockham's “Pelagianism,” see P. Vignaux, Prédestination, etc. 123–127; on Gregory of Rimini, Ibid., 153–175.

10 Ockham, In primum librum Sententiarum, Lyon, 1495, d. 41, q. 1, C. E. Iserloh suggests that this passage, which speaks of the need for “auxilium divinum,” expresses an opinion which is not that of Ockham himself, Gnade und Eucharistie in der Philosophischen Theologie des Wilhelm von Ockham, Wiesbaden, 1956, pp. 120 f.

11 Pierre d'Ailly, Questiones super primum, tertium et quartam Sententiarum, Paris, 1491, lib. I, q. 12, a. i, fol. 176 E (henceforth cited as I Sent. q. 12, a. 1, 176 E): “… in peccatoribus precedit aliquid quo digni sint iustificatione, etc. Dicendum hoc dupliciter posse intelligi. Uno modo quod illud tale peccatores habeant a se: et sic est illud falsum. Alio modo quod illud habeant ex preveniente misericordia dei: et sic est illud verum.” Documentation of the previously mentioned views of Ailly is given below.

12 Scotus, John Duns, Commentaria Oxoniensia, ed. Garcia, M. F., Quaracchi, 1912, lib. I, d. 41, q.un., n. 11, p. 1257. Cf. Vignaux, Predestination, etc., 24 ff.Google Scholar

13 Art. XI, Affirmitiva, n. 4–14. Schaff, P., The Creeds of Christendom, New York, 1877, vol. III, 166–170.Google Scholar

14 Cf., e.g., Summa Theologica II–II, q. 109, a. 4.

15 Vansteenberghe, E., “Un ‘Programme de vie’ de la fin du moyen âge,” Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters (Beiträge z. Gesch. der Phil. u. Th. des Mittelalters, Supplementband III/2) Münster, 1935, 1231–1246.Google Scholar

16 I Sent., q. 9, a. 2, 139 G.

17 M. Patronnier de Gandillac, op. cit., 52, fn. 1.

18 I Sent., q. 9, a. 2, 142 C. “Vitare peccatum ex puris naturalibus potest dupliciter intelligi: uno modo ut per pura naturalia excludamus omnia dona infusa supernaturalia. Alio modo ut per hoc excludamus adjutorium supernaturale. Tune secundum hoc pono aliquas propositiones: Prima quod secundo modo nullus ex puris naturalibus potest aliquod peccatum vitare. Patet: quia esto quod Deus absolveret ipsum a debito habendi caritatem seu quodvis alium donum supernaturale tamen adhuc non potest ex suis puris naturalibus (idest ex se et sine adjutorio Dei supernaturali) peccata vitare sicut nee aliquid agere bene. Secunda est quod primo modo quis potest ex puris naturalibus quodlibet peccatum vitare. Patet: si Deus absolveret ipsum a debito habendi donum supernaturale. …” It will be observed that the discussion deals with uncorrupted nature, with nature before the fall into sin. Comparable differences between our three authors arise in reference to human nature after the fall, but they are not as clear cut, for Ockham admits that all men are obligated to have the supernatural gift of charity, which is by definition beyond purely natural power, and so his emphasis on human moral strength tends to be disguised.

19 For Gregory, see text quoted by Vignaux, Prédestination, etc., 157, fn. 2; for Ockham, Ibid., p. 124.

20 E.g., Summa Theologica, I, q. 13, a. 7; and Oxoniensia, op. cit.

21 Summa Theologica, I, q. 19, a. 2, ad 1; q. 14, a. 4, resp.

22 I Sent., q. 12, a. 2, 178 G. “Utrum deum velle aliquid alicui possit esse consequens alicuius vere causalis: Et videtur quod non, quia sicut deo nihil potest esse causa ut sit, ita nihil potest ei esse causa ut velit, cum in eo sit omnibus modis idem esse et velle.” Ibid., 179 B. “Utrum deum velle aliquid alicui possit esse consequens alicuius vere causalis si antecedens sit deum velle vel scire. … Et videtur quod non quia cum in actu divine voluntatis nulla sit omnino distinctio aut prioritas aut posterioritas sicut imaginatur Scotus, non apparet ratio quare ista sit: quia deus velit a ideo deus vult b, plusquam e converso.”

23 For the logically peculiar character of Thomist and Scotist discourse about God, see Gilson, E., Le Thomisme, 5° éd., Paris, 1948, 150–159Google Scholar; and Scot, Jean Duns, Paris, 1952, 228–254.Google Scholar

24 Ailly describes Ockham's position op. cit., 176 H. Cf. Vignaux, Prédestination, etc., 134–135.

25 Ailly, op. cit, 179 F.

26 Ibid. “Signant causam cognoscendi … cum connotatione cuiusdam prioritatis inferentis respectu illati secundum nostrum modum concipiendi.”

27 Ibid., 177 B-C. Cf. Vignaux, Prédestination, etc., 135–136.

28 Ibid., 175 A. Cf. Vignaux, Prédestination, etc., 165–170.

29 Ibid., 175 H, 176 C. Cf. Vignaux, Prédestination, etc., 172.

30 See infra, notes 32 and 35.

31 Ibid., 178 D. “Secundo notandum quod isti termini predestinatio et reprobatio possunt capi dupliciter. Uno modo activi, et sic supponunt pro divino velle. … Alio modo passive, et sic supponunt pro effectu voluntatis divine ita quod effectus predestinationis vel reprobationis primo modo dicte potest vocari predestinatio vel reprobatio alio modo.”

32 Ibid., E. “Capiendo predestinationem et reprobationem passive (scilicet pro tali effectu) potest concedi probabiliter quod ipsius esse aliqua causa sumendo causam improprie et large … quia de lege ordinata licet non ex natura rei tali merito posito sequit tale premium vel pena. Sic loquendo cuiuslibet reprobationis passive est aliqua causa (scilicet culpa) et alicuius predestinationis est aliqua causa sicut meritum vel gratia.”

33 Ibid. “Capiendo predestinationem et reprobationem active satis clarum est quod ipsius nulla esse vel esse potest causa.” 179 A. “Ideo sequitur quod deum velle punire non possit esse consequens in vera causali ad istud antecedens sortes peccavit vel peccabit. Et iste modum dicendi mihi videtur probabilis, et est tam contra Ockham quam contra Gregorium.”

34 Oxoniensia, op. cit.

35 Ailly, op. cit., 179 D. “Videret autem iste modus probabilis ex hoc quia ordinate volens finem et eaque sunt ad finem vult media ad finem propter finem. Et ideo licet deus non per prius velit finem quam ea que sunt ad finem quia non est in deo talis prioritas actuum nec talia instantia qualia imaginatur Scotus, etc. Tamen videbitur quod deus velit ea que sunt ad finem propter finem et per consequens minus bonum propter maius bonum. Aliter non esset ordinate volens. Igitur deus vult alicui gratiam et alia que sunt ad beatitudinem propter ipsam beatitudinem que est omnium finis. Et per consequens quia vult alicui gloriam vult ei gratiam.”

36 I.e., justice is simply that which God wills. Ibid., 176 C.

37 Ibid., 179 G-H. “Potest hec secundum regula poni quod deum velle aliquid vel intelligere potest esse consequens alicuius propositionis causalis vere.” For example, “quia res sunt future ideo deus prescit illas esse futuras, … quia sortes est finaliter peccabit ideo deus reprobat sortem (id est non vult sorti dare gloriam finalem) … quia sortes finaliter peccabit ideo damnabitur vel deus vult eum punire.”

38 Ibid., 179 D.

39 The best work on these aspects of nominalist thought is by Moody, E. A., The Logic of William of Ockham, New York, 1935.Google Scholar

40 See note 4, supra.

41 Moody, op. cit., 240 ff., 304, 310–311.

42 I Sent., q. 1, a. 1, 36 F. “Tertio conclusio est quod impossibile viatorem aliquid extrinsecum ab eo sensibile evidenter cognoscere esse evidentia simpliciter et absoluta, sed bene evidentia secundum quid et conditionata.” Ibid., 37 A. “Loquendo de evidentia secundum quid seu conditionata … quamvis talis apparentia possit esse ipsis obiectis non existentibus per potentiam dei absolutam tamen propter hoc non habemus rationabiliter dubitare. Nam ex hoc multa inconvenientia et absurda sequerentur.” Cf. M. Patronnier de Gandillac, op. cit., 68–72; and Meller, B., Studien zur Erkenntnislehre des Peter von Ailly, Freiburg, 1954, 126–135.Google Scholar

43 It should be noted that these logical advances were not exclusively the achievement of nominalists. See Boehner, Ph., Medieval Logic, Chicago, 1952Google Scholar; Moody, E. A., Truth and Consequence in Mediaeval Logic, Amsterdam, 1953.Google Scholar

44 The fullest reliable account of Ockham's position on these points is that of Hochstetter, E., Studien zur Metaphysik und Erkenntnislehre Wilhelms von Ockham, Berlin, 1927. It should be noted, however, that Pierre d'Ailly was apparently somewhat more skeptical than his teacher. Meller, op. cit., 110 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

45 Boehner, Ph., “Zu Ockhams Beweis der Existenz Gottes,” Franziskanische Studien, XXIII (1950), 50–69.Google Scholar

46 Systematic Theology, vol. I, Chicago (1951), 176–178.Google Scholar

47 “Science, Philosophy and Faith,” Science, Philosophy and Religion: Symposium, A, New York, 1941, 162–183.Google Scholar